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CHAPTER
THE PROBLEM:

I

SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The fundamental importance of ethnic nationalism is

attested by the recent resurgence of separatist movements
in some European countries and throughout Asia and Africa.

The optimism that accompanied the end of colonialism, with
the subsequent independence of the new states, has been

deflated by the growing antagonism between ethnic groups and
the existing multiethnic states.

Biafra and Bangladesh

*For a discussion of separatist movements throughout
the globe see, Walker Connor, "Self -De termination:
The New
Phase," World Politics . XX (October, 1967), pp. 30-35.
For more detailed case studies of separatist movements in
Southeast Asia, Wales, Scotland, Brittany, Quebec and Africa,
see:
Walker Connor, "Ethnology and the Peace of South
Asia," World Politics . XXII (October, 1969), pp. 51-56;
E. Hudson Davies, "Welsh Nationalism," Political Quarterly .
XXXIX (July- September, 1968), pp. 322-332; John E. Schwartz,
"The Scottish National Party:
Non-Violent Separatism and
Theories of Violence," World Politics . XXII (July, 1970),
pp. 496-517; J. E. S. Hayward, "From Functional Regionalism
The Battle of
to Functional Representation in France:
(March
Political
Studies
XVII
Brittany,"
.
1969), pp. 48-75;
Separatism,"
Western
"French
Canadian
Frank L. Wilson,
Erwin C.
(March,
116-132;
XX
Quarterly
.
Political
1967), pp.
Elites
Change:
Young
and
Values,
"Nationality,
Hargrove,
in French Canada," Comparative Politics . 2 (April, 1970),
pp. 473-499; All A. Mazrui, "Violent Contiguity and the
Politics of Retrlbalization in Africa," Journal of Internationa l
Affairs . 23 (1969); and William John Hanna, Judith Lynne
Hanna, "Influence and Influential in Two Urban-Centered
African Communities," Comparative Politics . 2 (October, 1969),
For a more theoretical discussion on the
pp. 17-40.
question of ethnicity and ethnic conflict see: Robert
Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of
A Theoretical Perspective," The American
Communalism:
Political Science Review . LXIV (December, 1970), pp. 1112-1130;
Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States:
Toward a Theory of Conflict," unpublished paper.

exemplify the moat recent dramatic caaea.

Ethnic natlonaliam

seems to be on the riae deaplte the fact that
much of the

early literature on political development and
nation-building
had emphaaized the centripetal, proceaa of "homogenization." 2
In view of the fact that "of the total 132 contemporary

states, only 12 (9.1%) can be aptly deacribed as essentially

homogeneous from an ethnic point of view," 3 it becomes
imperative that acholars re-examine and reconsider some of
the earlier assumptions and explanations regarding the

nature of political development and national integration.^
While much of the attention on national integration

ha8 focused on the "developing" countries, thi3 problem,

however, is not limited to Africa or Aaia, as witnesaed by
the recent nationalistic manifeatations of the Welsh, the

Scots, the Bretona, some Black Americans, 5 French Canadians,
2 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change:
Modernization, Development and Politics," Comparative Politics .
3 (April, 1971).
This article is an incisive discussion
of the literature on modernization and political development,

^Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?",
World Politics , 24 (April, 1972).

^Since the concept of integration has been used in a
variety of ways, throughout this study the concept of
political or national integration will be used in the following
"The process of bringing together culturally and
sense:
socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and
the establishment of national identity...." Myron Weiner,
"Pblitical Integration and Political Development,* in Jason
L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development
and Social Change . New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966,
p. 551.

5por a discussion of the question of ethnicity in an
urban setting see: Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
The M.I.T. Press,
Bevond the Melting Pot (Cambridge, Mass.:
19*0).

3

some Eastern European Countries and the Soviet
Union. 6
In this study of the Basques,

1

shall proceed to discuss

Basque nationalism by using some of the literature on

political development and nation-building as my point of
departure.

While the Basques may not be considered unique

in so far as ethnic nationalism is concerned, their socio-

economic situation exhibits marked differences from other

minority groups which have also made demands for some type
of political autonomy or independence.

Thus, they make an

appropriate case study which may suggest some theoretical
insight into the question of ethnic natxonalism.

And, more

Importantly, there has been no comprehensive study of

Basque nationalism.
The case of the Basques is one to which one cannot

attribute demands for autonomy to a lack of economic
development, economic neglect-

,

or economic exploitation.

In fact, within the Spanish society, they may be considered
a privileged group.

Within Spain, the Basque region is one

of the more economically developed areas.

Moreover, in

comparison with ethnic groups in Africa and Asia, the Basques
have been incorporated into two states--the Spanish and

6Brzezinski, for example, argues that "a very special
and particularly perplexing kind of dissent (within the
Soviet Union) is posed by Increasing restlessness among the
Soviet Union's non-Russian nations." He further not*** that
"the political significance of this phenomenon has largely
been ignored by American scholars of Soviet affairs."
Zblgniew Brzezinaki, Between Two Ages: America's Role in
The Viking Press, 1970), p.
the Technetronlc Era (New York:

French states—for centuries, and the
cultural differences
between them and the surrounding populations
are not
as

sharp as the differences that one might find
between groups
In some of the Afro-Asian states.
For centuries, there has
been contact between the Basques and the surrounding

populations.

As will be discussed below, according to some

Indices one would tend to think that the Basques had become

assimilated Into their respective states

-

France and Spain.

The emergence of the states of Africa and Asia as

independent political units gave rise to a vast and variegated
body of literature on what has come to be known as political

development, nation-building, and/or political integration.
7See»
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The
Politics of the Developing Areas . (Princeton, 1960; Gabriel
A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics:
A
Developmental Approach, (Boston, 1966): David E. Apter. The
PoUfocs of Modernization, (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press,
1967); David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom of Uganda: A
Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism . (Princeton. 1961)* Wlllard
A. Belling and
orge O. Totten (eds.), Developing Nations:
Quest f s p a Model , (New York, 1970); James S. Coleman and
Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., (eds.), Political Parties and National
Integration in Tropical Africa , (Berkeley. 1964); C.E. Black.
The Dynamics of Modernization . (New York:
Harper and Row
Publishers, 1966); Karl tf. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and
Political Development," The American Political Science Review .
55 (September 1961), pp. 493-514; Karl W. Deutsch and >/ lliam
Atherton i-ress,
J. Foltz (eds.), Natlon-Bulldlng . (New York:
Beacon
(Boston:
Nation
Emerson,
to
.
From Empire
1966); Rupert
Press, 1960); Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, (eds.),
Political Development and Social Change . (New York: John
Wiley and Sons. Inc., 1966); Philip E. Jacobs and James V.
Toscano, (eds.), The Integration of P olitical Communities.
(Philadelphia, 1966) Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner,
(eds.), Political Parties and Political Development.
( P^t^t-™^
IQfifiT; MurHn Sovmntir Lip«»t T The First New
The United States in Historic al and Comparative
Nation:
Perspective . (New York. 1963); Luclan Pye, (ed.),

5

Collectively, these concepts are at times used
under the
rubric of modernization. There occurred a
renewed interest
among political scientists in problems of
political
integration.

Since, in the words of Lucian Pye, "political

scientists were intellectually ill-prepared for the
collapse
of empires and the formation of new states, "8 scholars,

particularly American scholars, felt compelled to devise
models and postulate hypotheses which would help to explain
the process of national integration.

Many of these studies

were both of a descriptive and prescriptive nature.

In

devising models of the integrated political system, and
drawing from the European experience, students of political

development thus hoped that political leaders of the
"developing

11

societies would be able to abstract some guide

lines which would help them to implement policies to bring

about national unity or political integration.

Communications and Political Development , (Princeton, 1963):
Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development . (Boston, 1966);
Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), The Political
Modernization of Japan and Turkey . (Princeton, 1964);
Aristide R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration,"
The Journal of Modern African Studies . 5 (December, 1967)
pp. 449-467.
8 Lucian Pye, "The Formation of New States," in Ithiel
Toward
de Sola Pool (ed.), Contemporary Political Science:
Empirical Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 183.
9 As Walker Connor has pointed out, much of the literature
area assumes that a high degree of social engineering
this
in
Both Lucian Pye and Ithiel de Sola Pool take
is possible.
this view. The following quotation from Lucian Pye
"...the widely recognized problem
illustrates the point:
of creating political consensus in most of the new states
is in part one of building new and more universal means of

While the author realizes the difficulty
of classifying
all the literature on political development
and nationbulldlng In one capsule, he believes, however,
that underlying

much of this literature are certain broad assumptions,
sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, regarding
the
nature of political development. It is assumed, for
example,
that economic and technological changes will ultimately

eliminate sectional and ethnic differences, within a political
unit, with the attendant result of bringing about a more

politically cohesive society.

Secondly, there is the

assumption that political integration (integration of various
ethnic groups into a larger political whole) is a desirable
goal, and conversely, the assumption that cultural self-

assertion is somehow "backward" or, to use Aristide Zolberg's
words, to view the "persistence of distinct sub-national
identities. . .as quaint sports. . .or pathological cases if

they appear to be a source of recurrent conf llct."^

national communications and transportation so that all
segments of the society can become more closely involved
with each other.", Pye, op. clt. . p. 10. Also, Ithlel de
Sola Pool, "The Role of Communications in the Process of
Modernization and Technological Change," UNESCO Document .
SS/KAC/1960/18. Karl W. Deutsch also expresses the
"Too often men have
possibility for social engineering:
viewed language and nationality superficially as an accident,
In fact they are
or accepted them submissively as fate.
neither accident nor fate, but the outcome of a discernible
process; as soon as we begin to make the process visible,
we are beginning to change it." Nationalism and Social
An Inquiry Into the Foundat ions of Rationality.
Communications;
(Cambridge, 1966), p. 164.
10 Aristide R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration",
The Journal of Modern African Studies . 5 (December, 1967),
P. 451.

7

Consquently, in studies ostensibly dealing with
political
development and national integration, the phenomenon
of

ethnic nationalism has been in some cases completely

overlooked and in other cases has been given only peripheral

consideration or looked at as a negative variable to be

eventually overcome.

Instead much attention is paid to such

social processes as urbanization, industrial development,
the rate of literacy growth and the role of groups such as

the military, political parties or the bureaucracy.il

The

reason for this lack of concern with the ethnic issue stems
from the assumption— seemingly taken

fP¥*

granted— that the

process of modernization moves progressively and uni linearly
"toward an interdependence among politically organized

societies and toward an ultimate integration of societies."
It is even assumed that at some point societies will become

"so homogeneous as to be capable of forming a world state. "12

For some writers the key obstacle to national integration
is essentially one stemming from a lack of communications. 13

Hconnor, op,

cfrt,

l 2 Black, op. cit. . p. 155.
Also, A.F.K. Organski, The
Stages of Political Development (New Yorkj Knopf, 1965).

^Communications will be defined here in a very broad
sense, that is, anything that promotes contact, direct or
indirect, between the different groups of a given plural
society. These contacts may take the form of trade between
different regions, the movement of populations from a rural
setting to an urban setting and improved methods of transportation which may facilitate greater geographical mobility
For a discussion of the concept of
for a given population.
Kuper and M.G. Smith (eds.),
Leo
"plural society" see:
1960).
(Berkeley,
Pluralism in Africa

8

In Pye*s words:

re c<>8nized problem of creatine
*
,M5 h€ , widely
political
consensus in most of the new states!
rt
e
buildin « new
more universal
il-iU
2? °f communications,
means «5
of national
of establishing
more effective channels of communications
and
transportation so that all segments of the society
can become more closely involved with each
other.l*
Another writer, James Coleman, also emphasizes
the crucial
role of communications in the process of national

integrations

"the problem of integration and building

consensus in African territorial political systems is
largely a problem of developing patterns of communications." 15
The most systematic treatment of the role of

communications in the process of nation-building has been

given by Karl

W.

Deutsch in Nationalism and Social

Communications l 6 In this work he conceptualizes the political
A

*Pye, op. cit.. p. 10.

l-\james s. Coleman, "The Politics of Sub-Saharan
Africa," The Politics of the Developing Areas , p. 345.
Before proceeding any further, I should indicate
that the question of national integration is not a new one
within the social sciences. Both anthropologists and
sociologists have theorized on this question, but under a
different name, i.e., assimilation. But in contrast to
earlier works by anthropologists and sociologists, the more
recent works of political scientists have put greater stress
on the process of integration, as opposed to the mere
description of plural societies. In other words, it seems
that political scientists have been more concerned with the
dynamic processes of change. For works on assimilation and
plural societies sees Ronald Cohen and John Middieton (eds.),
From Trj.be to Nation (Scranton, Pa.s Chandler Publishing Co.,
1970); J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (London,
1948); Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New
Yorks Oxford University Preas T 1964)* M.G. Smith. The Plural
Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley, 1965JT

Deutsch, op. cit .

community in terms of a network of communications.

In

Deutsche functional definition of nationalism, what
counts
"is not the presence or absence of any
particular variables,

but the presence of sufficient communications
facilities. "17
In this work Professor Deutsch also devises an elaborate

model by which a series of quantitative tests would indicate
(if possible predict) the direction that a plural society

might take.

Are the peoples of a given political unit moving

further apart or are they coming closer together?

assimilation or differentiation taking place? 18

Is

According

to Profe ssor D^iftsch's model, we may be able to answer

these questions by observing the pattern of communications

and more economic activity," he says, "then people begin to

think of themselves as a country." 19
The process by which communications will be set in

motion has been defined by Deutsch as "social mobilization."
Social mobilization is the process by which "major clusters
17

ibid., p. 99.

l^Deutsch uses the concept of assimilation to denote
the process by which the members of a minority group
learn and accept the language of the dominant group of a
plural society. As used by Deutsch, the concept means more
than the mere process of learning a new language. It also
means that the population being assimilated is accepting a
new culture* "Assimilation in language and culture involves
the learning of many new habits, and the unlearning of many
old ones*" Nationalism and Social Communications , p. 125.
19

Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 6.

10

of old social, economic and psychological
committments are
eroded or broken and people become available
for new
patterns of socialization and behavior. "20
communications
then, is the by-product of socio-economic
processes.

Economic growth, and the corresponding social
changes that
go along with it, become very significant in
this process.
"Within any geographical setting, and any population,"
he

says, "economic and social and technological
developments

mobilize individuals for relatively more intense communications.'
It is assumed that political community will follow economic

development and the development of the communications
network.

"The rise of industrialism and the modern market

economy," offers "economic and psychological rewards for

successful group alignments to tense and insecure indi-

viduals. . .taught to hunger for success." 22

Once this process

is initiated, "the stage is set for the rise of the political

movement of modern nationalism— that is, for the effort to

convert the channels of culture into storm ladders for masses
of individuals to social and economic advancement.

2^

in

view of these statements one conjures up the image of the
20

Deutsch
"Social Mobilization and Political
Development," The American Political Science Review T 55
(September, 1961), pp. 493-514.
2 l jSationalism

22
2

and Social Communications , p. 126.

lMJ»i

p.

ioi.

hmt,

p.

103.

11

nationalist as that of the rational
economic man. Among
other things, this leaves completely
out of the picture the
nationalist fanatic who may be willing to Put
up with all
kinds of economic hardship in order to achieve
his goals.
While one may not be able to deny the impact
of
economic variables on the rise of nationalism,
Professor
Deutsch's functional definition of nationality, and
consequently
nationalism, in terms of communications, does not seem
to be

adequate in order to distinguish the modern nation-state
from other communities.

Nationality, in Professor Deutsch's

view, is "an alignment of large members of individuals from
the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and

leading social groups by channels of social communication

and economic intercourse." 24

According to this definition,

one cannot make a distinction between the political

organization of the feudal period and the modern nation* state.
This definition is applicable to both.
The stress on communications facilities and the lack
of concern for the "presence or absence of any particular

variables" prevents one from making qualitative distinctions
on the communications content which may tell us more about
the nature of social relationships than simply the amount of

communications
Deutsch, along with the other students of political

development who make use of the tradition-modernity model,
Ibid.

,

p.

101.

12

also seems to assume that the process of
national Integration
is unilinear and irreversible. It is
presumed that
once

the process of "social mobilization" gets
under way, one
should witness the continual growth of modernity
and the

conccomitant decline of the traditional sector of society.
It is also assumed that the end result will be
approximately

the same for all states.

Faced with the forces of modernity,

the traditional sectors will disintegrate or shrink.

"Ihe

changes associated with social mobilization," he says,
"tend to weaken custom and tradition." 25

Consequently, the

decline of the traditional societies will force people to

express the "need for new patterns of group affiliation and
the new images of personal identity. "26

the logic of

Deutsche argument seems to indicate that individuals whose
loyalty, and identification, had been linked to traditional

society would switch their loyalty to the new emerging
state.

Thus in his study of Africa, Coleman also makes the

assertion that "the processes of urbanization, commercialization
and Western education have furthered the widening of

perspectives, accelerated social mobility, created new

reference groups, as well as a nationally -minded educated

25

Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development", p. 493.
26 Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and political
Development" 9 p. 494.

13

cla 8 s»27

Reference will be made again to this point below.

In a later work by Deutsch, Nationally and It*

Alternatives, 28 it was indicated that there is a critical
balance between the process of assimilation and the
rate of

"social mobilisation,"

Since "social mobilisation" is a

faster process than assimilation, it is probable that

assimilation might not take place, but instead ethnic conflict
and further differentiation might occur.

In order for

assimilation to occur, that is, the growth of political
community, "the ability to communicate over wide-ranges of
subject ^should be

J

spreading faster among men than is

necessitated by their working together directly." 29

In

other words, assimilation occurs if the ability to communicate
grows faster than the need to communicate.

Differentiation

will occur "if the need outruns the ability," 30

This

suggests then, that assimilation into a new language or

culture may be taking place for reasons other than social

mobilization.

But in the context of Deutsch 1 s work this

seems to raise a problem.

We saw earlier that the process

of assimilation seemed to be inextricably linked to the

process of social mobilization.
2 ^Coleman, The

It is as a result of the

Politics of the Developing Areas , p. 367.

28 See note 17.

Nationalism and Social Communications
3 °Ibld.

,

p. 125.

14

process of social mobilization that
different peoples are
thrown into contacts with each other and
exposed to
the

values of the market economy.

This seems to suggest that

the process of social mobilization occurs
prior to the process
of assimilation, for without some degree of
communications,
there can be no assimilation, and without
social mobilization
it would seem that social communications would be
minimal.

But then to say that assimilation must stay ahead
of social

mobilization, is in essence to admit that "social mobilization"
is not too much of an explanatory concept in so far as

assimilation is concerned.

Moreover, "social mobilization"

does not seem to explain differentiation either because

differentiation is the condition of plural societies.

Yet,

in Deutsch's view, "social mobilization" remains a

"fundamental process" underlying assimilation or differentiation.
A further ambiguity in Deutsche scheme, is the

relationship between communications and what he calls
"complementarity." 31 At times the latter concept is equated

with "communicative efficiency," 32 and at other times it is
implied to be a quality or predisposition in individuals which
permits them to communicate more efficiently.
held together •from within

1

M
,

"Peoples are

he says, "by this communicative

efficiency, the complementarity of facilities acquired by
their members." 33

Later, the concept of "ethnic complementarity"

31 Ibld .. p. 96.

32 Ibld .
33 fratlonalism and Its Alternatives , p. 98.

15

is Introduced.

This, he says, "is the complementarity that

makes a people. "3*

This does not seem to be very much

different from the old concept of ethnicity.

At any rate,

it seems that the communications model is unable to
explain
the concept of "ethnic complementarity".

The assertion that 'complementarity is greater if it

permits individuals to communicate efficiently no matter how
often they change their residence or occupations," 35 seems
to make "complementarity" a precondition before communications

can take place.

Finally, making reference to Herman Finer,

Deutsch indicates that "complementarity may be that elusive

property of individuals which.

..

•makes society cohere

which in our terminology makes it a community. "36

,

or

This

statement introduces great complications into Deutsch
model.

1

1

s

If it be admitted that "complementarity" is a quality

which permits people to communicate more efficiently, then
one is no longer explaining the existence of the community,
or the growth of community, in terms of communications,

but, on the contrary, explaining communications in terras of

"ethnic complementarity".
In order to distinguish the communications that take

place among a people who possess "ethnic complementarity"
34 Ibid .
33 lbld .. p.

100.

36 r jationallsm and Social Communications , p. 100.
<

16

from those communications that take place
among people of
the same profession, Deutsch Introduces the
concept of
"vocational complementarity" , that is, the ability to

communicate that exists among people of a given profession.
But if it is maintained, as Deutsch 3 ^ says, that an

individual belonging to a particular profession can communicate
more efficiently over a wide range of subjects with an

individual who possesses the same "ethnic complementarity"
than with his fellow specialists, then, once again, the
logic of the argument seems to lead one to conclude that

communications per se may not be that relevant in eradicating
ethnic boundaries.
The theoretical problems discussed above cast serious

doubt on the tendency to refer to the Western-educated elite
(within the developing countries) as a nationally-minded

class as if it were a monolith.

That an intellectual gap

exists between the Western-educated elites and their

villagers seems obvious enough.

But what is not so obvious

is that this gap is the principal obstacle on the path of

political integration, as it is sometimes maintained. 3 &
To this writer, research in this area has not really

established this point.

Further analyses of this question

37 Ibld .. p. 98.
38 Rlchard R. Fagen, Politics and Communications
Little, Brown, 1966); Luclan Pve. Politics.
(Boston:
Yale University
Persona llty t and Kation-Bullding (New Haven:
Press, 1962).
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seem to reveal instead that those most exposed to

communications and "universe 11 st M values do not seem to be
as nationally-minded as previously assumed. 39

They seem to

continue to view political activity through "tribal" or
ethnic glasses*

As All Mazrui has pointed out in making

reference to Africa, students of political development and

national integration have not "adequately differentiated
between tribalism as a way of life and tribalism as loyalty
to his ethnic group.

A person could adopt almost an

entirely Western way of life, yet retain great love and
loyalty to his ethnic group ."40

it seems, however, that in

studies of Afro-Asian societies the existence of a Western-

educated elite as a nationally-minded class has been
assumed rather than demonstrated.

As one study**! has cogently

argued, the dichotomous tradition-modernity model, which
has often guided research in this area, has dismissed other

theoretical possibilities.
While the present writer does not wish to denigrate
the role of communications in the growth of cultural

diffusion and political change, it would seem, however, that
communications alone are not enough in order to bring about

national integration.

^Donald

As we shall see in this case study,

l. Horowitz, see note 1.

40 Ali A. Mazrui, "Violent Contiguity and the Politics
of Retribalization in Africa," Journal of International
Affair » 23 (1969), p. 93.

^Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe,

see note 1.
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Basque nationalism has persisted— In fact, it has
become

more intensive— despite linguistic assimilation, the
growth
of communications, and economic development. In the
case
of the 3asques, it has been precisely those people most

exposed to modernity and cultural interchange who have
become the most articulate spokesmen of Basque nationalism.
The Plan of the Study

With the theoretical literature described above as
our point of departure, in the chapters that follow,

1

will

discuss the origins and the development of Basque nationalism
from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present.
The materials for this study have come primarily from primary
and secondary documentary sources.

Although this writer

has been in the Basque region and has talked to people from

various social circles of the Basque population, due to
political reasons a systematic opinion survey of the present
Basque population on the subject of nationalism is impossible
at this time.

Nevertheless, my travels in the Basque region

in the summer of 1971 were still valuable for the purposes

of this study since it enabled this writer to observe

closely the sentiment of Basque identity which seemed to be

very much alive throughout the region.
Even though there is no systematic study of Basque
nationalism, this writer was able to find a wealth of

information on this subject consisting of books, pamphlets
and general histories of the Basque region.

From these
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sources

I

have extracted the information for this study.

All translations from Spanish and French into English
have
been made by this writer.
In the discussion that follows,

1

will discuss the

emergence of Basque nationalism in a chronological sense
and in the process make reference to the socio-economic
and cultural conditions underlying the emergence of Basque

nationalism.

In the last two chapters the various components

of Basque nationalism will be analyzed and then an effort

will be made to relate the Basque case to the theoretical
issues raised in the first chapter.

CHAPTER

II

THE BASQUES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE
SPANISH AND FRENCH STATES J AN HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW
The Basque country (known to the Basques
as euskal-

erria or Basque nation)*2 consists of seven
small provinces,
the larger four of which are located in
northeastern Spain
(Vizcaya, Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Navarra), and
the other

three (Labourd, Basse-Navarre and Soule) lie along
south-

western France on the Spanish- French border.

The total

population of this area is over 2,000,000 people, most of

whom live within the Spanish State .43

with respect to

physical size this is a relatively small area.

It consists

of approximately 20,000 Km2, with approximately 17,000 Km2

within the Spanish State.
TABLE

1

POPULATION OF THE SPANISH BASQUE REGION
No. of

Persons
per Km2

Province

Population

Alava
Guipuzcoa
Navarra
Vizcaya

182,916
598,224
432,439
971,029

3,047
1,997
10,421
2,217

340

2,184,608

17,682

665

Total
Source:

Kn»2

46
240
39

Banco de Bilbao, Renta Nacional de Espana y su
Dlstribucion Provincial . (Bilbao. 1967).

^2 The modern name of the Basque country, coined by Sabino
de Arana, the founder of the Basque nationalist movement, is
Euzcadl .
4 3 There are many non- Basque people included in these
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Of the whole population it has
been estimated that
probably only one third can be considered
culturally Basque,
if one takes the ability to speak
the Basque language (known
to the Basques as euskera) as an index
of Basque culture.
It is estimated that on the French side
approximately 90,000

speak euskera and 600,000 on the Spanish
side;** and in Spain,
the eusjcera-speaking population is further
reduced to the

provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.

In the provinces of

Alava and Navarra, particularly in the southern fringes,
it seems that the language has just about disappeared
as a

normal means of communication. 45
The Spanish provinces have become much more assimilated

into Spanish culture than have the French provinces into

French culture.

To the superficial observer it might look

as though the Spanish provinces are no longer Basque.

But

population figures, particularly on the Spanish side. It is
difficult to get an accurate account of the Basques for
neither the Spanish or French governments make any ethnic
distinctions in their population census. Because of the
industry of the area, throughout this century, the provinces
of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa have attracted labor migrants from
other areas of Spain. See: J. Domingo Arana, Hombre. Raza.
Naclonalidad. Universalldad. presente v futuro del Pueblo
Vas£0 (Bilbao: Editorial Ercil la-Li bras) p. 13; A.G.
Barbancho, "Los movimientos migratorlos en Espana," Revista
de Estudios Agro-Sociales . No. 43 (1963); E. Goyheneche,
Notre Terre Basque ( Bayonne:
Editions Ikas, 1961) p. 1/;
J. Nadal, La Poblacion Espanola (Barcelona:
Ediciones
Ariel, 1966), p. 194.

^Manuel de Lecuona, Literatura Oral Vasca (San
Sebastian:

Editorial Aunamendi, 1964), p. 8.

^

Geografla Hlstorica de la lengua Vasca . (several
authors but no editor), (San Sebastian: Editorial Aunamendi,
1960), p. 10.
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paradoxically enough, it has been in the
Spanish provinces
that the most serious and militant
attempts have been made
at reviving Basque culture and the Basque
language. And
today, the Spanish Basque provinces still
remain the center
of Basque nationalist activities. A perusal
of the
publications on the Basques will reveal the predominance
of
Spanish-Basque writers and Spanish-Basque publishing houses.
Economically speaking, there are vast differences between the Basques north of the Pyrenees and those south
of
the Pyrenees. The French Basque region is considered an

economically depressed area without any significant modern
industries. 46

By contrast, the Spanish Basque provinces

make up one of the most heavily industrialized regions of
Spain, particularly the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa

which have a long tradition of mining industry. 47
are large deposits of iron-ore in this area.

There

Bilbao, the

46 Barzanti, Sergio, The Underdeveloped
Areas Within
the Common Market (Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
1965).
4 ^In

1966, for example, the three Basque provinces of
Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzcoa, along with the four provinces
of Catalonia whose population is approximately 14.4% of the
total Spanish population, produced 24.9% of the Spanish
national income. See: Juan Linz, "Wl thin-Nation Differences
and Comparisons:
The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt
and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Comparing Nations:
The Use of
Quantitative Date in Cross-National Research (frew Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966), p. 200, Writing about Spain
in 1943, Gerald Brennan refers to the Basque provinces as
"the satisfied areas of Spa in- -the only ones, apart from a
few irrigated districts in the southwest, where one can say
that there is no social problems." The Spanish Labyrinth
(Cambridge, England, 1943), p. 97.
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capital city of Vizcaya, is considered as
one of the major
financial and shipping centers of Spain.
Both Vizcaya and
Guipuzcoa are among the highest per capita income
provinces
4
^
of Spain.
Because the Basque region did not experience
the

feudal system of organization, this area has been
devoid of
a large class of large landowners.
Land has been fairly

evenly distributed in this area and the pattern of land
distribution has also been fairly stable.

One of the reasons

for this stability in land distribution lies in the old

Basque custom which stipulates that the Basque baserrlak
(farmsteads) must pass intact to an offspring selected by
the parent s. 4 ^

xt may not necessarily be the eldest.

Consequently, there has been no parcelling out of land into

miniature farms such as in other areas of Spain.
Although it is assumed that the Basques have inhabited
the hills of the Pyrenees since time immemorial, to this day

the Basques as a people and as a cultural group have

remained an enigma to both anthropologists and ethnologists. 50
48 Stanley F. Payne, Franco's Spain (New York:
Y. Crowell, 1967), p. 85.

Thomas

49 William A. Douglass, "Rural Exodus in Two Spanish
Basque Villages:
A Cultural Explanation," (December 15,
1969), p. 11, unpublished paper.

^Morton Levine refers

to them as "the most distinctive
linguistic-ethnic enclave in Furope." "The Basques," Natural
History . LXXVI, (April, 1967), p. 45. Another writer indicates
that the Basques have been considered by anthropologists as
the 'bldest people of Europe." "It is believed that the
Basque people are the only living representatives of
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Philologists, anthropologists, and
thenologists have long
studied the Basques as a distinct
cultural group but have
remained puzzled, as well as fascinated,
as to their orgins,
the orgin of their language and their
relationships to other
European peoples. 5 * The Basques themselves
seem to have
taken pride in the notion that they are a
mystery. This is
expressed in an old Basque saying:
"The Basques are like

an honest woman, they have no history."
It seems that with the exception of a few vague
re-

ferences by some Roman Writers, particularly Strabo and
Livy

who mention a people by the name of Vascones and whose
prehistoric European man." Herbert Pierrepont Houghton
An Introduction to the Basqu e Language; Labourdin Dialect

Leideni
E.J. Brill, 1961), p. 1.
"There are few races on
the face of the earth," says another writer, "whose origin
so little is known." Rodney Gallop, A Book of the Basques
(London:
Macmillan and Co., 1930), p. 2, hereafter quoted
as A Book o t the Basques . For a study of the achievement
motive among the Basques, see Leonard Kasdan, "Family
Structure, Migration and the Entrepreneur," Comparative
Studies in Society and History . 7 (October, 1964 /July, 1965).
<

See also:
Julio Caro Baroja, Los Vascos (Madrid: Ediciones
Minotauro, 1958). Baroja treats in great detail the communal
organization of the Basques, their customs and system of
agriculture. Another work by the same author, but more of
a historical nature, which discusses the violent relations
among the Basques at the beginnings of the Middle Ages, is
Vasconiana (Madrid: Ediciones Minotauro, 1957). For a
detailed study of a Basque village, see William A. Douglass,
Death in Murelaga (Seattle, Washington:
The University of
Washington Press, 1969). William Douglass indicates that
the Basques considered other Spaniards living in that
particular village as "foreigners", and that they were quite
conscious of the differences between themselves and other
Spaniards.

^*For a review of the hypotheses regarding the origin
of the Basques and their language, see A Book of the Basques ,
pp. 3-13.
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language they considered "barbarous and not to be
borne, 5 2
"There Is no historical documentation which deals
directly

with the Basques prior to the Middle Ages. "53
According to Rodney Gallop, the Vascones originally
inhabited the banks of the Ebro River around the Calahorra
region.

And in his opinion, "there is reason to believe

that the Vascones were reduced to submission

Romans^ In

the second century B. C,"54

£by

the

But on the other

hand, Gallop argues that it is very difficult to identify
the old Vascones with the modern Basques because in the

twelfth century the word Vascones was broken into two forms:
Bascll or Basculi and Gasconl .

These two forms later

became known as the Basques and the Gascons .->5

What seems most striking about the Basques and what

distinguishes them most apparently from the surrounding
populations is not the mystery regarding their origin or
their physical characteristics— although they are supposedly

taller and have a fairer complexion than that of the
59

•^Rodney A. Gallop, "The Problem of the Basques."
Nineteenth Century . 108 (July /December, 1930), p. 493,
hereafter as "The Problem of the Basques".

^Morton Levine, "Basque Isolations Fact or Problem?"
Sumpo slurp on Community Studies in Anthropology . Proceedings
of the 1963 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological
Society (University of Washington Press, 1963), p. 21.
54" The Problem of the Basques," p. 493.
5 5 The

name that the Basques give themselves is
eskua ldunak or euskualriunak . It hardly resembles the
Spanish word by which they are known - Vascos.
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surrounding population- but their language.56

Despite the

fact that it has borrowed from other
languages such as
French and Spanish, its structure is
such that scholars
have come to the conclusion that it is
not an Indo-European
language. It is not a unified language and
is characterized
as being highly agglutinative. There is
no uniform system
of writing throughout the Basque region. The
first

linguistic map of the area was devised by Prince Lucien

Bonaparte in the nineteenth century, who divided the
language into eight major dialects. 57

But it seems that

even the major dialects can be subdivided into subdialects.
The fact that students of the Basque language still use

Bonaparte*

s

classification, indicates that the structure

56studies on the Basque language abound. But for the
English readers and non-philologists, I would recommend
Antonio Tovar, The Basqu e Language (Philadelphia: Unniversity
of Philadelphia Press, 1957). This is one of the more
concise studies that I found. For those interested in
learning some Basque, there are two short English manuals
which might be of interest: J. Eiguren, How to Learn to
Speak Basoue (Homedale, Idaho, 1969), and Herbert Pierrepont
Houghton^ book, cited above. For the more scholarly
inclined individual with philological interests, the
following books might be helpful:
Louis Lucien Bonaparte,
Le verbe basque . (London, 1869); Julio Caro Baroja,
Materlales para una his tor ia de la lengua vasca en su
relaclon con la latlna (Salamance: University of Salamanca
1945): A. Campion. Grama tica de los quatro dlalectos
llterarlos de la lengua euskera (Tolosa:
lee4ji Henri
Gavel. Grammalre Basque (Bavonne:
1929); V/ilhelm Humboldt,
Los Primitives Habltantes de Espana (Madrid:
Libreria de
Jose Anllo, 1879, translated from the German by D. Ramon
Ortega y Frias); Bernardo Es tomes Lasa, Sobre historla y
Editorial
orlgenes de la lengua vasca (San Sebastian:
Aunamendi, 1967); 1. Lopez Mendizabal,, La Lengua Vasca
(2nd., ed.), (Buenos Aires, 1949).
57see note 56.
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of the language has not changed significantly.

"Even in

the most recent books, " says Tovar, "there
is repeated the
...diagram of dialects set forth by /~Bonaparte_7."58
As a written language, Basque is of recent
origin.

The first example of written Basque is dated to
1530, and

the first work entirely printed in Basque appeared
in 1545.59

Until the end of the eighteenth century, there was
little written in Basque except for some religious works

and some biblical translations. 60

Tovar indicates that

it was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century

with the publication of Manuel de Larramendi's El Impossible
Vepc?.do (The Impo ssible Vanquished )

T

considered the first

Basque grammar, that a greater interest was shown in the

study of the Basque language. 6 *
While we may witness a great interest in the study
of the Basque language, particularly from the latter part

of the eighteenth century to the present, Basque as a spoken
language seems to have continued its decline.

In the words

CO

-,

°Tovar, op. cit. . p. 106. Tovar further points out
that the "personality of the dialects / is not known_7
sufficiently so as to determine to what degree they are the
consequences of a differentiation of a possible * common
Basque" .", p. 108.

^Thls was a book of verse by Bernard Detchepare,
Lingua Vascorum Primltlae (Bordeaux, 1545). Reference to
this work is made in A Book of the 3asques . p. 74,
60 Luis Michelena, Hlstoria de la Literature Vasca
Ediciones Minotauro, 1960).
(Madrid:
61 Tovar, op. clt .. p. 25.
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of Antonio Tovar, "A present-day literary
history of the

Basque people has apparently not yet come alive." 62

Despite

the efforts of some Basque academicians and nationalists,

one is left with the feeling that euskera is destined to

suffer the same fate that has befallen such languages as

Gaelic and Welsh.

According to one study, the instances in

which one may find a person that speaks only Basque are
extremely rare. 63
Before the emergence of the political kingdoms of the

Iberian Peninsula and the monarchies of France and England,

knowledge about the Basques and their political form of
organization is rather meager.

There is evidence, however,

that the Basques did come into contact with the invaders of
this area, such as the Romans, the Visigoths, and later the

Arabs.

^

Their historical isolation has not been complete.

In each case, however, Basque resistance— which later

became legendary-- to external political forces seems to have
been successful.

Further evidence of their semi-isolated

situation is borne out by the fact that it was not until the
twelfth century that they were finally converted to
62 Ibid .. p. 33.
63 Geografla hlstorica de la leng.ua vasca . p. 17.
6 ^ A Book of the Basques ; Joaquin Arbeloa, Los orlsenes

Editorial Aunamendi,
del Reino de Navarra (San Sebastian!
r Country (London:
Thei
and
basques
The
1969); P.S. Ormond,
1925).
Butler and Tanner Ltd.,
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Christianity.

But before their conversion was
achieved,

they provided the, Church with a few
martyrs.

The reputation

for ferocity against the Christians
acquired by the people
of the Pyrenees seems to have motivated
some pious

missionaries to go to this area with the expectation
that
they would acquire the status of martyrdom.
In 1179, for
example, the Basque region was supposedly
excommunicated
for cruelty practiced against the Christians. 65

Earlier,

In 778, the Basques had made a name for themselves
by

supposedly eliminating the rear guard of Charlemagne's
army.

This gave rise to the famous Chanson de Roland

While some historical studies Indicate that usually the

Basques joined forces to expel invaders of the region,
it seems that the whole Basque region was never under the

complete control of one monarch.
to a historical Basque

It is difficult to refer

state— notwithstanding the assertions

of the nationalists— for historical evidence does not seem
to allow such a conclusion.

In so far as historical

documentation is correct, from the ninth to the sixteenth
centuries, the Basques were dispersed under several

political units. 66

It was only under Sancho El Mayor (999-1035)

65 "The Problem of the Basques,"
p. 494.
66,1

The Basques," says a Basque writer, "just like the
Greeks in their golden age, formed various independent states
and conducted separate international agreements. Although
united by blood, culture and language, they preserved for
several centuries their mutual political independence." See:
Luis de Ibarra Enziondo, El nacionalismo vasco en la paz v
en la guerra . Ediciones Alderdi, (n.d.), note 6, p. 14.
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that a political kingdom encompassing
nearly all the Basques
came into existence. 67 Aside from this
short-lived kingdom,
the political organization of the Basques, by
and large, has

consisted of "small counties and republics which
supposedly
engaged in frequent "sanguinary warfare amongst
themselves. "68
With the partition of the kingdom of Navarra by Sancho
£1

Mayor amongst his four sons, the nearest thing to a political
unit encompassing all the Basques came to an end.

After

1035, political consolidation of the area became increasingly

difficult because Sancho 1 s sons became actively involved

with the dynastic struggles of the region. 69
By the twelfth century the old Kingdom of Navarra had

been reduced in size to an area approximating present-day

Navarra and the French Basse -Navarre.

The present day

Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, and Gulpuzcoa
came gradually under the influence of the Crown of Castile

which they recognized as their seigneur by the fourteenth
century.

The French provinces of Labourd in the west and

Soule in the east passed gradually under the influence of
the French Crown.

Their submission to France was finally

Anacleto Ortueta, Sancho El Mayor Rev de los
6?see:
Vascos (Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1963); Na_barra
v la unldad polltlca vasca (Barcelona: J. Horta, 1931);
Bernardo Estornes Lasa, HJLstorla del Pals Basko (Zarauz:
Editorial vasca, 1933); Jus to Perez de Urbel, Sancho El
Mayor de Navarra (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1950).
.

68 The Problem of the Basques," p. 495.
69 Philippe Veyrin, Les Basques (Paris:

B. Arthaud,

1947).
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achieved by 1450.

Finally the kingdom of Navarra went
out
of political existence when Ferdinand
of Aragon conquered
it in 1512.
The remaining part of that kingdom,
BasseNavarre, was eventually annexed to the French
Crown via
the person of Henry IV (of Navarre) who became
the French
King, thus bringing to an end the political
sovereignty of
the Basques,

For all intents and purposes, the Basques

were not living under two different political orbits—
the French and Castilian Crowns.

The loss of political sovereignty, however, did not

mean the end of all political autonomy. 70

in

b 0th Spain and

France, the Basques retained considerable autonomy with

respect to their local affairs and even external relationships.
Both the Castilian and the French Crowns were viewed by the
Basques more as allies than political overlords.

The

Spanish- French border, in so far as the Basques were

concerned, was non-existent.

The Basques continued their

relationships; and it seems that as late as early twentieth

century they continued to make pacts amongst themselves,

known as facerles .?! regulating the usage of water and

^In a work published in 1963, Maria Puy Huicl Goni
argues that despite the fact that Navarra lost its king,
nevertheless, it continued to have an independent existence,
under the Crown of Castile, regarding its internal life;
"Nsda camblo, pues, en la Cons tituc ion del pequeno relno,
aunque abunde la creencia falsa de que el Estado Navarro
desaparecio en 1512." Las Cortes de Navarra durante la
Ediciones Rlalp, 1963).
Edad Moderna (Madrldt
71 Jaime Vives Vicens, An Economic History of Spain
Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 151.
(Princeton!
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pastures in the region.
The local autonomy of the Basques was
recognized by

the central governments in the form of
fo£s in France and
fueros in Spain. 72 It was these charters
which regulated
the relationships between the Basques and
their respective

monarchs.

It seems that political suzerainty of the
monarchs

over the Basques was purely nominal.

Making reference to

the relationship between the Spanish Basques and the

Castilian Crown, Gallop says that "beneath the famous tree
of Guernica the kings of Spain swore to observe the fueros

of Vizcaya."73

The recognition of autonomy by the Castilian

72
'^-During the nineteenth century, the origins of the
fueros became a point of contention between the central
government and the Basque provinces. The central government
and the advocates of centralization advanced the thesis
that the fueros were privi ledges granted by the Monarchy,
while the Basques claimed that they were rights inherent
in the Basque communities and consequently could not be
modified without their consent: Jose de Aralar, Los Adversarios de la libertad vasca desde 1794 a 1829 (Buenos
Aires:
Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1944;; Gregorio de Ba lparda.
Historla Critlca de Vlzcaya v de sus Fueros (Madrid, 1922);
Jaime Ignacio del Burgo, Origen v Fundamento del Regimen
foral de Mavarra (Pamplona:
Editorial Aranzadi, 1968);
Salvador de Madariaga, Memorlas de un Federallsta (Buenos
Aires:
Editorial Sudamericana , 1967); Rafael de Navascues,
Observaciones sobre los Fueros de Vlzcaya (Madrid:
Imprenta de Espinosa y Compania, 1850); J. M. Orense,
Los Fueros (Madrid:
1859); N. Vicar io de la Pena, Derecho
Imprenta del Asilo de
Consuetudinario de Vlzcaya (Madrid:
Hurefanos del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, 1901); Ramon
Menendez Pidal, The Spaniards and Their History (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1950); Liborio de Ramery
Zuzuarregui, El Libera lismo v los Fueros Bascongados
Imprenta de San Francisco de Sales, 1869).
(Madrid:
73 The Problem of the Basques," p. 495.

33

Crown is further evinced by the fact that
Navarra was
given a vice-roy~the only vice-roy outside
the American
Empire— which was recognized as a quazi-constitutional
monarch.

Navarra, for example, up to 1841, allowed
no

judicial appeal beyond the borders of the province.

"To

the foral provinces," says Carr, "their attachment
to

Spain was a contract dependent on the maintenance of
their
liberties and economic advantages. "74
In Spain the internal affairs of the provinces were

governed by broadly chosen juntas genera les which in turn
chose diputaciones forales.
as etats.

In France these were known

The point of contact between the Crown and the

Basques consisted in a representative of the King sent to

attend the meetings of the local assemblies; in Spain the

corrigedor and in France the intendant .

Although the

representative of the King could summon the assemblies
into session, no order of the King, however, was valid

without the assent of the local assemblies.

In Spain

this practice, which lasted up to 1841, was known as the

pase foral .

At a time when Western Europe was governed by feudal

relationships, the Basques were ostensibly practicing some
type of agrarian democracy.

In both Spain and France they

7^Carr, pp. cit. . p. 63. This book gives a very
extensive chronological discussion of nineteenth century
Spanish history and contains a very valuable bibliographic
index.
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were considered free men.

Ormond, for example, in discussing

the democratic character of Basque society
points out that
the Basque dialects have no words for kings,
vassals, counts,
serfs, and barons. 75 The aristocracy which
eventually

emerged in this area did not seem to enjoy the
privileges
that were enjoyed by other aristocratic classes in
other
parts of the Peninsula and in France. In contrast to
other parts of France, Labourd and Sould had no system of
servitude.

Making reference to the French Basques before

the French Revolution of 1789 took place, Gallop observes

that "in comparison with the rest of France, the Basques

were well off.

They were free men in the midst of a nation

of serfs, and their financial burdens were as nothing compared

with the load that crushed the life out of the French
peasant. "76
In the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, every in-

habitant was considered a nobleman.

In the fuero of Vizcaya,

a section is found proclaiming the nobility of all the

Inhabitants of the province:

"All the natives and

inhabitants of this segnory are notoriously noble, not
75ormond, op. cit. . p. 132. Travelling through the
Basque region in early nineteenth century, George Borrow
makes the observation that "no people on earth are prouder
than the Basques, but theirs is a kind of republican pride.
They have no nobility amongst them, and no one will
acknowledge a superior. The poorest car man is as proud
as the governor of Tolosa." The Bible in Spain (London:
J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1906), pp. 341-342.
76 a Book of the Basques , p.

18.
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only in Vizcaya, but outside, on the solitary
condition of
proving that they are sons of Vizcayan parents. "77
Nobility
was granted allegedly on the grounds that
these areas had
not been conquered by the Arabs. The belief that
the

Basques were noble eventually spread throughout the
Basque
region. 8
As a result of the rights conferred by the fueros,
the Basques controlled their budgets, were exempted from

taxation by the Crown and from conscription into the army
to fight in areas outside of the Basque region.

The Spanish

army could not enter the region without consulting first

with the diputaciones forales .

Persons from outside of the

region were not allowed to hold public office.

In some

instances the Basques were treated by the Castilian Crown
as a foreign power.

The Spanish Basque provinces were

included in the embargo which denied foreign powers commercial

access to the Spanish- American Empire.

The Basque

provinces had custom houses along the Ebro River (this river
separates the Basque region from Castile) which taxed in-coming

Spanish goods.

In the area of foreign affairs, they

maintained consuls in the Low Countries and conducted
treaties with foreign governments. 79
77Q U oted in Ormond, op. clt.

.

p.

7^Americo Castro, Los Espanoles:
Taurus, 1965), p. 15.
serlo (Madrid:

132.

como llegaran a

79nanuel de Irujo, In^laterra v los Vascos (Buenos
Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1945).
Aires:
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Needless to say, this arrangement was not
completely
satisfactory to both the Castiltan and French
Crowns bent
on pursuing a policy of aggrandizement and
consolidation of
their power. The existence of Basque autonomy
became
increasingly viewed with suspicion by both the
French and

Castilian Crowns, each suspecting that the other might
seduce the Basques into secession. 80 It seems that

this

suspicion continued throughout the nineteenth century.

Neither government felt that it could take the political
loyalty of the Basques for granted.

Nevertheless, despite

gradual attempts to curb the fueros . they continued to be
practiced in France up to the revolution of 1789, and in
Spain up to the middle of the nineteenth century.
The last vestiges of Basque autonomy under the French

Crown were swept away by the administrative reforms brought
about by the French Revolution. 81

Although the French

Basques protested in the form of sporadic armed resistance

and in the form of petitions to the National Assembly, they

were too weak to stop the avalanche set in motion by the
revolution.

Their fors were abrogated and the Pays Basque

80 In the Franco- Spanish War of 1793-95, the deputation
of Guipuzcoa declared itself neutral and it seems that some
circles were thinking in terms of secession. In the Peace
of Basilea (July 22, 1795), the French supposedly insisted
on a promise from the Spaniards indicating that the
Basques would not participate in a war against France,
Aralar, op clt .. p. 15.
ff

81 Joseph Nogaret, Petit Histojre du Pays Basque
T"
Franca is (Bayonne, France! A. Foltzer, 19
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was incorporated into the department of
Basse-Pyrenees
with the government seat located in Pau.
Besides the
abrogation of the fors, the French Revolution had
other
social side effects in the French Basque region.
The arm
of the central government could now reach into the
Basque

community and reform some of the old Basque customs which
the Paris government considered antiquated.

For example,

the law prescribing the equal division of a father's land

among all his children did away with the Basque custom of
passing the farmstead intact to one of the offspring.
Basque place names were changed and replaced with French

names
Initially, however, it seems that the Basques reacted

favorably to the French Revolution.

The National Assembly

gave the Basque language official status in the Basque
region, a calendar was published in Basque, and there was
the rumor that the Paris government was planning to create
a Basque state across the Pyrenees under the protectorate

of France. 62

3U t

Basque expectations were soon deflated

when the more extreme aspects of the revolution became
manifest, particularly toward Catholicism, and when it
became apparent that the revolution did not bring them

greater liberty, but instead brought about greater
centra liza tion
Veyrin, op. clt ., p. 186,
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The historical relationship between
the Basques of
Spain and the Spanish State is far
more complicated than
that of the French Basques and the
French State. Because
of their size and their relative economic
importance, the
Basques of Spain have played a far more
significant role in
Spanish history.83 In French history, however, one
has to

make quite an effort in order to find the
contribution of
Basque figures. But a perusal of Spanish history will

soon

reveal the extent to which the Spanish Basques have been
actively involved in great historical Spanish events, such
as the Reconoulsta and the expansion of the Spanish-

American Empire, thus leading one to conclude that the
Basques have long identified with the Spanish State.

Yet,

it has been in Spain that the question of Basque autonomy

has been a prolonged bone of contention between the central

83juan Sebastian Elcano, who circumnavigated the globe,
was a Basque; Francisco de Vitoria, a Jesuit and a
theoretician of international law, was also a Basque;
Churrua, another Basque, faced Kelson at Trafalgar. The
Jesuit Order owes its founding to the Basques, particularly
St. Ignatius Loyola who founded the order. During Phillip
ll'l attempt to conquer England, the Basques contributed
more galleons than the Castilians. Equally significant was
the Basque contribution in the colonization of the SpanishAmerican Empire, The territory forming the colony of
Rio de la Plata was given the name of Nueva Vizcaya, named
after the Basque province of Vizcaya. See Antonio Ramos
Oliver la, Politics. Economics and Men of Modern Spain.
1808-1946 (London: Victor Gallancz Ltd., 1946). p. 405;
See also Diario de Areitio, Los vascos en la histcria de
Espana (Bilbao, 1959. When Spanish historians discuss
Basque nationalism, they keep referring to the Basque
contribution to Spanish history in order to deny their
separatist claims.
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government and the Basque provinces.

This controversy

lasted throughout the nineteenth century
reaching its

climax during the second Spanish Republic
(1931-1936) when
the three Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, and
Guipuzcoa
were given a statute of autonomy by the government of
the

Republic.

Although historical writings indicate that some
Spanish Basques had long lamented the gradual erosion of
Basque culture and the growing influence of the Castilian
language, it was with the advent of the liberal constitution
of 1812 (the Cadiz Constitution) and after the death of

Ferdinand VII in 1833, that vasouismo 8 ^ began to grow as

political movement.

a

From 1812 onwards, the question of

Basque autonomy became a salient issue in Spanish politics.
For some students of Spanish politics, Basque autonomy

"remained as the main political challenge to nineteenth

century liberalism,"®^ particularly in view of the Basque
willingness to take up arms against the Madrid government

whenever the occasion seemed propitious.

Basque autonomy

became further complicated partly due to the fact that it
became highly entwined with Spanish dynastic politics

during the first half of the nineteenth century.

04 This term is sometimes used to refer to Basque
sentiment for Home Rule.

85 Carr, op. cfrt,, p. 67.
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From 1820 to 1876, the classical era of
pronunciation* 86
,

the government in Madrid never remained
stable enough to

carry out a consistent policy regarding the reform
of the
Basque fuerps. As we shall see below, the issue

of Basque

autonomy was kept alive not only by the desire of the
Basques
to keep their fueros f but also by the vicissitudes
of
Spanish politics.

To use a modern cliche, the question of

Basque autonomy became a political football, exploited by

both the Basques and the Madrid government.

Political

factions, in power and out of power, frequently used the

issue of Basque autonomy as bait in order to get Basque
support.

This was particularly evident during the Car list

wars and again during the second Spanish Republic; in return
for their support of the Republic, the Basques were

rewarded with a statute of autonomy in 1936.
Before proceeding to discuss in greater detail the
issue of Basque autonomy between 1812 and 1876, a brief

review of the question of Spanish political integration is
in order, so as to place the issue of Basque autonomy

within the larger context of Spanish political centralization.
One cannot be discussed without the other.

Although some Spanish historiansS7 are never tired of
reminding us that Spain was the first European nation-state
8 ^Between 1814

and 1923, there were reported 43
pronunciamentos in Spain. Oliveira, op p clt .. p. 40.
8 ?Madariaga, Oliveira, and Pidel.
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to arise out of the medieval order,
further analysis leads
one to qualify such assertion.88
one m&y granf
.

^

Spain was the first European state to
emerge out of the
medieval order, the social solidarity of this
state is

questionable.

Although Spain was formally unified through

the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabela in
the fifteenth

century, the traditional kingdoms of the Peninsula
retained
their separate legal and administrative systems. 89

xt seems

that unification of the area did not go very much
beyond the
demands of religious uniformity. As later became evident,
the Church and not the monarchy "was the unifying

institution of Spain. 9 0

Even when Phillip 11 inherited

the Portuguese Crown, it seems that no serious attempt was

made to incorporate Portugal into the Castilian Crown.

The

Portuguese administration remained intact and in Portuguese
hands, a fact later deplored by some Spanish historians. 9 !

Despite the efforts of Phillip II to unify Spain, he was
later castigated by Spanish historians for not having

brought about the unification of the Peninsula when he had
88 For an interesting essay on Spanish nationalism
see: Stanley G. Payne, "Spanish Nationalism in the Twentieth
Century," Review of Politics . 26 (July, 1964), pp. 403422 1 hereafter quoted as "Spanish Nationalism".
89 Rafael Altamira, A History of Spain (New York:
Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1949).

90 "Spanish Nationalism,"
p. 404.

9lMadariaga, Spain .

D.
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the power and the opportunity to do
so.

Thus, one

historian comments that Phillip 11 created
the modern
Castilian State, but not the modern Spanish
State:

Neither in their minds nor in that of their
collaborators occured the idea to instill in
all
Spaniards the notion of state unity, of whatever
kind. Charles and Phillip, it must be granted,
organized the modern Castilian State, but not the
modern Spanish State. But in so doing, however,
they accentuated the obstacles that arose in
the making of Spain.
Because they placed Castile
as the central political axis of the monarchy and
the fiscal basis of it, and transformed the
other peninsular states into mere satellites of
no more significance than the other European states
inserted into the general framework of their large
empire... It is enormous the responsibility of
Charles V and Phillip 11 in their negligence to
unite Spain. 92
It seems that the feeling of nationhood under the

Spanish monarchy remained rather fragile.

According to

Payne, "the country never became fully integrated, economically,

socially or politically"93

As a consequence, nationalism

in Spain has never manifested itself with the same degree

of passion and devotion that it has in Germany or France.
Payne even goes so far as to suggest that we cannot speak

of Spanish nationalism until the twentieth century.

It

might not be too far fetched to say that one could refer
to Spain as a nation during the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries --and in some instances during the nineteenth

century— in the same way that we refer

to Nigeria or the

9Z Claudio Sanchez Albornoz, Espana: un enigma historlco
Editorial Sudamericans , 1962),
(2nd., ed.) (Buenos Aires:
479-480.
pp,
93 "Spanish Nationalism ." p. 404.
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Congo today as a nation.

It existed in a formal sense.94

For peripheral Spain, however, the
Spanish nation became

identified with Castile.

Even today it is not uncommon to

hear Valencianos and Galicians say that
the Castilians
control everything. This is amusing because
franco is
not Castilian but Gelician.
94

Vel a refers to th *s lack of social solidarity
Mi5
f
"The nineteenth
century. -which still continues in
Spain-- has been unjustly severe to the classical
Spanish
Monarchy, ihi. severity is due to the false
assumption
that fifteenth century Spain was a nation which
had developed
ly » so to 8 P eak »
no ontaward accident.",
iSI
Olivelra, as well as other Spanish historians,
p. 357.
while acknowledging the particularisms of Spain, at the
same time refuse to give any ligitimacy to Basque or
Catalan nationalism. Making reference to Catalonia, he
says, "Catalonia had to continue to be Spanish because
history ordained so.", p. 361. Madariaga, too, refuses to
give Basque nationalism any legitimacy by persistently
maintaining that Basque nationalist sentiment is nothing
more than an extreme manifestation of the particularism of
the Spanish "character":
"We have no right to be surprised.
We know that this dispersive and disruptive tendency is a
typical feature of the Spanish character, and we have
found the Basque to be the quintessence of the Spaniard."
Spain., p. 179.
Madariaga even goes so far as to deny the
legitimacy for the political existence of the Portuguese
nation.state:
"A double wall of pride..., on the Portuguese
side, ... , prevents a clear understanding of a reality
which in its essentials is simple enough. So simple,
indeed, as to amount to a repetition of the Catalan reality:
The Portuguese is a Spaniard with his back to Castile and
his eyes on the Atlantic Sea." Spain , p. 185. Pidal also
tries to get around Basque nationalism by attributing it
to the "character" of the Iberians:
"The greater localism
in Spain does not depend upon a multitude of ethnicgeographical reasons, but on the contrary, on a uniform
psychological condition; it depends upon the original
exclusive character of the Iberians already noted by the
authors of antiquity." The Spaniards and Their History.
Rather than acknowledging Basque or Catalan
p. 77.
nationalism, Pidal placed the source of the problem
elsewhere:
"The provincialist or federalist movement is
upheld and encouraged by some foreign countries that are
interested in keeping Spain weak." Ibid. . pp. 89-90.

*

thus:.
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The weak political centralization
of Spain is further
evidenced by the fact that as late as 1812
(when the Cadiz

Constitution was promulgated) the country was
divided into
nine kingdoms, two pr^nclpadpg, one senorio
,

sixteen

provinces, and two Basque provinces (Alava and
Guipuzcoa)
known as the "exempted provinces ."95
The famous liberal constitution of 1812, written
and

promulgated when the Spaniards were trying to expel the
French from the Iberian Peninsula, tried to bring
an end
to most aspects of the anclen regime through a
series of

far-reaching political and social reforms which envisioned
the centralization of Spain along the lines of the French

model.

The Spanish liberals were trying to do in 1812 what

the French had done after the Revolution of 1789.

In the

first place the traditional administrative division of

Spain along with the privileges of particular regions

would be abolished and replaced with a uniform legal and
administrative system.

Secondly, and perhaps most importantly,

95The kingdoms were: Andalucia, Aragon, Cordoba,
Galicia, Granada, Jaen, Murcia, Valencia, y Navarra. The
princlpado8
Asturias, and Catalonia. The senorio:
Vizcaya. The sixteen provinces: Avila, Burgos, Zamora,
Cludad Real, Cuenca, Extremadura, Guadalajara, Leon,
Madrid, Palencia, Salamanca, Segovia. Sorla, Toledo, Toro
y Valladolid. The two exempted provinces were: Alava
and Guipuzcoa. Although the Navarre se are also Basques,
due to the traditional status of Navarra as a kingdom,
whenever official documents refer to the Basque region,
Navarra is always mentioned separately: Las Provincias
Vascongadas y Navarra. Pio Zabala, Historla de Espana
Sucesores de Juan Gill, 1930), p. 177.
(1), (Barcelona:
t
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Spain would be governed under a constitutional
monarchy in
the person of Ferdinand VII.
The constitution of 1812 96 and the ideas
expressed in
it set the stage for the political conflicts—sometimes

violent— that were to plague Spanish politics throughout
the first half of the nineteenth century— until
1876,

Initially the constitution of 1812 was accepted by the

djputaclones forales of the Basque region, although not

without some protestations.

At first sight this seems

puzzling particularly in view of the fact that this

constitution called for greater centralization, thus

eventually doing away with the foral liberties of the Basques.
On the other hand, the behavior of the Basque diputaciones
does not seem totally contradictory if one considers it in
terms of strategy.

First of all the French were occupying

the Basque region.

Although it seems that in 1808 they had

promised to respect the Basque fueros . 9 ? by 1810, however,
they reduced the region into one administrative unit and

placed it under military rule.
in the form of armed resistance.

The Basques acted swiftly
In light of these conditions

9o For a collection of Spanish constitutions sees
Arnald R. Verduin, Manual of Spanish Constitutions 1808-1931
(Ypsilandi, Michigan: Union of Lithoprinters, 1941).
9 ?There

we **e some French politicians who suggested to
Napoleon to annex the Spanish Basque provinces to the
French Basque region and make a protectorate of it with
the name of La Nouvelle Phenlcle . M, Sacx, Bavonne et le
Collection Ikas, 1968),
Pays Basque (Bayonne, France:
p. 151.
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continued French occupation seemed a
greater threat to
Basque autonomy than the newly drafted
constitution, and a
return of the Spanish monarchy in the
person of Ferdinand
VII who, on his way to France in 1808,
had promised
the

Basques that he would respect their fueros .98

Moreover,

while the 1812 constitution called for political
centralization, at the same time, it allowed for a
certain
degree of administrative autonomy. For example,
mayors

would be popularly elected, the municipality would
control
the police, the primary schools, collect taxes, and have

responsibility for road maintenance and construction.

For

Basque liberals the constitution of 1812 simply made

uniform throughout Spain what the Basques had been practicing
for centuries. yy In fact, some Basque diputaclones
expressed the belief that the constitution of 1812 embodied
the spirit of the Basque fueros .
The reforms envisioned by this constitution were

never fully implemented.

As soon as Ferdinand returned to

Spain (1814), he abolished the constitution along with the

major legislation that the Cortes of Cadiz had enacted, and
subsequently, attempted to re-institute the old regime.

On

^^Maximiano Garcia Venero, Historia del Nationalism
Vasco 1793-1936 (Madrid; Editora Nacional, 1945). This is
a valuable work on Basque nationalism for it contains
reprints of most of the royal decrees regarding the Basque
region. The book is marred, however, by its polemical nature.
9^Balparda took this view. Gregorio de Balparda,
Federallsmo? Feudallsmol (Bilbao: 1931.)
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his return Ferdinand also announced
that he would observe
and respect the Basque fueros .100
By 1815, however, Ferdinand's ministers
were showing

dissatisfaction with the existing Basque fueros
and
complaining that the Basques were not complying
with the
Crown on some policies, particularly in the area
of

contraband. 101

The possibility of moving the Spanish
custom

houses to the French-Spanish border and to the
Basque ports
100 For a copy
v
of the decree see, Venero, p. 143.

l°lThe report of a Junta of Madrid assembled
to
investigate "the abuses of the royal revenues in the Basque
Provinces," made the following comments:
"The adoration in
which the privileges and Fueros of the Basque Provinces are
held by the inhabitants is well known, by which for many
years the royal authority, as well as the high tribunals of
the kingdom, have experienced great disrespect.
It would
appear as if the permanent deputations of these provinces
had been established to oppose the measures of the government.
There is nothing in common with the rest of the provinces
in Spain. The laws are distinct; the commerce free; the
contributions almost nothing; the custom-houses profitless;
the officers opposed in the execution of their duty— are
maintained at great expense, and almost useless; the nobility
has become universal and self-created; and in fact they
have taken the government into their own hands.
The Peninsula appears open to all their commerce,
and negotiations; and without doubt they enjoy greater
advantages than the rest of the kingdom, being exempt from
the contributions of Castil, and the general tax of the
Crown of Aragon, from ordinary services, from general
contributions, from provincial rents, and from contributions
and donations which have been so heavy since the French
Revolution. And even in the tithes and ecclesiastical
contributions, they have paid almost nothing to the State
from which they receive protection. They have been free
from conscription, militia, from providing military stores,
barracks, baggage, enlistment for the marine service, and
in fact from every other tax or service for war." Quoted
in Francis Duncan, The English in Spain (London:
John
Murray, 1877), p. 167-170.
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was already being discussed.

There were further complaints

that illicit commerce was damaging
Castilian trade.
Subsequently, in a royal decree of 1818
addressed to the
Basque provinces, there appeared a clause
which was used
later as a tool to Justify the central
government's power
in clipping some of the Basque fueros . Making
reference to
the jfueros, this clause implicitly expressed
the view that
the fueros were not rights but privileges given
by the
Crown:

"The fueros that were abolished by the /""Cadiz
7
Cortes, obeyed and respected by that Province /""Vizcaya_7,

and later reinstituted by His Majexty, always carry the

implicit clause of without prejudice to the general interests
of the nation, the national unity, and the roval prlvilegea
of the

s upreme

sovereign authority . "102

Later, in 1818, the Crown demanded that the Basque

provinces make a greater contribution to the military needs
of the country, beyond that allowed by the fueros .

The

dlputaclones forales reacted negatively to this suggestion
and instead asked for a four-year delaying period.
As a result of a coup d'etat led by General Riego

(1820), and supported by the liberals, the constitution of
1812 was imposed on Ferdinand.

The victors of 1820 did

not waste any time in carrying out some of the reforms

anticipated in 1812, and proceeded to abolish some of the
Quoted in Venero, op. cit.

.

p.

146,
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Basque

fjjeros..

djputaclones

The dlputacion** fn~?,- were changed
f
lntQ

constr^

f

and the CU8tom hou8es were

moved to the Spanish-French border.

In addition, the Basques

would also be subject to military conscription
in the same
manner that other Spaniards were. However, the
regime
brought to power by General Riego was short-lived.

By 1823,

with the help of French forces (the 100,000 Sons
of St.
Louis) under the command of General Angouleme, Ferdinand

and

the coalition supporting him was to defeat the
liberals

and once again establish his rule.

During the struggle

between the liberals and the traditional forces, the

conservatives supporting Ferdinand presented themselves as
the protectors of the Basque fueros .

In the Basque region

an attempt was made to connect the fueros with the altar

and the throne, an association which lasted throughout
the nineteenth century. 103

Once Ferdinand had consolidated his power, he annulled

many of the reforms instituted by the previous regime,
including the reforms regarding the Basque fueros .

In order

103a s a result of this association, the Basques have
been labelled as reactionary:
"Pero nadie ignora que el
meollo, cogollo, raiz de la intolerancia espanola es el
vasco. El clero vasco ha sido siempre el inspirador de la
tendencia dura." Madariaga, Memorias de un federalists ,
Basque nationalism is but the extreme form of this
p. 172.
solicitude of the Basque priests to keep unpolluted by
liberalism, socialism. • .and the rest, by far the most
reactionary region of Spain. "Madariaga, Spain , p. 179.
"The Carlists were not fighting for their local liberties,
or political privileges, but in order to deprive other
Spaniards of liberty, to impose absolutism on the whole
of Spain," says Olivelra, p. 407.
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to elicit the continued support of
the Basques, he removed
the custom houses once again from
the Spanish-French border
to the Castilian border.

Despite this action, however, the

Crown continued to insist that the fueros
were privileges
given by the Crown and, consequently, could
also be taken
away or modified by the Crown:
"The Fueros as well as the
privileges are mere royal concessions, and are
subject,
consequently, to modifications."! 0*
The most intense confrontation between the Basques and
the Spanish state occurred after the death of Ferdinand
in 1833.

For six years the Basque region along with portions

of Aragon and Catalonia confronted the Madrid government
in a war that left the region nearly devastated.

Initially

the war, known as the first Carlist War, began as a

dynastic struggle between the supporters of Don Carlos VI,

brother of Ferdinand, and the supporters of Isabela II,

daughter of Ferdinand, under the regency of Maria Cristina,
wife of Ferdinand and mother of Isabela. 105

AW Quoted

Although it

in Venero, op. cit .. p. 152.

105por a general discussion of Carlismo . the name by
which the movement to place Don Carlos VI and his successors
on the Spanish throne became known, see Carr, pp. 155-196.
For a discussion of the ideological basis of Carlismo see:
Santiago Galindo Herrero, Breve hlstorla del tradiclonalismo
espanol (Madrid:
Publicaciones Espanolas, 1954). R,
Oyarzun, Historia del Carlismo (Madrid:
Ediclones Minotauro,
A Study In
1930); John N. Schumacher, "Integrism:
Nineteenth-Century Spanish Politico-Religious Thought,"
Catholic Historical Review . 48 (October, 1962), pp. 343-64.
Edgar Holt,
For a discussion of the Carlist Wars see:
The Carlist Wars in Spain . (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour
Editions, 1967; Antonio Pirala y Criado, Hlstorla de la
guerra civil y de los partldos liberal v carlista . Madrid: 1868
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seems that at the outbreak of the war
the fueros were not
mentioned, as the war progressed, it became
evident that
Basque participation in the war was based on
the fear that
the regime of Maria Cristina intended to
abolish the fueros .
This fear had some justification for on November
30 , 1833,

General Federico Castanon, in charge of an army base
in
the north, in Tolosa, gave an order abolishing
the fueros

of Vizcaya and Alava in retaliation for their participation
in the insurrection against the Madrid government.

Another incident reinforced the suspicions of the Basques.
It seems that in 1834 a cristino commander stationed in
the north sent a message to the Madrid government suggesting,
as a tactical move, that in order to bring the war to an

immediate end, the government should declare its intention
to uphold the fueros . and thus deprive Don Carlos of the

support in the northern provinces.

Allegedly this

message fell into Car list hands "which made a firebrand
out of it by pointing out to the troops that the officials
of the queen were planning to abolish the foral institutions,

although they might respect the fueros temporarily.

But

the fueros would be destroyed once the enthusiasm of the

Basques for Don Carlos subsided." 106

Don Carlos tried to

increase his popularity among the Basques by exploiting
their sensitivity regarding the fueros .
106q uo ted in Venero, op. cit.

.

"In September

p. 164.
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/-1834j

he went to Guernica, where In
1476 Ferdinand and
Isabel had taken the oath to preserve
the fueros under
the historic oak- tree. "107
there he algo
an
oath to uphold the fueros .

^

^

In order to allay the Basque suspicions,
and to

separate the cause of Don Carlos from that of
the fueros .
General Baldomero Espartero, commander of the
crlstlno
forces in the northern provinces, sent a message
to the
Basques, on May 19, 1837, declaring that the government
had

no intention of abolishing the fueros ,

"Basques, those

who do not cease to deceive you, tell you that you are
fighting for the defense of your fueros . but do not believe
it.

As the general in command of the armed forces of the

Queen and in the name of the Government,

I

promise that

these fueros that you feared to lose will be conserved and

there never was any thought to abolish them. "I 08

Notwithstanding the promise of Espartero, the constitution of 1837, the byproduct of the 1836 revolution
led by the radical liberals, anticipated the abolition of

all local privileges and fueros .
By 1839, however, it had become evident that the Madrid

government had acquired enough strength to crush the Car list
insurrection.

This, plus the political bickerings**^ in

10?Quoted in Venero, op. cit.
*

.

p.

164.

08 Holt, op. cit .. p. 69.

l°9carr, op. cit .. pp. 191-192; Duncan, op. cit .. p. 244.
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the Carlist camp and a desire
for peace, coupled with a
promise by Espartero to respect the
fueros , induced the

Basque contingents to lay down their
arms.

The Peace of

Vergara of August, 1839, finally brought
the war to a
formal conclusion. Espartero' s promise

to the Basques

was expressed, in a qualified manner,
in Article 1 of
the Pact of Vergara?
"General don Baldomero Espartero
will recommend with great interest to the
Government his
offer to formally submit before the Cortes the
concession
or modification of the fueros . "HO

Subsequently, in September of 1839, the subject of
the fueros was discussed in the Cortes in which the

Progressives had a majority. HI

It seems that they were

ready to abolish the fueros once and for all.
cabinet, taking into consideration Espartero

1

But the
s

promise to

the Basques, and his growing political influence, finally

settled for a compromise which recognized the fueros in
so far as they were not prejudicial to the constitutional

unity of the monarchy.

A later date was set for specific

reforms regarding the fueros ,
16,

A royal decree of November

1839, allowed the Basques to reconvene their local

assemblies in the manner consistent with their fueros .
This decree presented Maria Cristina as the protector of
the Basque fueros .

HOQuoted in Venero,

op. clt .. p.

Hlzabala, op. cit ,.

p. 377.

180.
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The regime of Maria Cristina
which had indicated

sympathy for the Basque jueros, did
not remain in power
long enough to work out a final
settlement with the Basques.
Political fortunes in Madrid changed once
again, thus
bringing some radical Progressives into
power who were
convinced that "a liberal constitution for
all Spaniards
left the foral liberties as an archaic
and unnecessary

conservative vestige. "112

A revolution initiated in the

provinces in 1840, and led by the Progressives with
the
support of Espartero, forced Maria Cristina to abdicate
as the Queen Regent and left Espartero as head of
the new

government,

From her place of exile in France, Maria

Cristina sent a telegram to the Basque dloutacionea in

which she praised the Basques, who not too long ago had
supported a war against her, portrayed herself as the

protector of the fueros and asked for their support in her
112 Carr, op. clt.

.

p.

220.

l^xhe immediate cause for this pronunciamento stemmed
from the political differences between the Progressives and
the Moderates over a proposal of the Moderates to reform
the local governments.
Because of the patronage available
through the local governments, and thus control of elections,
each party in power wished to control local government,
or reform to its own political advantage. In early 1840,
the Moderates found themselves in power and decided to
reorganize the local governments in order to undercut the
power of the Progressives, particularly in the large
towns.
The Progressives, normally advocates of
centralization, now found themselves in a position in
which they had to defend the autonomy of the municipality.
In order to stop the reform proposed by the Moderates,
they staged a revolution supported by Espartero. Carr,
op. cit .. pp 210-218.
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struggle against Espartero.
In the meantime, the local notables
of the Basque

provinces were becoming suspicious about
the Espartero
government which included representatives
of the antiforalist tradition. At a meeting of the
Cortes in June,
1841, the subject of the fueros had been brought
up for

discussion, particularly the share of the Basque
contribution
to national revenue.

A law passed by the Cortes dn

August 16, 1841, stripping Navarra of her fueros
reinforced
the suspicions of the other three provinces that the
days

of the fueros were numbered, 114

Subsequently, in

September, 1841, the Basque provinces supported an attempted

insurrection against the Madrid government, led by General
O^Donnell, an opponent of Espartero.
Basques lost.

Once again, the

As a punishment for their support of the

insurrection, Espartero issued a decree abolishing the most

important aspects of the fueros ; each province would have
a

1efe politico, appointed by the central government, who

would be the superior political authority within the province
The custom houses would be removed from the interior and

placed at Basque ports and at the Spanish- French border,
and the Basques would be subject to military conscription.
For the advocates of centralization, this was a victory.
114 For a copy
of the text of this law see Venero
(1st ed.), p. 101.

115 See Venero, pp. cit.

.

pp.

196-197.

1
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from 1843 to 1876, despite the turnover
of governments
and constitutions, no significant
modifications were made
regarding the fueros. The coalition which
overthrew

Espartero in July, 1843, and brought back Maria
Cristina
as the Queen Regent, by and large accepted
the modifications

which the Espartero government had instituted, although
it
seems that the Basques were expecting some radical

modifications.

Instead the new government gave the

juntas genera les some autonomy regarding economic matters

and abolished the office of iefe politicos .
In a manifesto drafted in 1850 by local Basque notables,

again under the famous tree of Guernica, they expressed
disappointment with the policies of the central government

regarding the modification of the fueros

:

We believe that a great number of the
policies introduced since the revolution of
1840 are another example of the violations of
the law of October 25, and consequently, many
examples of illegitimate acts, as a result of
which, in justice, we should be given immediate
reparations .116

Among other things, this document suggested that the
Basques should present a unified front to the central

government and follow, under the existing circumstances,
the only rational course open to them:
To negotiate, and negotiate with dexterity
and foresight is the only rational approach
that the Basques must follow in order to
salvage from ruin the sacred objects of their
*

16 Quoted in Venero, op. cit .. p.

199.
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cult. It was in this manner that our
forefathers, whose government consisted in a
constant negotiation with the central Power
*
worked on critical issues. Because our
position is more critical, and the interest,
whose fate shall be decided shortly, is far
more transcendental and grave, it is incumbent
upon us, their sons, to work with a double
effort.
Unity, and we shall be strong. 117

Although this document also expresses a conciliatory
attitude
and the realization that things had changed, and,
consequently,
the acceptance that the pre- 1839 foral liberties could
not

be reinstituted, nevertheless the Basques continued an

intense protest in the form of petitions to the central

government and the presentation of amendments in the Cortes
by Basque deputies, which sometimes caused acrimonious

debates, and sometimes by the obstruction of government

policies.

For example, during the 1859-1860 African War, the

Basque provincial assemblies and the central government

struggled for several months over the contribution, in men
and money, that the Basques should make to this war.

General Leopoldo 0» Donne 11, at the time head of the governmnt,

retaliated by issuing a decree (July

7,

1860) forbidding the

juntas genera les from meeting without the permission of the

governor of the respective province.
During the debate of the Lev de Presupuestos . in the

Cortes of 1864, the Basque senators introduced an amendment
which, if adopted, would have the effect of restoring the
117 Ibid .. p. 201.
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pre-1839 foral liberties.

The introduction of this

amendment stimulated a heated debate between
Sanchez Silva,
a senator from Seville, and two
Basque senators,
Pedro de

Egana and Joaquin de Barroeta-Aldamar.

Both sides appealed

to extensive historical documentation to
support or refute

the source of the ftaerps.

The debate seemed to have reached

its most heated point, however, when Egana, the senator

from Alava, referred to the Basques as a nationality:
That / foralJ7 structure which has lasted
undisturbed for a thousand years, has withstood
the violent political storms which have
demolished empires, overthrown monarchies and
even destroyed nationalities of great strength;
meanwhile that poor remote place has preserved intact that nationality which in the
eyes of Mr. Sanchez Silva does not deserve
respect nor worthy of retaining the unfortunate
fueros . Ho
Egana*

s

use of the word nationality elicited a response

from the President of the Council of Ministers, Alejandro
Mon, who argued that the Spanish government did not

"recognize any nationality other than the Spanish

nationality," and that any other nationality, whatever its
form, the Government would reject,

The chaotic state of Spanish politics between 1868 and

1876^0 presented the Basques once again with

the opportunity

Quoted in Venero, op clt .. p, 212,
119 ibid.

120 There was a revolution On September 19, 1868, which
overthrew Isabela II from the Spanish throne. This was
followed by an indecisive government which reinstituted the
monarchy in October 30, 1870 in the person of Amadeo I
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of placing someone in the Madrid government
sympathetic
towards their fueros. When the Carlists made
their last

major effort to place their candidate, Don
Carlos VII, on
the Spanish throne, the Basques again took up arms

for the

Car list cause.

This war, known as the second Car list War

(1872-1876), brought defeat to the Basques and the Carlists

whose candidate left Spain never to return again.
Although the war ended in defeat for the Basques, the
fuerlsta sentiment continued unabated.

In the national

elections for the Cortes (January 20, 1876), the Basque
candidates supporting the fueros emerged triumphant . *^1

It

seems that they were determined to salvage in the Cortes

what they had lost on the battlefield.

When the subject

of the fueros was introduced in the Cortes for discussion,
a Basque deputy from Alava, Mateo Benigno de Maraza, made
a last appeal to the Congress Imploring it to spare the

Basque fueros .

Their abolition, he said, would mean the

ruin "and the desolation of the unfortunate Basque country,
so eminently Spanish and so eminently monarchic ...

;

you

are going to ruin and destroy the country designated by
of Savoy.
But Amadeo abdicated in 1873, and the Republic was
proclaimed. In the following year, December 29, 1874, the
Republic was overthrown, and the Bourbon Monarchy was called
back in the person of Alfonso XII, son of Isabela. From
1876 to 1923, there was a period of relative stability in
Spanish politics.
121 Javier de Ybarra Berge, Polltica. Nacional en
Vizcaya (Madrid! Instituto de Estudios Pollticos, 1948),

P. 25.
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Providence to be the impregnable bulwark
of the motherland
and the progressive sentry of its
independence which, in
the fulfillment of these sacrosanct
duties, has always
been the model of pure loyalty to its kings. "122

Another Basque deputy, Martin Garmendia, from
Tolosa,
tried to persuade his fellow deputies to preserve
the
fue£os, for the Basques viewed them as if they were
"a

truly idolatrous cult."

Instead other deputies replied

that the Basques were "traitors to the Motherland. "123
On July 21, 1876, a law was finally promulgated by the

Crown stipulating the relationship between the Basque
provinces and the central government.

Article

I

As indicated by

of this law, 124 the general laws of Spain would

also be applicable to the Basque provinces.

Article IV

seemingly made a concession to the Basques— thus leading
some to believe that the pase foral might be established—
by authorizing the government "to resolve with the consent

of the provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya, whenever

appropriate, all the reforms that their traditional foral

organizations required, so that the welfare of the Basques,
good government, and the security of the nation would be

ensured."*^

*^Quoted

in

venero, op. clt.

l^Berge, pp. cit.

.

.

p.

227.

p. 37.

124 For text see venero, op. clt .. p. 228.
125 *bJLd

f
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The Basque dlputacion^ reacted
negatively to this
legislation. At a meeting in San
Sebastian (the capital
city of Guipuzcoa) on September
11, 1876, the junta of

Guipuzcoa agreed to appeal to "His Majesty
and the high
officers of the State, now and whenever
required, to petition
for the revocation of the law." Insofar
as they were
concerned, their "sacred rights remained intact
as ever."

In a secret meeting, the djputaclon of Vizcaya
agreed not
to cooperate "directly nor indirectly with the
Government
in the execution of the law."126

of the other two provinces.

AUva

followed the behavior

On September 17 and 18, the

diputaclonea of the three provinces met privately in order
to discuss the adoption of a common strategy to resist the
law.

"The meeting of Vitoria /~the capital of Alava_7",

says Venero, "was the first precedent of a systematic

concerted action which had never been realized until that
1 *'
time." 127

After this meeting, the dlputaciones sent delegates

to Madrid to persuade Canovas del Castillo, head of the

government, to have the law repealed.

After some heated

argumentation, Canovas allegedly threatened to declare the

provinces under martial law, if the dlputaciones persisted

with their obstructionist tactics.

Because of their

continued resistance, and their refusal to share the costs
126 Quoted in Venero, op. cit ..
pp. 230-231.
127 Venero

#

op, c^t., p. 231.
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of maintaining a military force left in the
area after the
end of the Carllst War, Canovas dissolved the
dlputaeior,^

and selected a provisional body of judges to take
their
place.

On May 5 f 1877, Vizcaya was put under the complete

control of Madrid.

This was later changed by the royal

decree of February 28, 1878. 1 28
The royal decree finally settled and spelled out in

detail the rules which would govern the relationship between
the Basques and the Spanish State.

The ideas expressed in

this decree gave rise to what became known as the conclerto

economlco .

This was an arrangement by which the Basques

would contribute to the Spanish national treasury a fixed
amount of revenue, to be negotiated from time to time

between each individual province and the central government,
but would leave each province free to apportion its taxes

among its inhabitants in any way it wished.

Under this

arrangement, the Basque provinces were given some form of

administrative autonomy.

For years the province of Vizcaya

did not have direct taxes on property and industry.

This

arrangement lasted up to the 1930' s.
The conflict discussed above between the Basques and
the Madrid government sets the stage for the later emergence

of the Basque nationalist movement.

Although there was

persistent conflict between the Basques and the central
government finally ending with the abolition of the fueros
128 For a copy of the text, see Venero, op. clt .. p. 633.
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in 1876, it would be premature to
characterise the activitie
of the Basques during this period as
full-fledged nationalism.

With very few and isolated exceptions does
one find
evidence that the Basque provinces considered
outright
separation from Spain. While it is undeniable
that

the

Basques considered themselves distinct from the
rest of the
surrounding populations, nevertheless, they struggled
to

preserve their fueros within the structure of the
Spanish
State. They tried to accomplish this by supporting the

traditional view of the Spanish monarchy.

As articulated

by the ideologue of Spanish traditionalism, this would

mean a Catholic Spain with
•••a king who both rules and governs; a true
Cortes in the Spanish tradition, decentralization,
and a real life of the municipality and of the
province; and above all, the Catholic spirit
living in the institutions, in the laws, in the
customs. . . . 29

This view "looked to the medievel Spanish monarchy,
limited by the fueros and the people." 130

gy refusing to

accept the legitimacy of the new order, the Basques in a
sense were reacting negatively to the forces of modernization.

Between 1812 and 1876, they fought the forces of political
integration.
The process of political integration had the paradoxical

effect of introducing disintegrating forces of a new
129 Antonio Aparisi
y Guijarro, Obras (Madrid,
III, p. 341.

13°Schumacher, pp. clt .. p. 344,

1873),
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dimension into Spanish politics.

The centralizing policies

of the Madrid government, along with
Carlist Wars, had the
effect of popularizing the Basque fueros
which might have
been taken for granted up to that time
-with the simultaneous
effect of making the Basques further conscious
of their
perceived uniqueness. Thus, modernization, in
this

particular case, had the paradoxical effect of
bringing
about greater political integration and at the same

time

reviving and reinvigorating tradition, aspects of which
had been nearly forgotten. It is from this period
onwards
that a plethora of works began to appear romanticizing
and

defending the historical roots of the Basque fueros.

CHAPTER

HI

THE EMERGENCE OF SPANISH BASQUE
NATIONALISM

Although fuerismo had remained alive after
the
abolition of the fueros in 1876, it seems that by

the end

of the nineteenth century many segments of the
Basque

population had reconciled themselves to the idea of the
COhclerto econoalco.

While lip service was paid to the

fueros, none of the major political groupings of the Basque

region, with the exception of the Integra list Party,

advocated a return to the pre-1839 political relationship
between the Basques and the Spanish State.
The erosion of the Basque culture and language had

continued its relentless course.

Consequently, by the end

of the century, Spanish Basques were confronted with the
fact that with stunning rapidity they had lost the fueros ;

and their culture was under attack in their very homeland.
The attraction of large numbers of labor migrants to the

Basque region, particularly Vlzcaya and Guipuzcoa, due to
the rapid industrialization of this area, had given rise to
a situation in which the Basques found themselves a minority

in their own urban centers; and the Basque language was

rarely heard in the streets of Bilbao and San Sebastian.
It has been estimated that by 1899 approximately 70 per cent

of the population of Bilbao was non- Basque. 131

One writer

131 Pedro de Basaldua, El Libertador Vasco (Buenos Aires:
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makes the observation that by the
end of the nineteenth
century the upper classes of the Basque
region had become
"fastened to their esrpanolissimo." "The
educated
and

cultural circle, of the area," says the
same writer, "had
become alienated from Basque patriotism,"
and this alienati on
was reinforced by the existing political
parties
of the

region. "132
By the end of the century, the speaking of Basque

had been reduced to coastal fishing villages and to
rural

districts.

Famous Basque intellectuals, such as Unamuno

and Maeztu, well-known figures of the generation of
1898,

wrote their works in Castilian and not in Basque.
It was out of this background that Sabino de Arena

Goiri,

a

young lawyer, son of an industrialist family from

Bilbao, launched the Basque nationalist movement with his

publication of Biskava por su lndependencla in 1893, the
object of which was, to use his words, to teach the
Blzkalnos "the history of their motherland," and to awaken
his "compatriots who disgracefully ignored the language
of their race. "133

Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1953), p. 127. This work, written
by a nationalist, is a biography of Arana but contains much
general information on the politics of the Basque region at
the end of the nineteenth century.
132sabino de Arana Goiri, Obras Completes (Buenos
Aires:
Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1965), p. 16. This work edited
by a nationalist whose name is not divulged, has an extensive
introductory essay discussing the formation of the PMV and
the subsequent development of Basque nationalism.
133

Blzkaya por su independencia
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ftrior to this

publication, Arana had spent
some years
in Barcelona where he studied
at the University

of that city,'

and had come into contact with
the Catalan cultural revival
which was flourishing at that time.
It seems that it was
during his stay in Catalonia that he
became fully converted
to the idea of organizing a Basque
nationalist movement.

Subsequently, Arana submerged himself in
the study of Basque
history and the Basque language, which he
could not speak.
Starting with 1877, he published several
works in philologyl34
in which he expressed his ambition to unify
the Basque
language and purify it by dropping the borrowed
"foreign"
words!
Spanish and French. Arana set himself the
task of

arousing the interest of the Basques in their language
and
culture which, as he realized, was fast disappearing.

"I

was born to witness your death. "135
Between 1890 and 1903, Arana devoted his life and his

energy to the cause of Euzkadl l36 a term Whi c h he coined to
refer to an Independent Basque nation; and laid the ground

work for the political organization of Basque nationalism

with the founding of the Partido Naclonalista Vasco (PNV)
(Bilbao: Editorial Verdes Achirica, 1932), p. 45.
134 Arana Goiri, op. clt ..
p. 82.

135 Arana Goiri, pp. clt ..
p. 26.

136jhe exact date as to when this term was first used
is not clear.
But it seems that it came into regular usage
after 1904 when a periodical entitled Euzkadi appeared

that year.
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in 1894.

As discussed previously, the
question of Basque

autonomy was not new in the Basque region.

What was new

in Arana «s writings was his nationalistic
point of view.
He carried the juerlsta position to
its logical conclusion.

Arena's writings are tinged with what
appears to be a
»racist»137 vlew whlch deplore8 the marriagG
of Basques wlth
non-Basques. The preservation of the Basques as a
"race"

appeared as one of the main tenents of his ideology.

Contempt for other Spaniards, whom he pejoratively referred
to as "maketos", is interspersed throughout his writings.

Frequent use of the phrase "invasion of maketos" was made by
Arana and his cohorts to describe the migration of other
Spaniards to the Basque region.

It was on ethnic grounds

that Arana, as well as later nationalists, made his case for

Basque nationalism.

Later Unamuno described this pre-

occupation with "racial" purity as "absurd racial virginity. "138
For this and for his general views on Basque nationalism,
he was castigated by the nationalists.

Although Arana evoked a responsive chord among some
segments of the urban sectors, students and members of the
clergy, his following remained small. 139

He faced apathy

137xhe concept of "race" as used by the nationalists
It is sometimes used to denote something
cultural and at other times something "racial".
is not clear.

138Q UO ted in Carr, op. cit .. p. 556.

13°Right after he published Blzkaya por su independencja .
group of people from Bilbao gave him a dinner in a place
known as Caserio Larrazabal where they asked him to explain
a
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in the rural areas and hostility
from Basque Industrialists
who, with very few exceptions, never
associated with Basque

nationalism.

Initially Basque nationalism was limited to
the
province of Vizcaya, Arena's home province. When

he

published

fiizfcaya

por 8U lndep endencia r he concentrated on

defending what he conceived to be the historical
rights of
that province, although reference was also made to the
Basque region as a whole.

But because initially he

addressed himself mainly to the Independence of Vizcaya,
early Basque nationalism was also referred to as
blzkaltarrlsmo.

It was not until after his death that his

ideas began to find support in the other three provinces.
It is interesting to note that in the following thirteen

articles elucidating the ideological basis of the (PNV)
the Basque localism that was expressed during the Car list

wars is maintained, although Arana tried to discredit and

disassociate himself from Carlism 1 ^ 0 for, in his opinion,

Carllsm had been responsible for the loss of the

fueros .

The government of a future Euzkadl would consist of a

confederation in which each province would retain its
traditional autonomy.

The two main tenets of the party's

his ideas. For the nationalists, this event became known as
el Juramento Larrazabal and is given as the date that marks
the beginning of Basque nationalism.

14°Sabino de Arana Goiri, El Partldo Car lis ta y los
Fueros Vasco-Navarros (Bilbao, 1897)
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ideology were "God and the Old Laws"

(

Jaunsoikua

^

Zarra )i
B1 Caya Up ° n enteri
«8 * Republican
»
5
accordin S to the acceptance
of lit
the 117aI^°VJ°
political doctrine expounded

^nf^Lii:

by
Goiri* tar Sabino (Sabino Arana Goiri) Arana
in the
8lo an Jaun^oikua eta La l
wh
±
ch
ls
ff
f
explained
the following articles.

m

Article 2— Juan-Goikua—Bizcaya will be
Catholic.
Apostolic, and Roman in all aspects of its
internal affairs and its relations with other
peoples.
Article 3— Lagi -Zarra -Bizcaya will be freely
reconstituted. It will reestablish, with complete
integrity, the essence of its traditional laws,
called Fueroq. It will restore the good
practices and customs of its predecessors. It
will be constituted, if not exclusively, then
principally, of families of the Basque race.
It will establish Basque as its official language.
Article 4— Eta-Bizcaya will be established upon
perfect harmony and accord between the religious
and the political orders, between the divine and
the human.

Article 5— Distinction between Juan-Goikua and
Lagi Zarra Bizcaya will be established with a
clear and marked distinction between the
religious and political orders, between ecclesiastical and civil.
Article 6— Precedence of Juan-Goikua over Lagi
Zarra Bizcaya will be established with a complete
and unconditional subordination of the political
to the religious, of the State to the Church.
Article 7—Confederation--Since Bizcaya is by
race, language, faith, character, and custom a
sister of Aiava, Benabarra (Basse -Navarre).
Guipuzcoa, Labourdi, fJavarra, and Zuberoa (soule),
it will become allied or confederated with these
six peoples to form a whole called Euskalerria,
but without surrendering its particular autonomy.
This doctrine will be expressed in the following
principle:
Bizcaya llbre en Euskalerria libre
(Free Bizcaya in a Free Basque country).
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Article

5n^5L

8— The
by

?}}«°

fiun5atUnJ!!

Basque confederation will be
f the B * 8 « ue 8tates w ith
each
,

e f °rmatton of lts

<

the confederation)

Article 9— The necessary basis for a solid
durable national unity are: unity of race and
as
far as is possible, and Catholic unity.
Article 10— The essential basis to insure
that
the Basque states entering the union will
retain
equal autonomy and Identical faculties arej
freedom to secede, and equality of obligations
and rights within the confederation.
Article 11— Once the confederation is established,
each member state will have the same rights and
identical obligations.

Article 12— The Confederation will unite its
members solely in the terms of the social order
and international relations; in all other
aspects each will maintain its traditional
absolute independence.
Article 13— All of the articles in this document
and political doctrine are irrevocable. 141

Judging from this text, an independent Euzkadi would be
a

loose Confederation in which the provinces would retain

considerable autonomy.
The fact that the Spanish political regime at this

time allowed a considerable amount of political freedom,

universal male suffrage had been established in 1890, the
nationalists were free to propagate their ideas and to
organize.

To this fact one might attribute the low incidence

of violence associated with Basque nationalism during these

years.

Between 1890 and 1930 Basque nationalism was devoid

^Reproduced

in Venero (1945 edition), pp. 244-245.
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of the use of violence either in the
form of assassinations
or riots. Of course this fact could also
have been due
to the lack of intense nationalist sentiment
among the

Basque population.

During the 1890»s Spain was having difficulties
with
the remnants of her overseas empire; and Arana,
in his

writings, delighted in this fact.

His support for the

overseas rebellion coupled with his views on Basque

nationalism, plus his virulent attacks on public figures,
led to his arrest in 1895.

His arrest was. not so much due

to his views on nationalism as to his verbal attacks on the

mayor of Bilbao.

While he stayed in incarceration for the

period of one month, the government brought action against
the Basque Center, the headquarters of the Party, and

demanded its closure.

It seems that the immediate reason

for the closure of the Basque Center by the government was

the publication of an article in the Party 1 s paper, the

Bizkaltarra . entitled, "La invasion maketa en Guipuzcoa. M 142
This article so offended the military officers of the area

that they planned to seize the headquarters of the Party.
This was the first confrontation between the government and

Basque nationalism.

Arana took responsibility for the

article and was given another four months in prison.
Initially Arana addressed himself to the people of
l*2y enero> pp. clt .. p. 290. Unless otherwise indicated,
references to Venero*s work are made to the 1968 edition.
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the Basque urban centers.

But apparently he was not

getting very much reaction from them,
for in 1896, he
decided to concentrate on the Basque
peasants instead. To
this end he began to write calendars
and religious songs in
eusjcesa.

In August of 1897 he started another
paper,

B*gerrltarr«> directed primarily at the peasants. 1*3
this paper he exhorted Basque workers
not to support
socialism gaining adherents among the workers

ln

of the mines

of Bilbao, for in his view, it was a Spanish
organization.

For Arana the "foreign domination" was more
odious than
the "bourgeois domination" 1*4
In 1897 Arana, with the members of the governing

committee of the Basque Center, decided to dissolve the
organization, which had been closed by the government
since 1895, and adopt instead a more low-keyed approach in

their propaganda . 1*5

This was done in order to avoid

government persecution, which had become more sensitive to
the propaganda of the nationalists largely due to the

overseas rebellion.

In his writings Arana praised both the

Cubans and the Philippinos.

Consequently, he and his

followers decided to form cultural and Catholic organization

under the cover of which nationalist objectives would be
pursued.
l*3 i bld .. p. 293.

l^Quoted in Ibid .,

p. 294.

^^Basaldua, op. cit ..

p.

110.
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The results of the elections of
August 1898, for the

provincial deputation, indicated that
popular support for
the ideas of Arana was more widespread
than had been apparent
This was the year in which Spain had been
defeated by
the

United States and lost the last vestiges of
her empire.
Passions were running high in Spain; and some
groups made
ready to take up arms against the government,
including the
Car lists whom Arana dissuaded from taking such
action.

Despite Arana*

support for the overseas rebels, he was

s

elected to the dlputacl on provincial in 1898.1*6

This

was the first time that Basque nationalism had competed
for public office.

In the following year five nationalists

were elected to the municipal government of Bilbao. 1*7
Nationalists were also elected in other municipalities.
The electoral success of the nationalists in Bilbao,

plus a new government in Madrid headed by Francisco Silvela

which included members favorable to the idea of regionalism,
produced optimism among the nationalists who decided to form

another Batzoki (Basque Center).
that the Party 1

s

This time it was decided

propaganda should take a moderate tone:

"The designation of nationalism should be concealed; but the
14fe lbld ..

p.

117.

1*7 Javier de Ybarra y Berge, Po lit lea Kaclonal en
Vlzcava (Madrid:
Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1948),
This book contains a wealth of information on the
p. 199.
local politics of Vizcaya and the relationship between the
industrialists of the region and the central government.
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Center should function a. a
propaganda instrument.
would be carried out by a choral
group known

Thi.

a. Euskerrla

•nd folkloric dancing group.. "148
on April 23, 1899.

nationalist daily,

On June 4,

^

The Center v.. inaugurated

1899, the fir.t issue of a

Correo Vapco, was published.

paper was not very .ucce.sful.

Thi.

It only .old 134 copies.!* 0

Thi. was followed in 1901 with the
publication of a weekly,
£li£l£SiSit of which four copie. were .old.
In October

of 1901

another weekly appeared, La Pa trie , which continued
to be
publi.hed up to the 1930»«. Although thi. paper
disclaimed
any association with Basque nationalism in order
to avoid

government harassment, it was actually maintained by Arena
and his brother, Luis Arena. 150
In March of 1902 Arena once again confronted the Madrid

government and was arrested, tried, and Imprisoned for
sending a telegram to President Roosevelt congratulating

him for granting independence to Cubaj
Roosevelt, President of the United States.
Washington. The Basque Nationalist Party
congratulates the noble federation over which
you preside for having granted independence to
Cuba which had previously been liberated from
slavery. This magnanimous and just example
given by your powerful states is unknown end
unheard of in the history of European powers,
particularly Latin powers. If Europe followed
this example, the Basque nation, the oldest
148 Venero, op. clt ..
p. 302.
** Q lbld.
*

5 0 lbld ..

p. 304.
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people of Europe who have enjoyed centuries
of
liberty, and whose constitution has been
praised in the United States, would also be
free.— Arana Goiri.151
In view of the lack of enthusiasm that Arana
seemed
to be encountering for his nationalist
doctrine, by 1902

he was beginning to have second doubts about
the development

of Basque nationalism.

He seemed to have accepted the

conclusion that the Basques had become too far assimilated
into Spanish culture.

It was his opinion that before long

the Basques, as a distinct group, would disappear . 152

His health was also deteriorating.

Consequently, he argued

that under the circumstances the best course for the Basques

would be to acquire some degree of autonomy within the
Spanish State.

According to an article published in

La Fatrla . he had decided to form a "new Basque party

which would work for the well being of /"the Basque country_7

within the Spanish State, and within the existing legal
system, but which would offer general guide lines for the

reorganization of the Spanish State and particular ones
for the /"Basque country_7." 153

The object of the new Party would be to work for

"greatest autonomy possible within the Spanish State and at
the same time the most appropriate to the Basque character

blueprinted in Venero, op. clt ..
bZgaga^dua, op. clt .. p. 139.
153 La Patrla . July 22, 1902.

p. 304.
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and to modern times. "154

Following the footsteps of the

movement for Home Rule In Catalonia, which at
this time had
acquired great momentum, he would name the new
organization
the
IfS

Usa

de vascos ee panollstas -

On August 24, 1902,

Patrla, with an exhortation to all Basques to gather

around the "Sacred Tree /"the tree of Guernica_7» , a
symbol of their "glorious and happy past" 155 announced the

formation of the new organization.

There were some

indications that Arena's change was purely tacticall56

in

order to avoid government persecution and to get the support

of those groups which desired some degree of autonomy, such
as the Carlists, but were unwilling to go as far as Arana.
In view of the fact that the Lllsa Reglonallsta of Catalonia

seemed to be getting some concessions through parliamentary
means, presumably, Arana believed that a similar strategy
by the Basques would be far more effective.
For the provincial elections of 1903, the nationalists

presented six candidates; but only two were elected.

But

for the Cortes elections of April, 1903, they did not

present any candidates.

In Guernica the millionaire Sota

y Llano, a supporter of Basque nationalism, ran for office
but was defeated. 157

^he results of these elections once

154 lbJLd.
15 5 xbld ..

August 24, 1902.

156 See Engracio de Aranzadi, Erelntza (Zarauz, 1935).

157venero, op. clt .. p. 310.
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again led Arana to believe that
Basque nationally was in
the throes of extinction. Even
though he had established
the ideological foundations of the
movement and had acquired
some followers, Basque nationalism had
not spread to any
significant degree beyond the confines of
Vizcaya.
On

November 25, 1903, after having dedicated his
life to the
cause of Basque nationalism, Arana died from
Adlsson's
disease. He provided Basque nationalism with
its
first

martyr.

After his death, Angel de Zarabala Azumis assumed

political leadership of the movement.
From the year of Arena's death to the 1930*
s, the Party

gradually grew in numbers, spread to the other three
provinces, and eventually acquired respectability as

evidenced by its subsequent gradual successes in electoral
politics.

Under the ideological leadership of Engracio de

Aranzadi, the Party began to develop a cult of personality

around Arana, later described by nationalists as El
Libert dor Vasco .

also launched.

An Intensive propaganda campaign was

In 1904 the Basque Youth Movement was

founded in Vizcaya under the leadership of Luis Urrengoeche.
In the following year, on April 29, 1905, the new leader

of the Party, Angel de Zambala Azumis, issued a Party

directive discussing the ideological position of the Party

vis-a-vis other political parties and exhorting Party
followers not to confuse the political objectives of the
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(PWV) with the objectives of the
other political parties.
In their efforts to spread beyond the
province of Vizcaya,
the nationalists began to make contacts
with the other
three provinces in order to establish Basque
Centers there.
In 1904 the first Basque Center was opened
in the province

of Guipuzcoa.

This was followed three years later with the

inauguration of another center in Alava and another one,
two years later, in Navarra.

By 1910, the Party had branches

in all of the four Basque provinces.

Despite strong

opposition from the tycoons of the region and the recently
created nobility, 158 between 1903 and 1923 the Party became
a serious political force in the Basque region, particularly

in the province of Vizcaya where, in 1918, it had acquired

enough of a following enabling it to get control of the
provincial deputation.

Vizcaya remained, down to the

^SO^s, the bastion of Basque nationalism and continued to
provide the leading personalities of the Party starting with
Arena.
In their efforts to revive Basque culture, the

nationalists began to address themselves to a group which,

particularly in the rural areas, had been regarded as the
protector of whatever was left of Basque culture, that is,

l^The Basque industrialists seemed to have fruitful
relations with the Madrid governments which they, along with
the textile interests of Catalonia and the agrarian Interests
of Castile, successfully pressured for a policy of
protectionism. See Puges, M. , Como triunfo el protecionismo
Editorial Juvenal, 1931).
en Esoana (Barcelona:
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the clergy.

Along with this approach the Party also

concentrated on building an electoral base in
the rural
areas. Although the Party had support in
the provincial
capitals, from which the leadership of the Party
came,

its electoral success in these area, specifically
Bilbao

and San Sebastion, would be limited by the fact that
these
two capitals contained large numbers of people who were
non-

Basques, and consequently, hostile to the movement.

It

seems that right after the death of Arana some segments of
the clergy, either in overt or covert fashion, began to

give support to the Party, a support which was destined to

increase in subsequent years. 159

it was a member of the

clergy, Reverend Ibero, who in 1906 published the following

pamphlet in order to explain and popularize the ideology of
It seems that the connection between the fueros,
God, and the clergy had always been close. During the
course of a sermon in Guernica, on July 21, 1895, to
commemorate the loss of the fueros, Rev. Resurrecion Maria
de Azkue admonished the Basqes never to forget their
fueros : Cuales son las armas de nuestro pueblo? Mo
penseis que vais a encontrar nuestro Roble en imagens de
piedra. Mo existe en estas. Aparece muerto. Nosotros lo
queremos con vlda. Sabeis donde esta, muy vivo, mas que en
parte alguna, el Roble de Guernica? Es en los corazones de
los autenticos euskaldunes donde tiene raices mas hondas
que en su tierra natal..
Escudrinad, vascongados a mantes del Arbol, vuestro
corazon; mirad bien ese Roble; lo teneis ahi mismo. Esta
en brazos de una cruz; la Cruz de Jesus tiene abrazada, con
grande carino nuestro Arbol. Con razon le llamamos Arbol
santo. En la Cruz esta representado Dios; en el Arbol,
la ley vieja, y en este senal de patriotismo que tenenmos
dentro del corazon, Dios y el Fuero.
Amad sin medida vuestro Roble; amad sin
Vascongados
Pues amando el Arbol conseguis introley.
medida vuestra
Cor-azon
el
ducir la Cruz en
y amando la ley amais al mismo
cit .. p. 287.
Venero,
op.
Dios. Quoted in
I
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nationalism.

This pamphlet, entitled Ami V fl8C o .
deserves
to be quoted at length for it became
one of the chief

ideological statements of Basque nationalism:

49— What

is Basque nationalism?
It is
political system which defends the rightthe
Basque race to live independent from any of the
other
race.

50— What is the basis for this system? The
distinction that exists between the Basque
race and the other races of the world.
51— Is

that distinction certain? Indeed it is;
so much so that no man of a sound mind and
median culture would dare to deny it.

52— How

can you prove it? With a sound and
irrefutable argument which is possible for
anyone to reach. In effect, I said previously
that differences between races is proved by
the differences between languages.
Since the
Basque language differs radically from all
the other languages, therefore, the race is
also different from all the others.

57— Does

one infer from what you said that the
Basque is not genetically Spanish? Yes sir.
Just as one can equally infer that he is not
French, nor English, nor German, nor Russian,
nor Hungarian, nor Turk, nor Greek, etc. To
assert that the Basque is Spanish is to commit
a triple error:
ethnic, geographic, and political.

59— Has the Basque race, distinct from all the
others, maintained up to the present its
integrity and purity? Yes sir. If it had
mixed with others, and in view of the fact that
it is so small, it most certainly would have
been absorbed by the others and at this time
there would not even exist a memory of the
Basque language. Likewise, the mixture of
races should easily be seen in the Basque
language. But one does not find any traces of
French, Spanish, Celt, German, nor from any
of the other European languages. One must
conclude, consequently, that the Basque race
has maintained its purity up to the present.
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61— Is

the right of the Basques to live
nt from ° ther Peoples based solely
on
iSf
S?53*
the difference
that exists between their race
and the others? No. It is also based
on the
exercise of that right which the Basques
enjoyed
for centuries until it was taken away
from them.
e

66— When

did the Basque states lose their
independence? Those on the other side of the
Pyrenees in 1789 during the French Revolution.
11
this side of the Pyrenees, much later,
P10
•
in 1839.

?™

89— What are the objectives of nationalism? To
re-establish the state of affairs in which the
Basque states found themselves prior to 1839 and,
without reducing the liberty of any one of them,
to form amongst themselves a federation to
protect the Basque race and its rights.
93— Is

the Basque Nationalist Party a party
fundamentally Catholic? Yes sir. The Party
wants for Euzkadi Catholic unity with all its
consequences, ^foremost and above all, the
Jaun-Golkua £ God_7, an Euzkadi devoted to
God such as it was before its fall in 1839.
There is no doubt on this point.
If the
Basque Nationalist Party had a choice between
an Euzkadi with its rights but divorced from
Christ, and one such as today and loyal to
Christ, it would choose the latter.

104— Your reasoning is such that there is no
choice but to accept your conclusions. But
there is still a more powerful argument. Here
it is:
Euzkadi is Christian; Euzkadi believes
in God.... 160
Reverend Ibero had earlier encountered difficulties with
the government for allegedly preached in a sermon, in

Pamplona the capital of Navarra, the "exterminio de todos
libera le s." 161

A publication of the Boletin Oflclal del

60 Evangelista de Ibero (Rev.), Ami Vasco (Buenos
Editorial Vasca Ekin, 1957).
Aires:
l

161 Ibid., p. 6,
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° bls P ado > 1910 indicating that
»
Basque name, would be

acceptable in the Church's registry is
further indication
that in their campaign to revive Basque
culture the

nationalists were gaining adherents among the
clergy.

In

1921 a group of Basque priests founded the Jaungoikua-Znl*

Baskuna, devoted to the instruction of Basque. 162
To the Basques, particularly the clergy,
socialism and

liberalism had become identified as anti-Christian and,
therefore, anti-Basque.

This, of course, was part and

parcel of the Car list Ideology which had characterized

every liberal as anti-Catholic since the Cadiz constitution
of 1812.

It should be added that among some segments of the

population of Navarra such ideology still exists.

It has

been argued that the Basque clergy saw in the nationalist

movement and in the revival of Basque culture a means to
isolate the Basques from the influence of liberalism:
"Don't teach your sons Castilian, the language of liberalism."! 63
The emergence of socialism among the mine and shipyard

workers of Bilbao, in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, gave rise to a situation which might have enabled
the socialists to control local government (Bilbao) at the

expense of both the nationalists and the established liberal
and conservative groups.

This fear on the part of the

162 Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil
Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 16.
War 1931-1939 (Princeton:

163g uo ted in Carr op. cit .. p. 558.
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"establishment" of the Bilbao area was
particularly manifest
during the preparations for the general
elections for the
Cortes In 1907. There was fear that a split
of the vote
between the nationalist candidate, Pedro Anitua,
and the
candidate of the "establishment", Fernando Maria
de Ybarra,
an industrial tycoon, might give the seat of Bilbao
to
the socialist candidate, Pabo lglesias, whom the
fueristas

regarded as a rabble rouser.

The following quotation from

a letter of a fuerista urging the nationalists to
support

Ybarra, illustrates the dismay of some fueristas at the Idea
of having a socialists representing Bilbao in the Cortes:
It has been brought to my attention that
the Party (PNV) has decided to present its own

candidate about whose personality 1 have nothing
but praise.
I also fully realize that such a
project is motivated by an excessive zeal to
maintain the purity of our doctrines. But I
must also point out that under the present
circumstances we must make all kinds of
sacrifices in order to prevent sectarianism,
the enemy of our race and laws, the standardbearer of the breakers of our social institutions,
the possibility of being elected.
1 consider it
a small sacrifice for the nationalists and the
orthodox fueristas to support Mr. Ybarra. I
believe that it would be a shame for Bilbao and
Vizcaya to elect to the Cortes to the £irst
time, a representative of that party / Socialist..7»
an enemy of all that which is sacred and dear
to us*
It is for this reason that 1 appeal to
you and the Party to accept and support the
candidacy of D. Fernando Maria de Ybarra. 164
There were some moderate nationalists who would rather
have seen Ybarra elected than a socialist.

And some of them

l^Ybarra Y Berge, op. clt. . pp. 276-277.
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did support Ybarra rather than
their own candidate, as a
result of which they were expelled
from the Party. Ybarra
was elected.

Antonio Maura's proposal (Maura was Prime
Minister)
to the Cortes of 1907 to reform local
government,

to make

local governments more independent of the
central government,
helpedl65 to 8park the revival of fuerista
sentiment in the

Basque region.

Judging from the behavior of the provincial

deputations, fuerista sentiment was not death as it had

apparently appeared to many people of the region.

On

November 28, 1907, representatives from the provincial
deputations of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya met to draft a

proposal which would, if accepted by the government in
Madrid, restore the foral regime of the Basque provinces.

Among other things, the final draft of this proposal asked
for the repeal of the 1876 law, which had finally abolished
the fueros . and the "absolute restitution of /their_7 old

regime."

In order to accomplish this end, "the deputations

of the Basque provinces and of the municipalities should

constitute themselves and function in accord with their
traditional usages and customs. "166

Fuerismo was back in

l^Carr indicates that the reform of local government
had long been an issue in Spanish politics. Between 1882
and 1932, 20 proposals to reform local governraemt were
presented to the Cortes, p. 375. For a discussion of local
government see, H. Puget Le Gouvernment Local en Espagne
(Paris, 1920); A. Posada. La evolucion leglslatlva del
regimen local (Madrid, 1910)
166For a copy of this proposal see Ybarra y Berge,
.
p. 627.

op. cit.
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politics again.

Maura while desirous of government
reform,

his pet project to eliminate the corrupt
system of

caclQuMmo * 67 by which elections were manipulated by
the

.

Ministry of the Interior in Madrid, would have
nothing to
do with this question. Moreover, he argued,
if

he ever gave

any support to such proposal, he would bring upon
himself the
wrath of the liberals who were not very enthusiastic
about

his proposed local government reform since they viewed
it
as a tactic by the conservatives to eliminate liberal

electorate strength.

He replied that under the circum-

stances the Basques should be content with the status quo

and the preservation of their conclerto economlco .168

Apparently the nationalists did not involve themselves

with this proposal put forth by the fuerlstas whom at this
time they seemed to regard as their erstwhile opponents.

Nevertheless, one might infer that this renewed interest in
fuerismo could not but help the cause of the nationalists

who continually maintained that the Basques lost their
independence in 1839 after the conclusion of the first

Car list War.
During the municipal elections of Bilbao, 1909, the

nationalists captured 8 seats out of a total of 23.

They

For a discussion caclaulsmo * see Joaquin Costa,
Ollgarqula y caciouismo (Madrid, 1902).

168ybarra y Berge, op. cit .. p. 285.
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held the largest bloc of votes
within the council. Jose
Horn, a nationalist, was appointed
mayor of Bilbao. The
growing success of the nationalists,
along with the growing
strength of the socialists, led the
conservative forces of
the area, most of whom came from the
banking and industrial
sectors and who had dominated politics in
the area,
to

formally organize a conservative party which
would combat
both the nationalists and the socialists in
electoral
politics. 169

Before the establishment of the conservative

party, there had been some plans to form a Catholic
party;
but these plans failed.

Leading the efforts to establish a

local wing of the conservative party was Fernando Maria

Ybarra, who became the local chief of the Party on June
30,
1909, when the Party was finally established.

This event

was honored with a visit of Antonio Maura, leader of the

Conservatives and also Prime Minister.

This was followed

with the formation of a local wing of the Liberal Party
in January of 1910.

Besides the fuerlsta sentiment already alluded to,

another issue which helped to radicalize political life in
the Basque region was the clerical issue introduced into

politics by the Liberals in 1910 under the leadership of
Jose Canals jas. 170

During the Restoration period, the

169 lbid .. pp. 313-319.
a discussion of this issue and the Liberal Party,
see Daniel Lopez (ed.), El Partido Liberal (Madrid, 1912).
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number of religious orders had proliferated
in Spain.
In
1910 the Liberals mad an issue out of this by
introducing
legislation, Ley de Condadn, which would require
the

religious orders to register just like any other
organizations
and would prevent the further growth of them
without
the

permission of the government.

To the Church and its

supporters, this was a violation of the Concordat and an

impingment on the Church's freedom.

On July 10, 1910,

Canalejas suspended diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
This action caused such a fury in the Basque region that,
in the words of Carr, "Basque Catholics threatened civil

war...." 171

Ybarra, a Basque industrialist, sent his

personal secretary to Rome to inquire about what to do

regarding the governments legislation. 172
The Basque nationalists along with other Catholic

groups of the Basque region planned a demonstration in order
to dissuade the government from carrying through the proposed

legislation.

The government forbade such a demonstration,

declared Bilbao under martial law, and sent troops to the
area.
The general events surrounding national politics
See also D. Seville Andres, Cana leias (Barcelona, 1956);
and M. Fernandez Almagro, Hlstoria del relnado de D. Alfonso
XIII (Barcelona, 1934).
171 Carr, op. cit .. p. 492.
72 Ybarra y Berge discusses at length the negative
reactions of the Basque industrialists to this law,
l

pp. 347-348.
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such as the revival of anti-clericalism,
with the subsequent
reactions in the Basque region from right-wing
groups, plus
the emergence of fyer|,smo presented the
t
Party with some
problems. It would have to compete with other
groups such
as the Car lists and other Catholic groups.
But the Party's
support for the Church, a revered Institution in
the Basque

region, and its association with right-wing groups,

unwittingly meant support for the monarchy.
was one of the Party

1

s

main tenets.

But republicani

For a group within the

Party the recent growing confessionalism of the Party and
its attempts to appeal to right-wing groups, was taken

with strong reservations.

Consequently, this secularly

oriented minority decided at the end of 1910 to leave the
Party and form a new group with the motto of Aberri eta

Askatasuna (Fatherland and Liberty) and founded a paper
entitled Askatasuna .

Its headquarters became known as the

Centro Nacionallsta Republlcano Vasco .* 73

This group which

never acquired too much of a following represented the
Left in Basque nationalism.
The growing appeal of socialism to the mine and

shipyard workers of Bilbao, most of whom were from the

outside of the Basque region, motivated the (PNV) with the

help of the clergy to found

a

Basque Catholic workers

organization which would be affiliated with the Party.
173 Venero, pp. cit .. pp. 340-341.
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This occurred in 1911 with the formation
of the Solldarld«H
de 9brero« Vascos (SOV).!™ Xo thia
organijEatlon came a

number of small Catholic labor unions which
had existed
in the Basque country for some time. 175
But lt

8eem8 that

the predominant group within this organization
was the

white collar workers of Bilbao.

Although orignlally Basque

industrialists, with very few exceptions, they did not
support the nationalists whom they regarded as "rebeldes
burgueses"; 176

apparently some industrialists eventually

came to the support of the Basque labor unions which eschewd
the notion of class struggle.

Needless to say, for this

posture they became the object of disdain for socialist
and anarchist labor unions. 177

The social philosophy of

the (PNV) was basically a conservative Catholic social

philosophy derived from the encyclicals of Pope Leo Xlll.
The period between 1913 and 1923 was a time of social

and political turmoil in Spain.

The political coalition

which had governed Spain since the Restoration in 1876
74 Eu2ko Langlllen Alkartasuna (Solidaridad de Obreros
Vascos), (Biarritz, 1961).
l

l

7 ^Juan N.

l

7o Ybarra

Garcia -Nieto, El sindicallsmo crlstiano en
sobre
notas
su origen v evoluclon hasta 193o.
p££J2£*»
Universidad de Deusto, Institute de Estudios
tBilbad:
Economico-Soclales, 1960). For a list of Catholic labor
organizations in the Basque region at the turn of this
century see, Estadistlca de las Asoclaclones Catollcas de
obreros de Espana en 1 de mavo de 1907 (Madridj Consejo
Macional de las Asociaciones Catollcas, 1907).

l 77 The

y Berge, op p clt .. p. 465.

socialist labor unions labelled them as "amarillos."
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was beginning to disintegrate
and seemed unable to deal
with the new political forces making
demands on the
political system.178 There were
sporadic strikes followed
by social distrubances and, by the
end of the decade,
particularly after World War I, persistent
government
crises. Regionalism in both Catalonia and
the Basque region
became increasingly militant. In the province
of Vizcaya,
the nationalists gained control of the
provincial deputation.

Following the footsteps of Catalonia which had
already been
given a statute to form a Mancommunidad (1913),
the (PNV)

just before the provincial elections had issued a
manifesto
also asking for a Mancommunidad for the Basque provinces.

Although nationalist sentiment was not as intense in the
other three provinces as it was in Vizcaya, there is no

question that sentiment for some form of Home Rule was

widespread throughout the Basque region.

For example, at a

meeting in Vitoria, the capital city of Alava, in July of
1917, the provincial deputations of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and

Vizcaya met to discuss plans to write

a

proposal to be

submitted to the government to grant local autonomy.

The

final version of the proposal asked for complete autonomy,

insofar as the domestic affairs of the provinces were
concerned, but would leave the power to deal with foreign

affairs in the Spanish State.

Essentially, some kind of a

178foi a discussion of this period see Carr, op. clt.
pp. 489-558.
.

.
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federal relationship.

This proposal submitted to the

government on December 17, 1917, was
shelved, as several
before, for further consideration.
The initiative for this
proposal had come from Vizcaya where the
nationalists were
displaying new confidence as the result of
their electoral
success in the recent elections.
In the following year during the general
elections

for the Cortes, the nationalists elected seven
deputies,

four of which were elected in Vizcaya.

On October 25, 1918,

the Basque nationalist, deputies, in commemoration
of the loss

of the fueros on October 25, 1839, sent a telegram to

President Wilson:
At the
anniversary of the abrogation
of the Spanish government of the independence
of the Basque nation, those undersigned deputies
and senators of the Spanish Parliament mindful
of their responsibilities in the name of the
Basque nation, give greetings to the President
of the United States of America who has
established the basis for the future peace of
the world based on the right of every
nationality, small or large, to live in
whatever form it wishes. These bases, which
were accepted by all the belligerent states,
we would like to see promptly applied as
required by the interests of justice and
collective freedom. 179

A similar telegram was sent to Clemenceau.

This was not the

first time that the nationalists had tried to get international

attention for their cause.

As will be recalled, Arana had

done a similar thing when he sent a telegram to the American
1

79R. e pr i. nte<j

in Venero, op. cit .. p. 395
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President in 1902 when Cuba was given
its independence.

And

in 1916 the Basque nationalists had
sent delegates to the

Conference des Nationals.

in

Lausanne.

But prior to

1936 it seems that the Basques did not make
too much of an

effort to give their cause international
recognition.

Such

efforts came only after 1939, as a result of the
dramatic
events surrounding the Spanish Civil War when they
were

defeated along with the Republican forces.
This telegram sent to Wilson and Clemenceau caused

great consternation within the Cortes.

Victor Pradera,

a Traditionalist from Navarra who down to 1936 remained one

of the more outspoken defenders of Spanish unity within the

Basque region, launched an attack on the nationalists and
tried to use historical evidence to refute their separatist
claims.

As to the question of a Basque ethnicity, Pradera

chided them over the fact that so many of the Basque

nationalists were not of Basque descent:
I have maintained that race is not the
criterion for nationality; but you have persistently
maintained the contrary. Using your own argument,
I ask you:
Where is your race? Italians, but no
Basques; Frenchmen, but no Basques; Germans, but
no Basques; and Spaniards who have abandoned their
fathers and mothers. How can you represent the
race whose existence you maintain? 180

180g uotecj in Ibid . . Jose Horn, a senator from Vizcaya,
was of German descent; Pedro de Chalbaud, another senator
from Vizcaya, was of French ancestry; and Arturo Campion
from Navarra was of Italian ancestry. "This reflects the
nationalists dilemma that much of the population of the
Basque country, including many ardent nationalists, possessed
shaky geneological claims to Basque descent. This fact
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Following the behavior of their
brethern, on December
30, 1918, a meeting of Navarrese mayors,
deputies, and
provincial deputies took place in Pamplona,
the capital city
of Navarra, in which a proposal for
autonomy was approved:
e n8
Navarra, s aspirations for the
—.«.«i
!i'
restitution
of its foral institutions remain as
firm as ever, and in light of the present
government's recognition of the possibility of
granting autonomy to the various regions, this
Assembly considers it appropriate at this time
for the deputation to bring once again
to the
attention of the government Navarra 1 s desire to
have its moral faculties restored by repealing
all laws which contravene them. Without
breaking from Spain, Navarra desires to
retain the special characteristics of its ancient
kingdom but adapted to actual conditions and
in harmony with those spheres within the purview
of the power of the Spanish State. 181

As illustrated by this statement, the demands of Navarra

were nothing more than old fuerlsmo in a modified form.
There was nothing radical about this proposal.
it the political unity of Spain was accepted.

Underlying
This was an

assumption which the nationalists did not accept.

As we

shall see later, Navarra followed a different path and

disassociated itself from the other three provinces when a
lends substance to the somewhat jocular criticism that in
order to be a confirmed Basque nationalist one must possess
at least one non- Basque last name or be ignorant of the
Basque language." William A. Douglass and Milton M. da
Silva, "Basque Nationalism," in Oriol Pi Sunyer (ed.),
The Limits of Integration:
Ethnicity and Nationalism in
Modern Europe . Research Report No. 9, Department of
Anthropology, University of Massachusetts, October, 1971,
p.

182.

ISlfteprinted in Venero, op. cit .. p. 400.
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statute of autonomy was finally
given in October of 1936.
The recent manifestation for local
autonomy on the
part of the Basques and Catalonia
led the government of
Romanones, in 1919, to appoint an
extra-parliamentary

committee to investigate this problem and
come up with some
proposal. After some deliberation, this
committee presented
a proposal which would grant autonomy
to the Basque provinces
withlji the Spanish State. 182 Among the
items enumerated
in

this proposal, the Basque language would be
given official

status and would become a requirement for public
employment
in the Basque region.

As to military service, a sensitive

issue in the Basque provinces, the Basques would be

obligated to serve in the Spanish military just as any other
Spaniards; but the provinces would have the option of

deciding on the form of recruitment.

Consonant with one of

the traditional Basque fueros . Basque servicemen

would

be stationed in their provinces except in cases of war.
To the more extreme nationalists, this proposal was not

satisfactory, because it proceeded on the assumption that
the Basques were a mere region of Spain a view which Arana

had rejected.

Apparently there was a group within the party who
had come to the conclusion that under the circumstances the
more realistic thing to do would be to accept the fuerlsta
182p or a copy of the proposal see Venero, op. clt ..
pp. 401-404.
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view and speak in terms of regionalism
rather than
nationalism. Whether this view was
being

accepted merely

as a tactic or whether it was
sincerely believed, is
difficult to tell although there is evidence
that a change
in ideology was taking place.

It seems that some members

of the Party were beginning to believe that
the cause of
nationalism had not gone very much beyond what it
was when
Arana founded the Party in 1894. Consequently,
the Party

seemed to be moving to a position close to that of
Cambo
in Catalonia, that is, regionalism.

This was the conclusion

reached by someone familiar with the activities of the
Party at that time:
The Basque Nationalist Party is losing its
cohesion and aggressiveness. It is becoming
factionalized and coming apart. One of its
factions is espousing a more tolerant view of
Spain and of the Spanish State. At this moment
a few men of good sense are in the process of
writing a manifesto of separation. They declare
themselves to be avid supporters of the Basque
language and the cultural life of the Basque
people, but they are willing to live within
Spain and even some say that they are among
the erstwhile supporters of the king. They
are about to form a fuerista party similar to
the one that existed before. This turn of
events is a return to an ancient cause. 183

The same writer also makes the interesting insight regarding

Basque nationalism by indicating that one of the reasons
for the slow development of Basque nationalism was the fact

that it had not been suppressed enough;
183j oa q U i n Adan, La obra pogtuma de Joaquin Adan
(Bilbao:
Editorial Vizcaina, 1938), p. 102.
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Basque nationalism is the least
of all nationalisms. It has not been persecuted
entertwined with religious struggles and
neither has
it been subjected to the sword, such
as the Irish
case.
The reactions of the public authorities
nad consisted in the mere closure of a
few
clubs, censure of a few publications, and a
few
shots by the security guards. 184
This shift in attitude was not acceptable to
all members
of the Party and to the youth organizations.
These

developments led to another schism within the Party; but
this time it was led by the ideological purists under
the

leadership of Sabino Arena's brother, Luis de Arana, who
had helped to found the Partldo ftaclonallsta Vasco .185

Since Primo de Riverain disbanded all political organizations

during his dictatorship, not very much is known about the

political activities of both groups during the 1920»s,
although they continued their propaganda campaign at a
different level through cultural organizations.
The social and political disentegratlon which seemed
to have been taking place within Spain was brought to a halt
10 *Ib±d..

p.

103.

185 Lui s de Arana Goiri, Formulorio de los prlnclpios

esenciales v baslcos del prlmltivo nacionallsmo vasco .
contenldos en el lema Jaun-Golkua eta Lagi-Zarra ( Bilbao:
Artes Graficas Grijelrao, S.A., 1932.)
186p or a brief discussion of the Union Patrlotica .
Primo de Rivera •s party, see Juan J. Linz, "From Falange to
Movimiento-Organizacion:
The Spanish Single Party and the
Franco Regime, 1936-1968," in Samuel P. Huntingdon and
Clement H. Moore (eds.) Authoritarian Politics in Modern
Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 131.
Society (New York:
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along with all political activities
In 1923.
On September 13
of that year General Primo de
Rivera led a successful
coup d'etat which brought the regime
which had governed
Spain since the Restoration to an end.
Subsequently, all
political parties were dissolved along with
all the

provincial deputations.

The only political organization

allowed to function was the Union Patrfn
t |^ founded by the
supporters of Primo de Rivera. Although the
Basque

provincial deputations were dissolved, along with
the
deputations of the other provinces, he kept the conciertp
ec Q n 9ff»lco *« « result of which he received the
support of

the Basque industrialists.

Paradoxical as it might seem, and judging from the
events of 1931, Basque nationalism seemed to have flourished

under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.

Although he

forbade the publication of nationalist periodicals and
newspapers, apparently he closed his eyes to their cultural

activities.

It was during his regime that the Basque

language was given recognition by the Real Academla Espanola .

Because political manifestations of Basque nationalism were
not allowed, the nationalists concentrated their efforts in

religious and cultural festivities.

Theatrical groups such

as Naski travelled throughout the region performing Basque

plays; and Plstkundla . a publishing house devoted exclusively
to Basque publications, was also founded. 8 ?

Venero, op. cit., p. 444.

This is a tactic
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which was adopted years later under the Franco
regime.
The growth of nationalism In the Basque
region proceeded

simultaneously with efforts at cultural revival.

As we

recall, Arana himself had started his nationalistic

activities by immersing himself In philological studies.
It must be emphasized, however, that many of those
engaged
in the efforts to revive Basque culture and language did

not necessarily share the political objectives of the

nationalists although they collaborated in this endeavour.
Starting with the latter part of the nineteenth
century, the Basque region experienced a romantic movement

which manifested itself in Basque historical studies with
the end result of mythologizing much of Basque history:

The country was experiencing a pseudohistoric romantic movement which constructed
legendary traditions with supposed heroic
feats of the ancient Basques such as their
rivalry with the Romans but never conquered
by them, the feat of Roncevalles, medieval
horrors, and popular creeds. 188

The Basques were portrayed as a fiercely independent and

democratic people whose history had been one of persistent
struggle to preserve their independence and liberties.

But

with the establishment of such scholarly journals as
La Revista Internacional de Estudios Vascos (1907), and

Eus^o- Folk lore (1923), Basque studies were put within a
188 Luis Michelena, Historla de la Llteratura Vasca
(Madrid:
Ediciones Minotauro, 1960), p. 136. This work

discusses the historical development of Basque literature
both in Spain and France.
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more rigorous setting.
This romantic movement had its precursor
in the person
of Jose Maria Yparraguirre who, in the late
1850»s and early
1860«s, romanticized, in the form of popular
songs, the loss
of the Basque fueros.* 89 It must be added that
this was

done with the support of the provincial deputations
which
in the later years of his life gave him a pension.

This interest in the revival of Basque culture was

also shown by the governmental bodies of the region.

In

1888, for example, the Piputacion de Vl2caya finally

created a chair of Basque studies, a project which had long
been discussed by Basque academicians.

Resurreccion Maria

de Azkue, a doyen of Basque studies, particularly the

language, became the first catedratico .

Both Miguel de

Unamuno and Sabino Arana applied for this position.
Judging from the short duration of the periodicals

which were founded during this period, ^0

^t

seems that the

sentiment to revive the language and the culture was not

widespread.

Much of this effort and sentiment did not go

beyond academic circles.

In contrast to the rise of

89 yparraguirre wrote the Guernicacao Arbola (The Tree
of Guernica) --this is the tree under which the kings of
Castile used to take the oath to respect the Basque fueros -which eventually became a national anthem for the Basques.
I

9 0 Revlsta de

Vlzcaya (Bilbao, 1885-1889): Revlsta
de las Pr ovine las Euskeras (Vitoria, 1878-1860); Revlsta
Euskera (Pamplona. 1878-1883); fcuska 1-erria (San Sebastion,
1880-1917).
*
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nationalism in Catalonia, Basque nationalism was not
preceded
by a literary renaissance.

And one of the early objectives

of the Party was precisely to do this:

to get the Basques

to become more interested in speaking and writing euskera
.

The pattern of the rise of Basque nationalism has not

followed very closely the pattern of other nationalist

movements.

That is, first there is a cultural revival which

is later followed by political nationalism. 191

The efforts at cultural revival, as opposed to

political nationalism, was pursued by Basques on both sides
of the Spanish- French border.

For example, at the Congreso

de Euskeristas Para La Unificacion de la Ortografia . held
on September 16, 1901, in Hendaya, Basques from both sides

of the border participated.

Both sides were also present

at the founding of the Federacion de Literature Vasca .

November 8, 1901, to which the Canon of the Cathedral of
Bayonne was elected president and Sabino de Arana vice

president.
present.

This collaboration has continued down to the
It seems that the French region has produced a

richer literary tradition (in Basque) than the Spanish region. 192
191"ln most cases. • .the national revival began as a
purely cultural movement. •• .Elsewhere, nearly always the
first symptoms of the new age was an eager delving into
national history and philology, the collection of legends
and folk-lore, the compilation of grammars and textbooks."
C.A. iMacartney, National States and Ration al Minorities
(London, 1934), p. 94.
192LU i, Michelena, "La Literatura en Lengua Vasca,"
La Gran Enciclopedia Vasca (Bilbao, 1968), p. 10.
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These efforts to revive the culture
culminated in
1918 when the deputations of the Basque provinces,
with the
help and support of the PNV sponsored the First
Congress of

Basque Studies held at Onate.

Although nationalists were

present at this congress, the participants consisted of
people of diverse political leanings. 193

^

congress wa8

honored with the presence of Alfonso XIII who was;
named
honorary president of the governing board. From
this

congress the Socledad de Sstudlos Vascos and the
Academia
de la L engua Vaaca emerged.

Viewed retrospectively, the Basque culture was too far
gone for a successful resuscitation.

In the words of Carr

as late as the 1930' 8— and one might add up to

now— Basque

nationalism had "produced no literature even remotely
comparable with that of the Catalan Renaissance. "194

This

is not to mean that there are no literary figures in the

Basque region.

On the contrary, the Basque region has

produced much literature; but most of it written in Spanish.
Pio Baroja, has written profusely about the Basques, but all

of it in Spanish.

Both Unamuno and Maeztu, titans of the

193 prlmer congreso de Estudlos Vascos . (Bilbao:
Bilbaina de Artes Graficas, 1919). It was one of the main
objectives of this congress to place the study of the Basque
language on a more "scientific" level. A list of 774
persons attending this congress reveals that most of them
were from urban centers and middle class background.
Reading the papers presented at this congress one gets the
impression that the feeling of Basque identity was quite
strong.

l^Carr, op. clt ..

p. 556.
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generation of »98, wrote their works in Spanish.
Although Basque nationalism found followers among
some
Carllsts and persons from Car list families— Arana* s
family
had supported the Carlist wars«--it was essentially a
new

radical political force in the Basque region.

As we saw in

our discussion of Carllsmo . it did not advance political

separatism from Spain.

It was essentially a conservative

movement trying to preserve the traditional Institutional
arrangements of the Spanish Monarchy and thus, preserve
the traditional Basque local liberties, a phenomenon which

had also occurred in other European countries when

modernization and state centralization got under way.

In

contradistinction to Basque nationalism, Carlismo can
properly be called a regional movement which presupposes
the existence of the larger Spanish nation.
the fuerlstas had a double nationalism:

one Basque. 1^5

In a way

one Spanish and

The fuerlstas , while very much suspicious

of the power of the central government, and also concerned

with the preservation of the Basque language, nevertheless,
objected to the political objectives of the nationalists.
Among representatives of the fuerlsta view, one finds

Victor Pradera, an avid defender of the traditional
195it should be pointed out that many Spaniards make
a distinction between "la patria chica" and "la patrla
grande". The former refers to the region and the latter
to the whole of Spain. But, as many Spaniards say, in many
cases the "patria Chica" is the one that counts.
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prerogatives of the provinces; but who, at
the same time,
persistently castigated the political doctrine
of the
nationalists and their vitriolic attacks on
Spain.

To the

Carlists the political unity of Spain was not
in question.
All in all there is no question that sentiment
for

some degree of autonomy continued to exist in
the Basque

region.

However, not all such sentiment could be labelled

nationalistic for the reasons discussed above.

CHAPTER

IV

BASQUE NATIONALISM AND THE
SECOND SPANISH REPUBLIC 1931-1939

With the resignation of General Primo de Rivera on

January 28, 1930, as dictator of Spain, and the subsequent
proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic on April
1931, a new era in Spanish politics began.

14

This era offered

new possibilities to Basque nationalism since the political
freedom of the new republic would allow the nationalists to

openly proselytize for their cause.

Apparently Basque

nationalism had suffered less under the dictatorship of Primo
de Rivera than might have been expected.

No sooner had the

Republic been proclaimed than the nationalists immediately
began to mobilize their forces and to discuss the possibility
of demanding a statute of autonomy from the new government

and immediately assumed that the new Republic would be

federal.

In order to mobilize their supporters, the

nationalists called for a rally to take place in Guernica
on April 17,

1931.

But the new government forbade such a

rally for fear that the Basques might follow the example
of the Catalans who, under the leadership of Francisco

Macia, had proclaimed a Catalan State (April 14) within the

Spanish Republic.
On April 19, 1931, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco
issued a manifesto recognizing and supporting the Republic
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and expressing the aspirations of the
Basque municipalities
for the restitution of their traditional
liberties. 196 It
was expected that the new regime would be
more responsive
to the demands for autonomy than the
previous governments,
under the monarchy. But it later became apparent
that the

new regime was almost as reluctant as the governments
of the
monarchy to hand out statutes of autonomy. Furthermore,
while Article II of the constitution of the Republic made
provisions for regional autonomy, 197 which if applied to
all regions or provinces would lead to a federal republic,
the new republicans were as unwilling as their predecessors
to recognize the Basques as a nation.

noted that the leadership of the

PN"V

It must also be

did not call for

outright independence either but for autonomy within the

Spanish Republic.

But one may conjecture that autonomy was

only a step in the direction of eventual political independence.
Jose Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube, a young lawyer from
an industrialist family of Bilbao who had been elected mayor
of the town of Guecho during the April 12, 1931, municipal
196For a copy of the text see Venero, op. cit .. p. 478.
197 Th e constitution of the Second Spanish Republic was
promulgated on December 9, 1931. Article II read as follows:
"If one or several contiguous provinces with common
historical, cultural, and economic characteristics agree to
organize as an autonomous region, in order to form a
political and administrative nucleus within the Spanish
State, they shall present their charter according to the
provisions of Article 12." For a collection of Spanish
constitutions see Arnold Verduin (ed.), Manual of Spanish
Constitutions 1808-1931 (Ypsilandi, Michigan: University
of Lithoprinters, 1941).
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elections, assumed leadership of Basque
nationalism with the
advent of the Republic. Aguirre had a long
record of social

activism and was popularly known as a leading
soccer
player in the Basque region. He had founded the
Socledad
Eusko-Ma^tesupa (Basque Youth Organization) and was former
president of the influential Acclon Catolica de Vizcaya .198
His religiosity and social work with the Catholic

organizations of the region undoubtedly made him a strategic
candidate to lead Basque nationalism for he probably had
more contacts with the clergy of the region— in the Basque

country very close to the parishoners and respected by them
(in contrast to most of Spain)— than any of the other

leading members of the Party, and thus, maintaining the

Party's identification with the Church.

Under his leadership, the Party initiated an intensive

campaign in order to bring Navarra under the orbit of
Basque nationalism.

Several meetings and rallies were

held in Navarra in order to popularize nationalism in that
province.

Aguirre chose Navarra as his electoral district

when he campaigned for the constituent Cortes of 1931.
Despite these efforts, Navarra continued to be the home
base of Carlismo .

But the fear that the new Cortes might

be composed of a leftist majority which within the context

of Spanish politics would mean an avalanche of anti clerical ij
-

198 For a short bibliography on Aguirre see Pedro de
Basaldua, En Defensa de la Verdad (Buenos Airess Editorial

Vasca Ekin, 1956).
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motivated the Carlists to join the
nationalists in an
electoral alliance for the coming general
elections. In
return the nationalists were able to elicit

support for an

autonomy statute.
After these initial agreements, the Society of
Basque
Studies was entrusted with the responsibility of writing

up the proposal for Basque autonomy which was later approved
at an assembly of Basque municipalities held in Estella
(the old Carlist capital) on June 16, 1931.199

The carlists

accepted this proposal with less than rampant enthusiasm.
While the nationalists viewed the coming elections for the

Cortes as a plebescite for or against the formation of a
Basque state, the Navarrese looked upon the statute as a
•'Catholic-fuerista coalition for the defense of the high

interests of the Church, full restitution of the fueros .
and the statute which Navarra may approve. "200

as a

concession to the Carlists, an article was included in the

proposed statute stipulating that within the Basque region

relations between Church and State would be governed by

a

Concordat to be negotiated by the Basque provinces and the
Vatican,

Furthermore, all the educational institutions of

the Basque country would pass under the complete control

l"This statute became known as the Estatuto Genera^
Vasco . For a copy see Venero. op. cit .. p. 639.
Estado
del
200j O8e Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube, Entre la llbertad
v la revolucion 1930-1935 (Bilbao: Verdes, n.d.), p. 92.
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of the Basque provinces.

This aspect of the proposed

statute, which later became a point of
contention between
the central government (composed of a
republican-socialist

coalition) and the Basques, aroused the
anticlerical feelings
of the socialists who felt that "Spain (could)
not tolerate
the territory /the Basque countrv7 turning
itself into a

Vaticanist Gibraltar ."201
The general elections for the constituent Cortes

(June 16, 1931) produced a republican-socialist majority.
These elections also produced a relative success for the

nationalists.

captured 13. 202

Out of 17 seats in the Basque country, they
The other four remaining seats were split

201 E1 Socialista . June
30, 1931.
It seems that
earlier Indalecio Prieto, the leader of the Socialists of
Bilbao, had indicated that only the Leftists regions would
be given autonomy.
See Juan de Iturralde (Padre Juan de
Usabiaga is the real name), £1 catollclsmo v la cruzada de
Franco (Bayonne, France j Editorial Egui-lndarra , 1956), 1, p. 60.

202 Composition of the Constituent Cortes elected June,
1931:

Party
PSOE (Spanish Socialist Party)
Esquerra (Catalan Left)
Accion Republicena
Organi. Regional Gallega Autonoma (Orga)
Radical Socialists
Republicans on different coalitions
Partido Federal
Progresistas
Intellectuals at the service of the Republic
Derecha Republicana
Republicano Liberal Democrat a
Derecha Liberal Republicana
Partido Radical
Lliga Regional! s ta (Catalan Right)
Partido Nacionalista Vasco
Independents of the Center-Right and Right

Seats
105
34
24

14

50
62
10
8

10
13
2
6

70
2

13
13
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between republicans and socialists.

These elections also

indicated that the nationalists had displaced
the Carlist
influence from both Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.
Neither one of
these provinces voted for traditionalist candidates.

And

in Navarra, Agulrre was elected.

Two days before the opening of the Cortes, the

nationalist-traditionalist group held a rally in the town
of Guernica (the symbol of Basque liberties) where the

nationalists made a pledge to fight for the autonomy of
Euzkadl within the Cortes.

Among the deputies elected to

the Cortes was Canon Antonio Pildain from Guipuzcoa who
at this meeting referred to the Basque country as the

"Irelanda de Occidente" and to Aguirre as their 0»Connell.203

Among the first items to be discussed by the constituent
Cortes, which started its first session on July 14, 1931, was
an old and sensitive question in Spanish politics:

namely,

the position of the Catholic Church in Spanish society.

When Article 26 of the new constitution came before the floor

Agrarlos
Accion Nacional
Renovacion Espanola
Tradicionalistas (Carlists)
Unidentified

24

Total

470

3
2
2
3

Juan Linz, "The Party System in Spain: Past and
Source:
Future", p. 260. Cited in the previous chapter.
203 Quoted in Richard A. H. Robinson, The Origins of
of Franco's Spain 1931-1936 (Pittsburg: University of
Pittsburg Press, 1970).
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for debate, the first fury within the new
Cortes took
place. According to this Article the Catholic

Church would

lose all the privileges that it had enjoyed
under the

monarchy.

The traditional government budget for the
Church

would be eliminated within two years, religious orders
would
have to register as any other secular organizations and

would be allowed only as much property as required for their
survival.

Furthermore, Church property would be taxed and

the educational activities of the Church would cease.

This issue brought the Basques into the first conflict

with the new government.

Because of their intense

opposition to this Article, the Basque deputies were labelled
by their fellow deputies as "cavemen". 20^

In the Basque

region there were some demonstrations against the new
government; and the Basque press, most of which was in

Catholic hands, launched a virulent attack on the government
for which the government suspended most of the newspapers.

The Basque deputies walked out of the Cortes.
The proposed statute for autonomy was finally presented
to the government by a Basque delegation in September 1931.

The religious clause in that document was not acceptable to
the government which appointed a committee to revise it.

The revised statute, ready by January of 1932,

omitted the

possibility of a Basque concordat with the Vatican and gave
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the central government greater control In
the areas of

public education. 205

^

traditionalists immediately refused

to accept the revised document which they referred
to as

"Godless*

1

.

The traditionalist press proceeded to attack

it and offered 5,000 pesetas to any person who could find
the name of God mentioned in it. 206

The gap between the

trcditiona lists and the nationalists was further widened

when the members of the old Integralist Party and the

Car lists met in Pamplona on January 6, 1932, and joined
forces to defend the Church and traditional Spain.

As a

result of this meeting, the Comunion Tradlclonallsta Carllsta

emerged which supported restitution of the fueros but

rejected the idea of a single statute for the Basque region
for that was considered a contra fuero .

207

Nevertheless,

despite their opposition to the statute, at a meeting of
Basque municiplaities held in Kavarra on January 31 to

decide as to whether or not a single statute was acceptable
to all the provinces, a majority of the Navarrese municipalities

2°5xh e article regarding the Concordat with the Vatican
contradicted Article 26 of the Spanish constitution which
"All religious denominations shall be
read as follows:
considered associations subject to special laws. The state,
regions, provinces, and municipalities may not maintain,
favour, and subsidize financially, churches or religious
associations and institutions." Verduin, op. cit .. p. 88.
206 Aguirre, Entre la llbertad v la revolucion . p. 93;
Iturralde, 1, p. 242.
207 Sant t ago Galindo de Herrero, Los Partidos Monarquicos
fla-lo la Segunda Republica . (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1956;,
pp. 129-131.
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decided for a single statute. 208
Meanwhile, the traditionalists continued
their campaign
to change Navarrese opinion to vote against
the statute.
In order to counteract the propaganda of the
traditionalists,
the Navarrese deputation issued a statement on
June 6

asking the municipalities to accept the statute and
indicating
that there was no reason to fear the loss of the traditional

personality of Navarra.209

The subsequent vote taken on

June 16, 1932, to approve the statute, revealed that the

traditionalists had been able to change the opinion of a

substantial number of municipalities.

When the municipalities

gathered in Pamplona to take a vote on the statute, they

encountered such slogans as

"

Fueros . yes

I

Estatute, no I"

The leader of the integra lists, Juan de Alazabal, referred
to the nationalists thus:

"Oh, if St. Peter the Apostle

were living in these times, what epistles he would write

against certain Catholics. M 21°

When a vote was finally

taken, the Navarrese municipalities rejected the statute by
a vote of 123 to 109 while 35 municipalities abstained.

It

was approved overwhelmingly by the municipalities of Vizcaya

208^^^

Ignacio del Burgo, Orlgen y Fundamento del
Regimen Forgi de Kavarra (Pamplona: Editorial Aranzadi,
This work gives a very extensive discussion
1968), p. 472.
of the legal relationship between the Spanish State and
Navarra up to the present.
209 bid.
i
2

l°Quoted in Robinson, op P cit .„ p. 92.
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and Guipuzcoa while only 51 of the
municipalities of Aleve
accepted it with 15 abstaining and 11 voting
against it. 211
Making a comparison again with Ireland, the
nationalist

Manuel Irujo Olio referred to Navarra as their Ulster. 212
Despite the rejection of the statute by the Navarrese,
the nationalists had made substantial inroads into
Navarra

which had remained in the periphery of Basque nationalism.
Without the acquiescence of Navarra, some of the municipalities
of Alava began to manifest doubt regarding the acceptance of
a single statute for it was feared that without Navarra

Alava would become a satellite of the two richer industrial
provinces.

Consequently, on June 26 a traditionalist Alavese

deputy, Jose L. Oriol y Uriguren, called a meeting of

Alavese mayors to discuss the implications of the statute
and explain the reasons for Alava'
it.213

s

reluctance to accept

xhe Carlists concentrated their propaganda efforts

on Alava in order to wrest control of that province from
the nationalists.

Along with the Monarchists they also

launched a vituperative campaign against the nationalists

and in August of 1932 produced a document revealing a

Nationalist-Communist-Jewish-Masonic plot to destroy the

Catholic Church. 21^
See Table

The PNV was able to get the help of
in the Appendix.

212 Joaquin Arraras, Hlstorla de la Segunda Republlca
Espanola (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1964), 1, p. 388.
213 Quoted in Ibid,

,

p. 388.

214R 0 binson, op. clt .. p. 146.
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the bishops of Vitoria and Pamplona to
indicate that the

document had no foundation.

This marked the end of the

coalition between the nationalists and the
Navarrese,
although there were substantial supporters of
nationalism
within Navarra. Under the circumstances, Aguirre
decided
that the association with the traditionalists was
more

of a

burden than a benefit, and consequently, proceeded to
organize to hold a plebescite with or without Navarra.
When the government approved a statute of autonomy for

Catalonia in September of 1932, the nationalists felt
confident that a Basque statute would soon also be granted.
Since they had lost the support of the traditionalists,
the nationalists now concentrated in maintaining a good

rapport with the government in Madrid.

But the political

ideologies and factions within parliament and the Basque

region were such that the nationalists were bound to get
into conflict with the government.

If they became too close

to the traditionalists, they would invite the displeasure

of the government in Madrid.

On the other hand, if they

became too close to the central government, the traditionalists

would accuse them of supporting a government dedicated to
the destruction of the Catholic Church.

Consequently, when

the municipal elections of April of 1933 were held, the

nationalists decided to campaign alone and won twice as

many seats as the other parties.
Meanwhile, another event occurred which once again
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brought the Basque region, along with
the PNV, into conflict
with the central government. In May of
1933, the Cortes
passed the Law of Congregations which would
implement
Article 26 of the constitution. As a result
of this law,
all Church property would be nationalized,
although the

Church could continue to make use of it, Catholic
secondary
education would cease by October of that year and all
Catholic primary educatiion would cease in the following
December.

As might have been expected, this caused

tremendous consternation among Catholic groups.

Allegedly

some bishops had threatened to excommunicate those deputies

who voted for the law but were dissuaded from such action
by the papal nuncio, Bishop Tedeschini. 2 *5

The Catholic

deputies published a manifesto, signed by the Basque
deputies, calling "all citizens of good faith who view

with deep sadness the ruin of their country, irresponsibly
managed

by foreign powers of the Masonic sects and the

Socialist International. "216

This was followed by a

pastoral letter issued by the Spanish bishops to remind
the faithful that attendance at lay schools was contrary to

canon law.

On June 3, Pope Pius XI issued an Encyclical,

Dllectissimi ftobls . asking all the Catholics to oppose the
2l5Q a <b r ^ e i Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil
War 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965),
p.

106.

216 £1 Debate

.

June 4, 1933.
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law by "all the legitimate means
which Natural Law and
(civil) legislation allow them," and
exhorting them to
support Catholic Action (Acclon Catolica)
"for the defense
of the Faith and to ward off the
dangers which threaten
civil society." Catholics began to
organize to boycott
lay schools. 217 Thls put the Bafique
natlonallst8 lntQ a

difficult position.

Morally and in view of the position of

the Vatican, they had no choice but to
oppose the government.

From a political view point they would have
alienated large
segments of the Basque population had they not
protested

against this legislation.

While they could use this issue

to mobilize the Basque population behind them at the
same

time they could alienate that very same Cortes majority

from who they would need approval in order to get autonomy.

At any rate, within the Cortes they were in the forefront

amongst those protesting against the Law of Congregations.
According to the Basques, the law not only violated
their consciences, but was also an infringement on Basque
liberties.

To them the educational concept of the republican

state, as manifested in the Law of Congregations, was one

of etatisme and therefore "pure facism".218

on this issue

there was solidarity between the traditionalists and the

nationalists.

To the nationalists, and the clergy

2l7 Ibld .. July
1, 1933.
218

Debates de Seciones de las Cortes Constituventes
(DSCC), March 29, 1933. The Library of Congress has
twenty- five volumes.
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supporting them, the recent religious
legislation convinced
them that the need for Basque autonomy
was greater than
ever. The uniform applicability of
this law throughout
Spain was simply a new form of centralization. 219

Nevertheless, they were willing to work
with the government
for some kind of negotiated solution
regarding the Basque
provinces. 220 Xhe traditionalists on the other
hand were
ready and willing to take up arms against the
laic republic.
As a result of the recent religious legislation,
some
of

the traditionalists were once again willing to
collaborate

with the nationalists for the coming general elections
(November 19, 1933) for the Cortes.

The traditionalist,

Jose Maria de Urquijo owner of the Gaceta del Norte had
r

approached the nationalists on this question and promised
them that he would call off the traditionalist propaganda
in A lava and support the efforts for the piebescite on the

condition that the nationalists form a Catholic coalition

with the traditionalists for the coming elections.

The

nationalists refused this approach for they feared that it
***It seems that for some members of the Basque clergy
nationalism had become a means to preserve the religiosity
of the Basque country. For example, in 1932 a priest had
written to Aguirre to tell him that there was "no redemption
save nationalism", and another one had written:
"You must
not abandon your leadership of the Basque Israel for which
God has appointed you." Iturralde, I, or. clt .. p. 426.

220xhe Basque nationalists were confronted with a
paradoxical situation. Ideologically the PNV belonged on
the Right, but yet it was from the Left that they expected
a statute of autonomy.
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might dilute their support to the advantage
of the
traditionalists. Moreover, the results of
the municipal
elections of April of that year had made them
pretty
confident that they could stand alone. The
traditionalists,
subsequently, continued their campaign against the
plebiscite and helped to spread the rumor that it
would be
unlawful for a Catholic to vote for a statute given by
the

laic republic for this action would be tantamount to

recognizing the legitimacy of an anticlerical government.
Bishop Mateo Mugica of Vitoria was finally asked to decide
on this

issue—in 1932 the bishops of Vitoria and Pamplona

had been approached on this question but they remained

neutral--and declared that there was no incompatibility
between voting for the statute and protesting against the

Law of Congregations.

In order to allay the fears of his

parishoners, Bishop Mugica was one of the first voters to

vote for the statute on November

5,

1933.221

This act,

which could not be interpreted other than a political act,
was highly resented by the Carlists who later, after the

war began in 1936, harrassed him and had him under virtual
house arrest in his episcopal palace.

Despite opposition by the socialists who asked their

voters to abstain and the advice of the traditionalists to
their followers to vote against the statute, and their
221\/enero, op. cit .. p. 533.
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allegations suggesting that the statute
would be harmful to
the Basque economy, 222 the results
produced a victory for
the nationalists.
Out of a total electorate of 489,887
voters, 411,756 approved the statute, 14,196
voted against
it, and 63,935 abstained. Again overwhelming
support had
come from Vizcays and Guipuzcoa where the electorate

approved the statute by 88.4 per cent and 89.7 per cent
majorities.
11 per cent

In Alava only 46 per cent voted for it, while

voted against and 43 per cent abstained. 223

The general elections of November 19, 1933, had

produced a Center-Right majority in the new Cortes. 224

Although the nationalists lost one seat in these elections,
they remained large enough (12) to form a minority within
the Cortes.

With a majority in the new Cortes ideologically

close to them, plus the results of the plebiscite, the

nationalists felt confident that the new government would
finally grant the statute of autonomy.

It soon became

apparent that the new Cortes in which the C EDA 2 2 5 gr0up had
a majority was not willing to discuss regional autonomy

222Ar ra ra8, II, op. clt .. p. 264.
223rvhite Paper of the Basque Government, (Paris, 1956)
See also Arnold Toynbee, "The Spanish Background of
p. 39.

the War in Spain," Survey of International Affairs , Vol. 2,
1937, p. 40.

224see Robinson, op. clt .. p. 149.

225cEDA stands for Confederacion Espanola de Derechas
Autonomas led by Gil Robles.
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but instead wanted to stop the political
disintegration of
Spain. The committee appointed by the
Cortes to study
the results of the Basque plebiscite
proposed another

plebiscite on the grounds that Alava's majority
did not
meet the constitutional requirement of a
2/3 majority.
The nationalists opposed the idea of another
plebiscite

and interpreted Alava»s abstentions as support for
autonomy. 226
But by April of 1934, the committee in charge of the
statute

(with a Rightist majority) blocked further action on that
question.

For all intents and purposes, the Basque statute

for autonomy was buried in the new Cortes from whom the

nationalists had expected a better reception.

Gil Robles,

the leader of CEDA, although willing to grant some kind of

administrative autonomy, viewed political autonomy as out
of the question. 227

As a result of this new turn of

events, the nationalists began to look to the Left and

indicated that they would not support the new government.
In the meantime, political life in Spain was becoming

further radicalized and polarized between Right and Left.
There was great fear and uncertainty as to the political
future of Spain.

The Left was disappointed and embittered

over the fact that it had lost its majority.

Their

bitterness was reinforced with the actions of the new Cortes.
226 DSCC, February 8, 9, 1934.

227 J. M. Gil Robles, "The Spanish Republic and Basque
Independence," The Tablet . June 19, 1937, pp. 876-877.
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No sooner had the new Cortes met
than the new majority
began to modify and repeal some of
the legislation of the
previous Cortes. The Law of Congregations
was ignored and
the Church schools continued to operate.
Agrarian reform
which had been Initiated under the constituent
Cortes came
to a standstill.
Agricultural wages were reduced.
Some

of the property of the orders which had been
confiscated
by the previous government was restored to the
Church.

General Sanjurjo, who had plotted to overthrow the
Republic
in 1932, was acquitted by the new Cortes.

To the Left

these actions made it appear as though a Right-wing coup
was
in the offing or that Spain might follow the example of

Germany where the legislature had voted a dictator into
power.

Consequently, the Left now began to think in terms

of revolutionary activity.

Largo Caballero, the leader of

the Socialist Party who had participated in the previous

government, was being impelled by his followers to think
in terms of revolutionary rather than evolutionary change.

(Caballero had collaborated with Primo de Rivera during the
1920* s).

The relative peace which had existed in Spain

between 1931 and 1933 began to give way to violent acts
such as assassinations, demonstrations, and strikes.

Frequent shoot-outs between different political groups were
not uncommon in the streets of major cities.

Arrests of

Leftist deputies were also not uncommon on the grounds that
they were collaborating in the strikes and inciting rebellion
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Consequently, the Right, too, began to
believe that Spain
was In the throes of a Bolshevik revolution.
This fear was
reinforced when in October of 1934 the mine
workers
of

Asturias rebelled and took over that province.

Within a

few days this rebellion was crushed by army units
under the
command of Franco.

Although the leadership of the PNV had indicated that
it would not use violence in order to get autonomy, by
1934 some segments within the Party were willing to resort
to violence.

One such group was known as the aberrianos

led by Gallestegui, the leader of the Mendjgoltzales .
a mountain-climbing group which was turning itself into
a para-military organization.

While the leadership of the

Party kept its affiliate organizations under control, by
1934 they, too, were beginning to manifest a new degree of

militancy towards the governments procrastination regarding
Basque autonomy.

During the summer of 1934, the Basques

and the government came into deadlock over the question of
taxation.

The government was going to introduce a Law of

Municipalities which would regulate taxation throughout
Spain.

If this law were applied to the Basque region, the

local towns 1 taxes

(

consumos ) on wines would be abolished

depriving many Basque municipalities of one of their

228f 0r a discussion of the issues that confronted the
Second Spanish Republic see Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish
W.W. Morton and Co., 1970).
Revolution (New York:
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primary sources of revenue. 229

To the Ba8ques

ma

wfls

a

violation of their traditional privileges
regulated by the

concerto

economj.co, which, in their view, the
government

could not modify or change without their
consent.

Legislation regarding taxation would have to be
negotiated
between the central government and representatives
of
the

provincial deputations.

The Basques decided to hold elections

in order to elect delegations to go to Madrid to
negotiate

with the government on this issue.

The government reacted

by forbidding such elections and sent troops to Bilbao,

Vitoria, and San Sebastian to make sure that no elections

would take place.

Some towns, however, defied the government

and held elections as originally planned.

Subsequently, the

government ordered the arrest of several mayors.

Government

troops occupied some town halls and some roads were blocked
to prevent the nationalists from the several provinces from

meeting and planning demonstrations.

Even the Basque

parliamentary deputies were harrassed by the police.
The gap between the Basque nationalists and the Right

continued to widen, and the Left, particularly the

Republicans and the Socialists, now began to support the
Basques in order to get their support.

Indaleclo Prieto,

the leader of the socialists of Bilbao, who not too long
229 Jackson, pp. clt .. p. 141.

230Arrara8>

n

9

pp. clt .. p. 389.
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before (1933) had exhorted his followers
not to vote for^the
autonomy statute, now became an avid supporter
of the Basque
nationalists. At a meeting of the PNV held in San
Sebastian
on November 11, 1934, members of Leftist groups
were

present and gave their "total support to the autonomist

movement of the Basque municipalities and to the attainment
of the statute as a solution to all problems, if the

nationalists participated in the revolution, deemed
necessary, "231
In return Aguirre declared that In case the Right

tried to impose

a

dictatorship or to reinstitute the

Monarchy, "the Basque Nationalist Party would oppose those

institutions with all Its strength; and if the occasion
should arise," he said, the Party would take "measures to

meet the circumstances of the moment, "232
The Leftists were not very satisfied with such an

equivocal stand.

While Leftist groups seemed ready to take

up arms against the government, the Basque nationalist
leadership would not go beyond committing itself to defend
the existing Republic,

The association of the nationalists

with elements of the Left was not welcomed by all members
of the Party, a fact which caused some dlssention.

Consequently, In October of 1934 a group of Alavese
nationalists broke away from the Party and formed the
231 ibld ,. p. 401

232ibld.
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Pcrecha Autonoma v»s,cf
Increasingly the nationalist* seemed to
be taking a
position of aloofness from the great Issues
disturbing
Spanish politics. In the course of an Interview
with the
m. of Madrid on June 13, 1934, Aguirre had declared

that

the Basques were "neither with the Left nor the
Right;

L they_7 were simply autonomists."

And when In the fall

of 1934 Spain was afflicted with a series of strikes,

Aguirre told the government that the Party would not
encourage rebellion "but neither would
to help the government. 2 33

JTitJ

lift a finger

The seeming Indifference of the

nationalists as to what was happening within Spain elicited
such hostility from CEDA to the point that Calvo Sotelo
and Aguirre came to blows within the Cortes In October 1934.

From this point onwards the hostility Increased.

As of

1934, It had become clear to the nationalists that a statute

of autonomy granted by the Right was out of the question.
In the meantime the CEDA group was trying to gain adherents

within the Basque region by concentrating on the defense of
the concfl.erto economic

and helping to spread the rumor

that a statute of autonomy would be disastrous to the Basque

economy.

This hostility from the CEDA group had the

attendant result of pushing the PNV further to the Left
from which it expected a better hearing and a political

solution for the Basque provinces.
Robinson, op. cit .. p. 191.
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The continuing shift to the Right
by the Cortes majority
led President Alcala-Zamora to call
for new elections with
the expectation that a moderate majority
would be produced,
a majority which might be able to
govern the country and

acceptable to both the Right and the Left.

Contrary to

Alcala-Zamora' s expectations, the new elections
produced
another extremist majority. The Popular Front,
consisting
of Socialists, the Republican Left, the Republican
Union,

and the Communists, which was formed for the purpose
of

campaigning for these elections, won a majority of the
seats.

Out of a total of 453 seats, the Popular Front

controlled 257 seats234_. more tnan wnat

^ t nee ded in

order

to control the Cortes.

Although the PNV had indicated support for the Popular
Front, which in its election campaign had promised autonomy
for the regions, the Party decided to run independently of

both Right and Left.

But the PNV lost two seats in Bilbao,

thus ending up with a total of 10 seats.
This new majority produced panic on the Right.

The

Cortes of February 1936, following the behaviour of the
Cortes elected in the fall of 1933, began to modify and

repeal some of the acts of the previous government.

Among

the first acts of the new government was a decree of general

amnesty setting free those put into prison for political
234 or a discussion of the Popular Front elections
see Jackson, op. cit .. pp. 184-195.
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reasons.

Approximately 30,000 political prisoners were
*\ <j

set free.

e

Among these prisoners were a great number of

Socialists and Anarchists who decided to take the law
into
their own hands by shooting those whom they thought

responsible for their arrests.

In Southwestern Spain the

euphoria produced by the new majority led the peasants to
seize lands and engage in Church burning, not an uncommon

incident in Southern Spain.

To the Right these incidents

brought back memories of the Asturias strike of 1934 when
the workers seized the province.

According to Hugh Thomas,

"it now seemed /""to the middle cla8S_7 that almost anything,

even a military dictatorship, was preferable to the

continuation of the present political disintegration. "236
Consequently, the army was asked by some leaders of the
Right, among them Gil Robles, to declare martial law.

Franco supposedly approached the Prime Minister, Porte la

Valladares, to ask him to declare a state of emergency
and prevent the Left from assuming power.
The actions of the government against Right-wing generals,
in the form of early retirement or transferals alienated that

very same group which might have been able to keep order in
235jackson, OPf clt .. p. 181.
2 36 Hugh

Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York:
Harper and Row, 1961), p. 81. For other accounts of the
civil war see Frank Jellinek. The Civil War in Spain
Victor Gallancz, 1938); Franz Borkenau, The
(London:
University of Michigan Press,
S panish Cockpit (Ann Arbor:
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the Republic.

The plot, which had been planned
by General

Sanjurjo who was in exile in Portugal;
General Mola in
charge of the troops in Pamplona; and Generals
Goded,

Cabanellas and Queipo de Llano came to its fruition
on
July 18, 1936, when the insurrection, with the
support
Right-wing groups, began. 237

of

This led to the Spanish Civil

War which lasted until 1939.

Although on July 19 Euzkadj. indicated the support of
the Basque nationalists for the Republic in "la lucha

entre la ciudadania y el fascismo," there was disagreement

amongst the nationalists as to the exact course that the
Basques should follow and the nature of their support for
the Republic.

Some were of the opinion that the Basques

should declare their independence while others, such as
Luis Arana, brother of the founder of Basque nationalism,

maintained that the Basques should concentrate on defending
themselves!
The Basque nationalists should not unite
with the Spanish democrats nor with the
dictatorial ones but concentrate in assuming
command of Vizcaya, and in the rest of the
Basque country, in order to maintain peace.
The others should take care of themselves
and the Basques should take care of the Basques. "8

"'Thomas, op. cit .«

p.

117.

238 Quoted in Venero, op. clt .. p. 574.
Throughout
army, the
own
their
maintained
the civil war, the Basques
Caballero
Largo
Gudarls . When in September of 1936
suggested that the Basque provinces be united with
Santander for military purposes, the Basques refused:
"No tenemos mas remedio que protester energicamente y no
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It seems that the Republican government
itself was not very

sure about the loyalty of the basques.

Besides the fear

that the Basques might use the occasion to
declare themselves

independent, there was also the fear that they might
reach
some kind of an arrangement with the insurgents.
In order to make sure that the basques would continue

to support the Republic, in September 1936 Largo Caballero,

then Prime Minister, supposedly offered Aguirre a post in
his cabinet.

The basques refused to accept a post in the

Republican government unless they were granted a statute of
autonomy.

It is reported that an agreement was reached

whereby Aguirre would become Minister of Public Works in
return for

a

statute of autonomy.

Aguirre allegedly refused

the post on the grounds that he disapproved of Communist

participation in the government. 239

Instead, Manuel de

lrujo, a basque nationalist from Guipuzcoa, became Minister

without portfolio.

On October 1, 1936, the beleaguered

Republican government granted the basques autonomy.

The

presence of a basque nationalist in the government emphasized
the support of the basques for the Republic.
By the time the statute was granted most of the basque

acceptarla, porque la demarcacion de guerra debe ser
Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Alava y Navarra (estas dos provincias
las consideramos objecto principal de nuestra conquista),
quedando Santander unido a As curias a qulen el ministro
Iturralde, II, p. 196.
de guerra espanol crea oportuno."
239 Ven ero, op. clt., p. 591.
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country had already fallen into
Insurgent hands. Navarra,
where General Mo la had planned the
insurrection with the
help of the Carllsts, was among the
first places to initiate
the rebellion.
In Alava the regiment of Vitoria took
that
city on July 19 without any great efforts.

By September

Guipuzcoa, in which a great deal of fighting took
place,
had also fallen to the insurgents. The nationalists

evacuated this area and retreated to Vizcaya where they
fought until June 19, 1937. 240

After the statute of autonomy was granted, a General

Council for the Basque provinces, with representatives from
the three provinces which had approved the statute in the

plebiscite of November 1933, was formed and a Basque

government was formed with Aguirre as President

(

lendakarl ).

It was a coalition government consisting of four nationalists,
one member from the Accion Naclonalista Vasca . three

Socialists, one Left Republican, and a Communist. 241

This

government mobilized the population of Vizcaya, kept order
in that province, and conducted the war against the Franco

forces*

The Basque Autonomous government hastily improvised

a small array, the Gudarls . which was attended by a Corps of

Almoners consisting of a hundred priests. 242

on November 30

24°For an account of the Civil War in the Basque
provinces see George L. Steer, The Tree of Guernica
(London: Hodder and Staughton Ltd., 1938.)
241 Venero, op. clt .. p. 599.
24 ? Le Clerge Basque .

Paris 1938.

This work gives an
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a Basque offensive was
launched to take back Alava.

Gudar

The

equipped with antiquated artillery
bought from the
Soviet Union, were no match for the forces
of franco
supported by Italian troops and the German
Condor Legion.
The only Basque offensive ended in a defeat. 243
Ba8 que
troops retreated back to Vizcaya where they
put up a
*r

8

^

successful resistance until June 19, 1937, when the
Franco
forces overran that province. 244 After the fall of V

i ZC aya,

the Basque government retreated to the neighboring
province

of Santander where it set up its own administration in

Santona and continued to fight until August.

When the

account of the Basque clergy during the Civil War and
answers the charges brought against them by the Spanish
hierarchy.
2A3 Luis Maria de Lojendio, Operaciones
Ml 11 tares de la
Guerra de Espana. 1936-1939 (Madrid, 1940), p. 244. See
also Steer, pp. clt . This is probably the best journalistic
account of the Basque provinces during the Civil War.

244on April 26, 1937, the German Air Force bombed the
old 3asque town of Guernica (symbol of Basque liberties)
and machlnegunned the population. This incident was given
extensive International coverage and motivated Picasso to
produce a painting, entitled "Guernica", dramatizing the
destruction of that town. It became a famous painting.
The clergy of the town wrote to the Vatican to describe the
senseless air bombing of the town. After unsuccessful
efforts to see the Pope, the two Basque priests who carried
the letter to Rome were finally given an audience with
Cardinal Pacelli who remarked that "The Church was
persecuted in Barcelona," and "showed them the door."
As a consequence of the bombing of Guernica,
Government in exile attempted to bring a case
Basque
"the
Germany
at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. The
against
attempt was unsuccessful, since no events which occurred
before 1939 were taken into account at Nuremberg."
Thomas, op. clt ., p. 420.
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situation had become hopeless, Juan de
Axuriaguerra, leader
of the PNV since Aguirre had become
president of Euzkadi .
negotiated a Basque surrender on August 22
with the

Italian troops under the command of General
Mancini.245
As part of the surrender agreement, the
Basques were

promised that they could evacuate the area and leave
for
Prance on British ships that were waiting in the harbor
Santona.

of

On hearing this news, Franco's officers became

furious and immediately sent troops to the area to prevent
the escape of the Basques.

Those that were already in the

ships were ordered to disembark and arrested.

Aguirre had

already left by plane for Prance.
The support of the Basque clergy of the provinces of

Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa for the Basque nationalists and,
consequently, for the Republic raised some moral questions

within the hierarchy of the Spanish Catholic Church.

The

clergy of these provinces refused to obey the collective
letter of the Spanish Bishops (July

1,

1937) in which the

Spanish hierarchy explained the reasons for their support
of the insurgent forces, and reprimanded the Basque clergy

1M^«» P* 420. Aguirre has indicated that earlier
in 1937 Mussolini had suggested that the Basques surrender
to the Italian troops and that then a separate peace treaty
would be negotiated between the Basque government and the
Italians with the possibility of making Euzkadi a
protectorate of the Italian government. Aguirre referred
to this as a "picturesque proposal of an Italian
protectorate over the Basques." Jose Antonio de Aguirre y
The Macmillan Co.,)
Lecube, Escape via Berlin (New York:
52.
p»
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for not having followed the "word
of the Church. "246

The

Basque clergy maintained that its
position was morally
sound since they had seen no reason to
support a rebellion
against a lawfully instituted government. 247

The fact that

one of the most Catholic areas of Spain
supported the

Republic was an embarrassing situation for the hierarchy
which maintained that it was fighting the forces of
Bolshevism
As a consequence of their support for Basque nationalism,
members of the Basque clergy were later arrested, some were
shot, and some had to go into exile. 248

Eventually the

Primate of Spain, Cardinal Goma, intervened and asked

Franco to put a stop to these actions.

One of the Basque

Bishops, Dr. Mateo Mugica, never signed the collective letter

and defended the position of the Basque clergy as a result
of which he was intimidated and threatened by the Carlists
Be f° re the
who referred to him as a "red-separatist" .249
war was over, he left Spain and went to France into exile.
The lack of prolonged resistance in Alava and the

support for the insurrection in Navarra did not necessarily

mean support for the Franco forces or that these provinces
had all of a sudden become indifferent to the question of
246 Thomas, op. cit .. p. 450.

247 The theological position^ of the Basques is discussed
in great depth in Iturralde, 11.

24Ss ee Le Clerge Basque , pp. 94-107, and Inaki de
Aberrigoyen, Sept Mols and Sept Jours dans l'Espagne de
Franco (paris, 1938).

249jackson, pp. cit .. p. 377.
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local autonomy.

On the contrary, once the insurrection

began, the Navarrese immediately
started to take steps to
reinstitute their old fueros. The Navarrese
were fighting
not to bring back the Alfonsine monarchy
the legitimacy of

which they had never accepted nor to put Franco
into power
but to reinstitute the monarchy of traditional Spain. 250

And by August of 1936 the deputacion foral of Navarra
began
to take steps toward this end.

"On August 11, 1936, the

Superior Committee on Education of Navarra, created by

Law 22 in 1828 of the Cortes of the Kingdom was established.
The deputation affirmed that it would pursue its announced

objectives to restore in its entirety the foral regime
insofar as it affected the organization of primary education
in Navarra ."251

This deputation had also formed some ambitious plans

for social and agricultural reform for which the Juntas de

Re forma Agraria v Re forma s Sociales had been created.

But

in 1940 these were ordered to be dissolved and the anticipated
250i n a manifesto issued by Carlos Alfonso, June 29,
1934, emphasis was put on the traditional political
organization of Spain. He asked for the "establishment of
the traditional Monarchy with its essential characteristics:
catholic, frugal, federative, hereditary, and legitimate,
and consequently, fundamentally opposed to the liberal,
democratic, parliamentary, centralized, and constitutional
Monarchy. The federative affirmation implies the restoration
of ail the regions with their fueros . liberties, exemptions,
usages, and customs and the guarranty of the pase foral ."
This was a call for the return of the pre-1839 relationship
between the Spanish State and the regions. Quoted in
Galindo Herrero, pp. 240, 241.
251<jel Burgo, op. clt .. p. 475.
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reforms were never carried out.

After the war, the

government In Madrid respected only the
conclerto .rn.odrn
which had existed since 1876 and would not
entertain any
further suggestions to reinstltute the traditional
foral

regime:

"The outcome of the three years of war and
of the
subsequent reorganization of the machinery of the
state

did not show any positive results.

Only in the sphere of

primary education, thanks to the laborious efforts of the
Superior Committee on Education, did an authentic restitution
of the fueros take place. "252
The fact that the Navarrese fought with the Franco

forces has not made them any less suspicious of the power
of the central government.

They have remained ever

suspicious of the power of the Madrid government and continue
to maintain that the law of 1841, by which General Espartero

modified the fueros of Navarra to which they refer as la
lev pacclonada . was a contract between the central government

and the Navarrese which cannot be modified without their
consent.

Alava also has retained the concierto economlco . 253

This was

a

insurrection.

reward for its lack of resistance to the
It seems that when the insurrection began

the Basque nationalists in these provinces did not even
252 Ibid .. p. 477.

253fQr a discussion of the conclerto economlco with
Alava, see Jose Badia La-Calle, El Conolerto Economlco con
Editorial Deusto, 1965).
Alava (Bilbao:
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try to resist for they realized that the
odds against them
were so great as to make it a hopeless venture.
The regiment
in the city of Vitoria had supported the insurrection
and

immediately took the city.

In the provinces of Guipuzcoa

and Vizcaya the local regiments had planned also to support
the insurrection but were caught in time and put under

arrest by the committees of local defense.
As the civil war came to an end in the Basque provinces
of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, those provinces were stripped of

their concierto economlco and a great number of Basques

were either imprisoned or shot.

Those that could escape

went into exile into France and from there went to Latin

America where they have maintained Basque Centers in Buenos
Aires, Caracas, Santiago, and Mexico City from which they

have carried on an anti-Franco campaign.

In the Basque

provinces, particularly in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, all

manifestations of Basque culture were forbidden, including
the speaking of Basque by the clergy at Church services.

The central government "embarked on a deliberate policy of

imposing the Castilian language and banning or ostracizing
the local language outlawing its use in the administration,

education, mass media, translations •• .as well as making

impossible any association that directly would foster the

national sentiment." 2

^

254 Juan L. Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Author!
The Case of Spain", unpublished paper, p. 59.
tarian Regime:

CHAPTER

V

THE RESURGENCE OF THE BASQUE QUESTION

Between 1945 and the early 1950' s, the exiled Basque

government lived with the expectation that the Franco
regime

would soon collapse under the pressure of the allied forces
which, they believed, would not tolerate a regime that
had come into power with the help of those regimes which
had just been defeated in the war.

In 1945 the political

groups of the Basque region in exile reached an agreement
in Bayonne, France, called El Pacto de Bavonne .

This

agreement was to advise the Euzkadi government and coordinate
their struggle against the Franco regime. 255

But, as it

later turned out, the initial ostracism of the Franco regime
by the allied forces, plus Franco's efforts in staying

out of World War II, apparently had the effect of mobilizing

support for Franco256.. or ac least silencing much of the
opposition.

International events also seemed to have worked in
favor of the Franco regime.

The amity which had developed

between the United States and the Soviet Union during the
^~*-*

Euzko Deya (Oflcina Prensa Euzkadi), March/April,
Thi 8 is an information bulletin published
1966, p. 4.
by the Basque government in exile.

256p or a discussion of the Franco regime see Arthur
Spain and the Defense of the West . (New York:
Prager,

P. Whitaker,
Frederick A.
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war soon turned into enmity with
favorable consequences for
Franco.
In its search for allies in
the diplomatic campaign
to hold back the Soviet Union,
strategic considerations
forced the United States to change
its earlier position on
the Franco regime.
The United States changed its
policy
of ostracism to one of soliciting Franco's
support in the
cold war struggle. The recognition of the
Franco regime
by the United States in 1951 signalled the
deathknell to
the Basque nationalists' expectations of
returning to Spain.

Spain had now become an ally of the United States,
and

indirectly linked to NATO depriving the Basques and other

republican groups in exile the support from the major Western
liberal democracies which they might have otherwise received.

Subsequently, the Basque nationalists in exile had to

reconcile themselves with the fact that the Franco regime
seemed well established and gaining in international

respectability.

Nevertheless, they maintained their

propaganda campaign against Franco and have kept in touch

with a small Basque underground. 257
Although after the civil war and up to the late
1950'

s

the PNV continued to be the main spokesman for Basque

nationalism, several organizations have emerged to challenge
257xhere is some evidence that the PNV has some
underground cadres throughout the provinces of Guipuzcoa and
Vizcaya. The New York Times . May 1, 1967, p. 22. Although
it seems that the PNV receives some financial support from
some wealthy Basques within Spain, this writer has not come
across specific documentation. See Whitaker, pp. 361-362.
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^^

Its leadership during the
past decade .

approximately eight organization,
which represent various
shades of Basque nationalism. 258

Until the 1960.s, the activities
of Basque nationalism,
sponsored primarily by the PNV
in exile, did not go very
much beyond the occasional sponsoring
of folkloric
festivals; the distribution of
nationalist literature within
the Basque region; and the
gathering of information

regarding the conditions of the Basques
under the Franco
regime. The franco government has not
hesitated to suppress
ostensibly cultural and religious activities
on the

suspicion that such activities are motivated
by nationalistic
considerations and organized by the Basque
underground.
The Aberri Epuna, the Basque patriots day,
is celebrated on
Easter Sunday. The nationalists in exile in turn
have

exploited the reactions of the regime by pointing out that
the government is engaged in "cultural genocide."

The

argument of the nationalists has some credence for they can
point out that other regions are allowed to manifest their

cultural peculiarities but only the Basques have been
singled out for suppression.
Overseas, particularly in the United States 259 and
258 The Partido Nacionalista Vasco,
Accion Vasca, ETA,
Frente Nacional Vasco, Partido Comunista de Euzkadi,
Enbata, Accion Social Democratica Vasca and the iMovimiento
de Sacerdotes Vascos.
It is the opinion of this writer
that some of these organizations are mere paper or office

organizations.
259 The Basque communities of the United States are

141

in some of the Latin American countries,
Basque Centers have
been founded with the objective of keeping
Basque identity

alive through Basque festivals and publications.

In these

organizations both Spanish and French Basques collaborate.
There are two Basque publishing houses in Latin America,

Buenos Aires and Caracas, that publish exclusively
nationalist
literature or literature discussing cultural themes of the
Basque country.

Some of this literature is then sent to

the PNV organization in Bayonne, France, which is then

smuggled into Spain.

During the 1960»s a new wave of protest and nationalist
activity, corresponding with the increase in the centralizing
of power and the increased international respectability of
the Franco regime, began to manifest itself in the Basque

region in the form of labor strikes, demonstrations by the
clergy, some occasional violent actions such as bomb

explosions and gun

battles with the Spanish police.

Although the PNV has given moral support to some of these
activities, they have been planned by groups unaffiliated

with it.

The new militant activism has been initiated by

a radical group known as Euzkadi ta Askatasuna . ETA

(Basque Nation and Liberty), which split in 1959 from
Euzko Gastedl . a nationalist youth organization affiliated

with the PNV.

ETA, which calls for an "Euzkadi independiente

y socialists " (a socialist and independent Euzkadi),
found mainly in Nevada, Idaho, and California
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apparently spilt from the PNV over
the question of the
tactics that should be pursued by
the Party. 260 Apparently
the members of ETA had come to
the conclusion that
the PNV

had become ossified and ineffective
in its approach.
Consequently, ETA has adopted a more radical
and dramatic
approach. Its occasional handbills indicate
that ETA has
adopted some brand of Marxism as its social
ideology, in

contrast to the PNV, ETA does not claim to speak
just for
the Spanish Basques but for the French Basques
as
well.

Among its professed goals is the unification of
all the
Basques in an eventual European Federation of nations.
There are some indications that the membership of ETA does

not consist exclusively of Spanish Basques, but also includes

French Basques. 26 !

In this respect ETA is quite a departure

from the PNV which is quite conservative and bourgeois in
its social orientation and claims to speak only for the

Spanish Basques.
Due to the secrecy in which this organization works,
its exact membership is not known.

But the arrests made

by the Spanish police of alleged members of ETA indicate

that the membership is fairly young, between the ages of 18

and 30 years old.

In contrast to the activities of the PNV

ETA has not hesitated to resort to violence as a result of
26 ^See the interview with ETA members published in the
Paris "Match , August 17, 1968, p. 6.
2 61 zutik

.

April, 1965.

This is an ETA publication.
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which it has received all kinds of
attention, particularly
in the latter part of the 1960«s,
thus making Basque

nationalism once again one of the more
sensitive topics
in Spanish politics. The radical activities
of ETA
apparently were not approved by the whole membership
for
in 1966 a split occurred giving rise to another
group known
as ET/A-Berri (New ETA) favoring a more moderate
approach. 262
It seems that it has been the ETA-Zarra, (Old ETA),
which

has been responsible for the

;

radical forms of activism in

the latter part of the 1960»s.

While the PNV still claims

the following and support of broad segments of the Basque

population, ETA during its short period of existence has

emerged as the leading nationalist group, and recently has
done more than the other organizations in bringing to the

attention of the international press the question of Basque

nationalism which had seemed nearly forgotten.

ETA»s

activities became so persistent that by the end of the
1960's the government in Madrid

campaign in order to crush it. 263

launched an Intensive
The hunt for ETA members

262 The Economist . V,
237, (December 12, 1967), p. 35.

263 In 1968 Pueblo , the paper of the official labor
unions, began to discuss the question of Basque nationalism
making particular reference to ETA. According to the
articles in Pueblo . ETA members were coming primarily from
urban environments and not from fishing villages or
peasant communities. The whole emphasis of the Pueblo
articles was to show that ETA was an atheist and Marxist
organization and thus, contrary to Basque traditions.
Pueblo . September 27, 1968, p. 6. By 1969 the police were
claiming the "total desmantelamiento de la ETA." Pueblo .
March 25, 1969, p. 9.
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became particularly Intensive after
the a S8aS 8lnatlon of the
chief of the secret police of Guipuzcoa,
Mellton
de

Manzanas, In 1968.

According to the ETA publication,

Manzanas was not assassinated b«t executed
for his
"crimes" against Basque nationalists. 264

Zutifc.

The Trial

The assassination of Meliton Manzanas gave rise
to the

most spectacular and dramatic incident surrounding Basque

nationalism since the Civil War.

The sixteen members of

ETA suspected of having planned the assassination were
finally put on trial (the military tribunal of Burgos) in

December 1970.

On the day before the trial, December 1, 1970,

a group from ETA kidnapped a West German consul, Eugen

Bethel, from San Sebastian and announced that they intended
to keep him as ransom during the course of the trial.

This incident, which focused the attention of the international

press on the sixteen accused ETA members— who otherwise

might not have received as much attention had not this
incident occurred--probably confronted the Franco regime

with one of its biggest crisis since the end of the Civil
War.

There were strikes and demonstrations in the Basque

region, particularly in Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya.

A state of

martial law was declared in the province of Guipuzcoa, and
police reinforcements were sent to the area.
264 2utlk . September 1968.

There was
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dissension within the army leadership
and the cabinet over
the course of action that the regime
265
should
take.

Some senior members of the officer corps
resented the fact
that a military tribunal should handle
this problem
since, in their view, this would only serve
to discredit
the army before the eyes of the public, while
others felt

that the regime should show no mercy and adopt a
get-tough

policy.

This incident, along with the international

publicity that it received, was particularly embarrassing to
the regime which in the latter part of the 1960«s had begun

to emphasize its "liberal" tendencies with an eye to closer

relationships with the Common Market.
Within a few days the international press focused on
Spain and the trial of the Basques.

What had begun as a

trial of sixteen ETA members accused of the assassination
of a public official became overnight a trial of basque

nationalism.

Since the Civil War, probably no incident

has done more for the cause of Basque nationalism than the

kidnapping of Eugen Beihel.

One day before the verdict was

265xhe trial was given extensive coverage in the
New York Times . Le Monde , and ABC (Madrid). Richard Eder
of the New York Times wrote several comprehensive articles
on the Basques in general and on the trial. See The New
York Times . November 28, 1970, p. 3; December 3, 1970, p. 6;
December 6, 1970, p. 3; December 7, 1970, p. 2; December 9,
1970, p. 29; December 12, 1970, p. 12; December 17, 1970, p. 3.
The Christian Science Monitor also gave a fairly good
coverage of the trial in its December 1970 issue. See
particularly the article of Richard Mowrer in the December
?3,

1970, issue, p. 1.
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announced ETA freed Beihel.

It had made its point.

December 28, 1970, the verdict was
announced!
accused were given death sentences and
the

On

six of the

others, amongst

whom there were two priests, were given
long periods of
imprisonment. 266 After a cabinet meeting
on

December 30,

it was decided to commute the death sentences. 267

The

decision was announced on New Year«s Eve when
Franco

delivered his message to the nation.

Judging from the news releases from the area, segments
of
the population viewed the accused more as martyrs
rather

than criminals.

While ETA was seen as an extremist

organization and the action regarding consul Seihel was not
condoned, nevertheless, there seemed to be broad support for
the accused.

Both the bishops of Bilbao and San Sebastian

asked for clemency and issued pastoral letters before the
trial began, asking for a trial before a civilian tribunal.

These pastorals angered the regime which, through the

Ministry of Justice, issued a statement accusing the bishops
of "prejudging court decisions which (had) not yet been

made" and of "comparing criminal violence, which is

punishable by law, with the punishment imposed by law. "268
The accused were defended by Basque lawyers, such as

Juan Maria Bandres, some of whom consider themselves Basque
266 The New York Times . December 29, 1970, p. 1.
267 Ibld .. December
31, 1970, p. 1.

268xhe Spanish Episcopal Conference meeting in Madrid
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nationalists and hold the sentiment
that there exists a
Basque nation which has lived under
oppression since
1939,269 whue it appear8 that

^

8egment8 q{

^

population do not approve of ETA's methods,
nevertheless,
they do not seem to question its
objectives. A
Basque

priest from the Basque community of Idaho,
although
deploring the "methods and philosophy of ETA"
which he
considered against everything that is Basque, added

that

"you don't make a revolution with rosaries. "270
The Church

Along with ETA, the Basque lower clergy has also been
in the forefront of protest in the latter part of the

1960»s.

They have participated in strikes, demonstrations

and have allegedly given sanctuary to members of ETA pursued
by the Spanish police.

By virtue of its position, the

clergy has a greater leeway to act than strictly political
groups.

However, the activities of the Basque clergy have

raised some sensitive issues between the government and
the Church which, up until recently, had been one of the

at this time, supported the pastorals of the bishops of
Santander and San Sebastian and also asked for clemency.
ABC (Madrid), December 3, 1970, p. 21. Also Kee sing's
Contemporary Archives . January 23-30, 1971, p. 24406.
269 The New York Times

.

December 15, 1970, p, 6.

27 0 Ibld .. December 20, 1970, p. 18.
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central Institutional pillars of the regime. 271

it must be

emphasized that clergy support for Basque
nationalism is an
indirect kind of support. This was also the case
during
the 1930«s.

Members of the clergy were never formally

affiliated with the PNV, which did not allow membership
for
members of the clergy. Consequently, the protests of the
Basque clergy are addressed to what they perceive to be

violations of human rights.

But this had not prevented the

civil authorities from arresting some of them, an action

which deliberately violates the Concordat.

Under the rules

of the Concordat signed by the Vatican and the Spanish

government, a member of the clergy cannot be arrested

without the permission of his bishop.
The activities of the clergy seem to parallel the

activities of ETA.

The clergy began to speak out against

acts of torture committed by the Spanish police against

imprisoned Basque nationalists.

On August 3, 1968, the

day after the assassination of Manzanas, the Guardia Civil

surrounded the Benedictine Abbey of Lazcano, Guipuzcoa,
and searched the area, for it was believed that the monks

were giving sanctuary to ETA members. 272
The actions of the lower clergy eventually brought them

27lon the relationship between the Church and the
Franco regime see William Ebenstein, Church and State in
Franco Spain (Princeton: Center of International Studies,
I960).
272 -rhe New York Times . November 4, 1968.
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into conflict with the hierarchy, which
did not heed the
c lergy«s
demands that it publicly denounce the
repressive
actions of torture against ETA political
prisoners.
In

the eyes of the more radical members of the
lower clergy,
the hierarchy was collaborating and compromising
with the

regime and ignoring what they consider the injustices
done
to the Basque people.

Faced with seeming indifference

from their bishop, a group of priests from Bilbao finally

appealed to the Vatican on November 4, 1968.

A letter was

sent to Pope Paul VI discussing the political conditions of
the Basque country and the grievances of the Basque people.

After making a case that the Basques were a nation divided
"between two states, without any proper relations between
the two areas, without a proper bases for government,

development and communal living," they then deplored the
fact that the Spanish Church was systematically involved in
the process of Castilianization because it only recognized

Castilian as the offical language of the Church. 273

The

letter was a plea for the recognition of the Basque people
as a distinct ethnic group.

Some priests have gone so far

as to call for an "indigenous" Church and a Basque

Episcopal Conference. 274

while the clergy addresses itself

273«a Nuestro B.P. Paulo VI, contodo respecto un
grupo de sacerdotes vascos de Vizcaya." Bilbao, November 4, 1968.
2 7*On

November 11, 1968, 60
the seminary of Derio and sent a
which they accused the Church of
politico-fascista militarista."

priests staged a sit in at
letter to their bishop in
being wedded to a "sistema
Among other things,
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to the violations of human rights, there seems
little

question that their immediate interests are the fate of the
Basques as a people.

This was made very explicit in a letter

signed by 500 priests and sent to the Spanish Episcopal

Conference in 1969:
The sensitivity of nations and ethnic
groups is such, insofar as their ethnic or
national consciousness is concerned that we
believe it difficult to resolve the problem
without a recognition of their personality and
the rights that belong to them. 275
On May 4, 1969, after considerable pressure from his

clergy, the Bishop of Bilbao, Jose Maria Cirarda, finally

issued a pastoral letter taking note of what was happening

within the Basque region and calling attention to the fact
that the "Concordat had been violated, more than once, in

these events" .276

For some members of the lower clergy,

this pastoral letter was too mild.

Subsequently, a group

of exiled priests in France sent Cirarda an open letter

accusing him of lack of moral leadership and of failure to
they criticized the Church for supporting a regime engaged
in "repression dirigida a la dissolucion de la etnia vasca
al aniquilamiento de la cultura del pueblo trabajador
vasco." During 1968 and 1969 the clergy became so active
that some of the newspapers in the North began to refer to
their behavior as "guerrilismo clerical." Hierro . December
20, 1968, p.4.
275 Alderdl . March/April, 1969, p. 10.
publication of the PNV.

This is a

276«E X hortacion Pastoral " from Jose Maria de Cirarda,
acting Bishop of Bilbao, May 4, 1969.
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recognize the critical political
situation existing within
the Basque country.
They asked him to resign and
withdrew
their obedience to himi
"We do not want the Church that
you keep and administer for it is an
egoistic
and sold

Church, a collaborator with the oppressors
of our people.
Indeed, this assertion is scandalous, but
it
is not

exaggerated nor false." 2 ??
Some people may interpret the actions of the
Basque

clergy as part of the larger international phenomenon
regarding the concern for reform within the Catholic
Church.
With respect to the behavior of the Basque clergy the
evidence
does not seem to allow such an interpretation.

In very rare

instances has the issue of Church reform come up; and when
it has come up, it has been in connection with the fact that

the hierarchy has not taken the stand advocated by the

clergy regarding the actions of the regime vis-awis Basque

nationalists.

It should also be noted that it has been in

the Basque country and Catalonia, two areas with a history

of sentiment for Home Rule, that segments of the clergy have

publicly taken stands against the regime.

In their public

pronouncements, the Basque clergy has not shown so much

concern with the rights of all Spaniards, but with the

rights of the Basques; and in this endeavor, tne Y have

received the moral support of their fellow clergymen in
277Le tter from a group of Basque priests to the Bishop
of Bilbao, 1969.
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the French Basque country.

Recent events surrounding the Spanish hierarchy and
the place of the Catholic Church within the future
regime

of Spain suggest that the Basque clergy might have found a

sympathetic hearing for their cause and that a future regime
of Spain may well give the Basques some degree of official

repognltion.

At a meeting of Church dignitaries and

priests held in Madrid on September 17, 1971, several

resolutions were passed which, In this writer

1

s

opinion,

and given the traditional position of the Church under the

Franco regime, should be characterized as radical departures
from traditional Church policies.

These resolutions asked

for an independent Church, that is, Church dignitaries would

no longer occupy government posts as they do now, such as

representation in the Cortes and in the Council of the
Realm; respect and protection of political rights; and

most significantly, respect and liberty for the ethnic

minorities of Spain. 278

An official body of the Church has

recognized the existence of ethnic minorities within Spain.

Undoubtedly the Basque clergy along with the Catalan clergy
must have had exercised a high degree of pressure in order
to introduce the resolution regarding the status of the

ethnic minorities.

Another resolution which was introduced,

but did not pass, asked the Spanish people to forgive the
278ABC, September 16 and September 24, 1971.
La CrolxTTParis) September 18, 1971.

See also
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Church's partial stand (the almost
unconditional support of
the Franco forces) during the
Civil
War:

qUentl We hUmbly cognize
ask f«Sff
forgiveness ?for not having acted asand
agents
of reconciliation in the midst
of a people COrn
torn
by a civil war fought among
brother s.27§
Public Opinion
Since we have no public opinion surveys
of the Basque
population regarding the extent and intensity
of support for
organized nationalist groups, it is difficult
to make fast
generalizations regarding the nature of the support
and the

degree of autonomy desired by most of the population.

There

is evidence, however, that there exists a body of
middle

class opinion which favors some degree of autonomy
for the

Basques within the Spanish State.

One such group, formed

within the Basque country, is the Accion Social Democratira
Vasca which advocates democratization and decentralization
of the Spanish State with a view toward a European

Federation. 280

According to this group the old exclusivist

form of nationalism is outmoded and out of fashion.

At the

same time there seems to be a fairly large body of opinion

within the Basque country which is very sensitive to the
immigration of non-Basques to the Basque region.

There is

279 Quoted in Euzko Deva . September
20, 1970, p. 3.

^°Jose Domingo Arana, Pueblo Vasco (Bilbao! Editorial
Ercilla-Libras, 1968), p. 167. See also his Centra lismo
Politico y Reglonalismo (Bilbao, 1966).
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fear that through the process
of intermarriage the Basque
population may become diluted. Consequently,
some Basques
argue that in light of this possibility
an effort should be
made to assimilate non-Basques into the
Basque community

rather than vice-versa.

Some argue that the Basques are

the most European of the Iberian peoples;
and, if Spain

wants to change and become more Europeanized,
it should
follow the example of the Basques. 281 This is not a
new
argument. Decades earlier a Basque writer of centralist
tendencies, Maeztu of the Generation of 1898, had already

made the argument that if Spain wanted to industrailize
it
should study the Basques and follow their example.

It

seems that the Acclon Democratlca Vasca is willing to

accept the notion of one Spain but with regional and
cultural diversity.

Decentralization would be the cure for

many of the social and political problems of Spain.

This,

too, is an old argument in Spanish politics.

Although the Carlists are still in existence, and
presumably still have their organization, the Communion
Tradiclonalista which officially does not exist, the lack of
information regarding this group does not permit one to

assess the extent to which it could become a serious

political force in future political changes in Spain.
Despite the fact that the Franco regime allowed Navarra to
281 Jorge de Oteiza, Quosque Tandem (Ensayo del
interpretacion estetica del alma vasca.) San Sebastian: Editorial
Aunamendi, 1963.

155

ke *P its concjerto economico
a reward for Its help
,
during
the Civil War, the Carlists
have never been too satisfied
with the Franco regime. Their
hopes that Franco might
select a Csrlist pretender to sit
on the Spanish throne were
deflated when Franco finally made his
decision to select
Juan Carlos as the future King of Spain.

It seems difficult

to conceive that the Carlists seriously
entertained the

possibility that a Carlist pretender might
inherit the
Spanish throne. At any rate, with the Franco
regime
approaching its end, the Carlists, too, have begun

to show

their dissatisfaction with the Madrid government.

At a

Carlist meeting held in Pamplona on December
20, 1968,
Prince Carlos Hugo de Bourbon-Parma appeared. But the
government in Madrid viewed this with some displeasure and
asked him to leave Spain. 282

French citizen.

p r i nce Carlos Hugo is a

As a result of this incident, there were

clashes between the police and Carlists in Pamplona.

Groupo de Accion Carlista .

a

splinter group from the old

Carlist organization, supports Carlos Hugo, but beyond this
not very much is known about its size or its social ideology
or whether or not there is any collaboration with ETA. 283

There was in Kavarra a small nationalist group, Xratxe .

(Movimlento I^acionalista Navarro), but it fused with ETA in 1965
2Q2^ eeS £ ng i
p. 23112.

8

Contemporary Archives . January 1-11, 1968

283 Le Monde . January 2, 1971.
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At the cultural level there
seems to be a growing
Interest In the Basque language and
Basque cultural

activities.

Apparently through the efforts of ETA
some
£kastolas (Basque schools) have sprung up
in the Basque
country. But this interest with Basque
schools

seems to

have broad support.

£1 Alcazar reported in 1958 that there

was great interest in the Basque language. 284

ln 1968 an

article published in Hlerro indicated that much
more is
written in Basque now than ever before. The article
comments
further that "It is about to be realized the beautiful

enterprise of establishing billngualism in the schools.
It should be pointed out, in passing," the article read,

"that there exists almost a hundred schools in Vizcaya and

Guipuzcoa,

a

number which never existed before in the

Basque country. "285

a new literature prize for works in

Basque has also been established:

the Premio Nacional de

Literatura Jose Maria Iparraguirre.

And in 1967, the

Diputacion de Navarra approved a plan to teach Basque

a half

an hour per day in the schools of that province. 286

A recent survey has revealed some significant information

regarding the Basque language.

It seems that far more people

speak Basque than had been supposed.

For example, it was

284 E1 Alcazar . December
17, 1958.
285 Hjerro (Bilbao), November 12, 1968.

286 See Dlcclonario de Legislation Administrative v
Fl sea 1 de Navarra . I Pamplona: Editorial Aranzadi, 1969),
pp. 1118-19.
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found that 82 per cent of the Spanish Basque
rural population
speak Basque, while 51 per cent of those of
the urban areas
speak It and 19 per cent of those In the big
cities. 287 But

only 12 per cent of the whole Basque population can write
In Basque. 288

As indicated by the FOESSA survey, the use

of Basque seems to vary with the amount of education and

urbanization but not the Interest In It.

It was pointed

out that the Basque middle class favors the learning of

Basque as a second language.

A survey of housewives further

Indicates that AO per cent of them favored (very much)
their children learning Basque while only 31 per cent

believed it to be necessary that their children learn
Basque. 289

This attitude did not seem to vary with class.

Another finding indicates that 71 per cent of the house-

wives preferred the Basque language for their children's
comic book 8 while 30 per cent preferred the use of Basque
on radio and television and 36 per cent for movies. 290

Thus, the result of this survey indicates that there exists
a significant minority with interest in the perpetuation

of the language an interest which should not be taken
287 FOESSA,
Informe sociologlco sobre l fl sltuaclon
social de Espana . Directed by Arnando de Miguel, Luroamerlca
I am thankful to Mr.
Fundaclon FOESSA, 1970, p. 1304.
Pedro Blasco , a fellow In Sociology at Yale for having
brought this source to my attention.

288 lbid.
2S Q lbld.. p.

1307

29 °lbld.. p.

1276.
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lightly for the future development
of Basque nationalism.
If this interest has been able
to survive under the Franco
regime, one should expect its
continued growth under a
possible more liberal regime after
Franco.
The French Basq ues

Far more significant in recent
developments, however,
is the changing attitude of the
French Basques. Basque

nationalist aspirations have come primarily
from the
Spanish Basques. But recently the French

Basques, too,

have begun to manifest nationalist aspirations.

On April 15,

1963, a congress of nationalists met in D'ltxassou
(in the

French Basque region) to organize a nationalist
organization.

£nbata, the organization which emerged out of this
congress,
calls for a Basque state in which both Spanish and French
Basques will live, but for the moment it will settle for the

formation of a department consisting exclusively of the
three traditional Basque provinces. 291

in

suc h a department,

Euzkera along with French would have official standing.

Eventually all the Basques would be united under a European
Federation.

It is their belief that the future of Europe

does not lie with the large state units but with the break

up of such units and the emergence of
on ethnic groups.
fcyA

a federation based

Insofar as the members of Enbata are

For a discussion of the French Basque movement see
Paul Serant, La France des Minorites (Paris:
Edicions
Robert Laffont, 1965), pp. 158-189.
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concerned, France as a political unit
does not mean very
much to them. Simon Haran, the Secretary
General of Enbata,
expressed this sentiment in the following
terms!

I can already see against mee
ail those
refuse the path to independence, or who find who
scandalous even to speak about it, even relative
independence, administrative, and cultural.
1
see them all, all those people, Basque or
foreigners, to emerge in the defense of the
French State.
But hexegonal France is a myth.
If you do away with the administration, the
police, the army and the language not much of
France will be left.
If you expel from the
Basque country the French or Spanish
administration, police, and the army,
79 what is
there left?292

Some mtmbers of Enbata have suggested that a common

market should be established between the French and the

Spanish Basque region since the latter has enough capital
to develop the whole region.
In contrast to the program of the PMV, Enbata seems to

take a more pragmatic approach, and among its grievances one

finds mention of specific economic problems such as lack of

employment and lack of any significant industry. 293

The

Rev. Pierre Larzabal, considered as one of the militant

nationalists of the French Basque region, is of the opinion
that the French government has purposely kept industry out
of this area in order to make it a tourist haven.

Consequently,

he feels, the young population of the area will be reduced

292 Quoted in ibid.,
pp. 167-168.

293 £nbata (aayonne, France), January, 1964.
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to the status of "servants-waiters,
maids, concierges ."294
This area has a long history of emigration.
Most of the
Basque sheephearders of the American West
have come from
the French Basque country.

Although it seems that in the past the French
government
has ignored the Spanish Basques coming into the
French

region when pursued by the police, recently it has begun
to show concern with Basque nationalist activities.
It has
asked Spanish Basques to stay away from the French Basque

region and has offered them exile but in departments
outside of the Basque region.

French Basques have in turn

protested the activities of the French government and

demanded that Spanish Basques be allowed to stay in the
French Basque country.

In March of 1970, nine Spanish

Basques went on a hunger strike in the Cathedral of Bayonne
in order to protest the French Governments demands that

they move away from that area.

Instead the local clergy

protested and replied that "Basques have a right to live
in the Basque country. "295
As of late, the French Government has also begun to

take notice of the nationalist activities of the French

Basques.

Several members of Enbata . along with its

secretary, Simon Haran, were given a month's imprisonment
29 ^ The New York Times . January 11, 1971, p. 8.

295 Ibld .. p.? March 31,

1970.
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In September of 1971 for having organized
a celebration for

Aberrl Efiuna.296

The day of Aberri Eeuna

is a

practice

which was started by the Spanish Basque nationalists.
Apparently there are no relationships between the PNV and
Enbata; and the PNV seems very reticent toward the latter

organization.

There are good political reasons for the

seeming lack of interest of the PNV for Enbata .

Any show

of support for Enbata could well mean their expulsion from

Prance

Certain themes in European politics seem to favor

nationalism such as that of the Basques.

It has become

fashionable these days to speak of regionalism and

decentralization both in France and Spain. 297

At the 69th

convention of the French Radical Party in December of
1970, the Party passed resolution demanding the end of

state centralization and recognition of political and

administrative autonomy for the regions and municipal! ties. 298
The central government would retain the power to deal with

broader European political issues and eventually become part
of a federation known as the United States of Europe.
296 Le Monde . September 25, 1971.

297 For a discussion of regionalism in France see
Robert La font, La Revolution Regionallste (Par is j Gallimard,
The Politics of Continuity
1967); Lowell G. Noonan, France:
and Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970),
p. 166; Laurence Gladieux, "Regionalism in France", Public
and International Affairs . I (1967), pp. 135-157.
298 The Kew York Times . December 7, 1970, p. 4.
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In Spain there has also been
some discussion of
regionalism and decentralization by
public officials.
In an interview given i„
1966, The Ministro de Gobernacion

discussed his support for decentralization
which he felt
was a necessity for the modern state. 299
Even the
the paper of the Spanish labor
union s, has given some
attention to the question of regionalism.
In an article
entitled, «De la Region a la Patria", it
was argued that
Spain would benefit by giving the several
regions greater
autonomy. 300 It was the author's opinion that
decentralization
would bring about the "patriotizacion de las
regiones."
So far, however, regionalism has not become a
question of

national policy.

29 °Pueblo (Madrid), November
16,

30°lMd..

1966, p.

11

CHAPTER

VI

ACCOUNTING FOR THE RISE OF BASQUE NATIONALISM:
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
In the preceeding chapters we have discussed
the

gradual growth and development of Basque nationalism.

In

this chapter we shall try to dissect the various components
of the movement.

We shall make an inquiry in the relation-

ship between Basque nationalism and several variables which

are sometimes given as responsible for the rise of ethnic

nationalism.

Among these variables we find the following:

(1) the political structure of the state to which the ethnic

minority belongs; (2) the economy of the society at large
and the economy of the region where the ethnic minority
has its home base; and, (3) the degree of assimilation and

social mobilization.

What relationships can we detect

between these variables and nationalism?
differently:

To put it

Are there any detectable variations between

Basque nationalism and the political structure of the

Spanish State, the degree of Basque assimilation, and the
state of the national and regional economies?
the following question is also pertinent:

In addition,

Is Basque

nationalism essentially a class phenomenon?
Due to the lack of recent sociological studies in
this area, our inferences regarding Basque nationalism and
the variables described above must of necessity be somewhat

inconclusive.

A detailed public opinion survey of the
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Basque country would possibly reveal to us a more
precise

picture and probably allow us to reach conclusions that
the
scope of the present study does not allow.

But "in the

absence of reliable survey data," says Donald Horowitz,
one can still draw some inferences "from the timing of

conflicts and the issues of political debate."

What are

the salient issues presented by the leaders of ethnic

nationalism and what do they "consider worth fighting for"? 30 *
To be sure, this is a round about way of analysing our

problem, but it is the only available at the moment.

Even though there is no detailed class breakdown of
the support for the Partldo Naclonallsta Vasco (PNV), the

general evidence available, and the writings of people
familiar with the movement, suggest that support for the
Party came primarily from the middle class, the peasant
sector, and the members of the lower clergy.

The religious

hierarchy of the Basque region, including those of Basque
descent with very few exceptions has not supported the

political objectives of Basque nationalism.

This is not

surprising, particularly under the Franco regime, since
Franco, under the terms of the Concordat, has the power to

veto appointments by the Vatican.
The comments of observers of Basque nationalism and
301 Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the
Toward a Theory of Conflict", in Robert J.
[sew States:
Jackson and Michael Stein (eds.), Issues in C ompara t ive
Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 176.
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the electoral statistics of the Basque region indicate
that

broad segments of the Basque population did not support all
the objectives of the PNV.

The Party never became the

dominant party of the region.

The largest percentage of

the popular vote that it ever received was 46 per cent during
the Cortes elections of 1933. 302

The national (Spanish)

monarchist parties were able to elicit substantial support
throughout the Basque region.

Support for the national

monarchist parties, however, should not be interpreted as
acceptance of greater centralization from Madrid, but

rather for the existing status quo, that is, for the
concierto economlco arrangement.

It seems that some of the

people who supported the status quo also considered themselves

autonomists but not anti-Spanish as the nationalists did. 303
The support of the middle classes and the peasant

sector must be qualified for support from these groups

varied within the various Basque provinces.

Support for

the Party was concentrated primarily in the provinces of

Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya.

Navarra and Alava were also

autonomists but in the traditional medieval sense.

Their

localism did not seem to go beyond their province, whereas
the nationalists wanted to create a cross-local identity

302 Juan J. Linz, "Opposition in and Under an AuthoriThe Case of Spain," unpublished paper, p. 67.
tarian Regime:
Hereafter quoted as "Opposition under an Authoritarian

Regime."
303 Ybarra, op cit .. p. 461.
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within the Basque provinces.

While there is a feeling of

Basque identity throughout the Basque
region, at the same
time, one also witnesses an extreme
local identification
with the traditional provinces and traditional
institutions.
For example, it is not uncommon to hear
Basques refer to
themselves as the A^aveses, the Navarros, and the

Mzkainos.

It could be argued that this attachment to
pre-modern or

pre -nationalist institutions has been an obstacle
in the

full development of Basque nationalism.
The history of the area indicates that two processes

of integration or national identification have been at

work.

One might graphically represent these two processes

in the following manner:

From the point of identification with the local province,

we witness the process of the rise of Basque nationalism,
and at the same time, a process going into the opposite

direction, that is, Spanish identification.

Curiously

enough, it seems that it has been in the same provinces,

Vlzcaya and Guipuzcoa, where these two processes seem to
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have gone the farthest.
The provinces of A lava and Navarra, primarily agricultural

and rural during the 1930«s, did not manifest the same
degree of enthusiasm for Basque nationalism that the other
two provinces did.

But due to the fact that we find rural

support for the Party in the provinces of Vizcaya and

Guipuzcoa, one might have to conclude that the rural-urban

variable might not have been that decisive in influencing
the degree of support for the Party.

The very rich Basques, on the other hand, seemed to

have supported the center, rather than the PNV.

The

position of the Basque very rich, such as industrialists
and millionaires, is probably not unrelated to concrete

policy issues, to their economic position in the Basque

community and in the economy of Spain.

"The point is hard

to document," says Linz, "but it seems clear that a large

part of the Bilbao business elite, which created giant
steel mills, other industrial plants, and some of the most

successful industrial and investment banks, remained aloof
from the incipient nationalist movement. "304

it seems that

the Basque rich worked closely with the Madrid government

from which they received protection for their industries
in the form of tariffs and government contracts.

For example,

304 Juan J. Linz, "Early State-Building and late
The case of
peripheral nationalisms against the State:
Spain." Unpublished paper, p. 115. Hereafter cited as

"Early State -Building."
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the Sociedad Espanola de Conatruccion
Naval, founded to

construct ships for the Spanish Navy, was financed
with
Basque capital. This group of industrialists
apparently
became the nucleus of the parties of the Restoration
in
the region in the latter part of the nineteenth
century.

Some supported the Liberals and some gave their support
for the Conservative s. 305

These ties between the Bilbao

financiers and the Madrid government, says Linz, have

continued after the Civil War.

"Leading business men

and a small group of anti-Basque intellectuala of the region

were among the main aupportera of Franco; and a few of them
were even in early, but not permanent, contact with the
founders of Spanish Fascism, some of whom would occupy key

positions under Franco." 306

Linz further notes that there

has been an interchange of personnel between Basque big

industry and government positions.

Basque finance and

industry is national in scope rather than regional, thus

another reason why it might view Basque nationalism as

a

threat.
The close contact between the Madrid government and
the Basque industrialists began with the Restoration when
it became a policy of the Crown to bestow titles of nobility
on some Basque industrialists*

A Basque defender of the

Spanish cause in Vizcaya, makes reference to the Monarchy
305 Ybarra, op. clt .. p. 327.

306n Early state-Building," p. 116.
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in these terms:

"It would be unforgivable Ingratitude to

forget the care so many times demonstrated by
the king's
assiduous attention to those things that affected
Vlzcaya
for which we should make great efforts to eagerly
gather
around the throne ."307
It Is not difficult to see how the Basque industrialists

might have perceived Basque nationalism as a threat to
their interests.

First of all, the political objectives of

the nationalists in all probability would have had drastic

consequences for Basque industry.

The protection, and the

safe market, afforded these industries by the central

government might have been lost.

Secondly, the PNV

threatened to displace this group as the center of political

power in the region, particularly in the province of

Vlzcaya.

There is some evidence which suggests that the

Basque tycoons, through the system of caclaulsmo . pretty

much controlled election results in some areas, both to the

Cortes and to the local governments.

Basque industrialists,

such as Ybarra and Chevarri, were highly involved in

political activities and frequently ran for public office.
The PNV in all probability meant a challenge to this

position.

Ybarra indicates that there were bitter feuds

between the PNV and the tycoons of Basque industry.

In

the words of a nationalist, this sector of Basque society,

the industrialists, had been "devasquizado", that ic it had
307 Ybarra, op. clt .. p. 327.
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become Spanish or Castilianized.

And as one might have

expected, It was this sector which was concerned
with the
economic implications of Basque nationalism and not
unmindful
of the role of the Madrid government in the growth
of Basque
industry.

Ybarra rejected what he considered the absurdity

of the nationalists by pointing out the benefits of being
tied to Spain:

"So much wealth and so many benefits have

accrued as a result of Vizcaya«s relations and ties with
the rest of Spain." 308

The foregoing may allow one to conclude that the

variable of class was not absent in the degree of support
for Basque nationalism.

But this conclusion cannot be

carried too far and without qualification for, as we

mentioned above, the PNV received support from various
socio-economic groups:

the middle class, the peasants, the

industrial workers and the lower clergy.

If one were to

characterize the Party regarding its general orientation
to socio-economic policies, therefore, one might

characterize it as a conservative bourgeois party.

Although

Basque nationalism also had a left-wing group, the ANV,

which concerned itself with socio-economic reforms and
class issues, it never became a serious force in the Basque

region.

The parties of the Left, particularly the

Socialist Party, with the exception of some urban centers,
such as Bilbao, and in some mining towns, did not elicit

^IMd.,

p. 471.
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much support from the Basques.

It seems that the support

that it received came primarily from non-Basque workers

who had immigrated to the area.

The PNV had created its

own labor union, the Solidarldad de Trabaladores Vascos .
The PNV scarcely concerned itself with class issues, but

concentrated its efforts almost exclusively on the question
of political autonomy. 309
In a multi-national state the form of political

organization has at times also been considered an important

variable shaping or determining the rise of ethnic nationali
for manifestation of ethnic nationalism may be interpreted
as reactions to political oppression or to the lack of

representation in the central national institutions ,3 10
The changes in the political structure of the Spanish

State and the rise of Basque nationalism are not unrelated.
This relationship, however, is no more satisfactory as a

sufficient explanatory tool than class analysis.

As

discussed in the preceeding chapters, we found that the
rise of the Car list movement (a pre-nationalist movement)

was in part a reaction against the centralizing policies of
the nineteenth century liberals.

Up to this point the

309 Jesus de Sarria, Ideolosia del Nacionalismo Vasco
E . Verdes, 1918)7"
(Bilbao:

310 John E. E. Dalberg-Acton, The History of Freedom
and Other Essays (London, 1907); Ernest Barker, National
Character and the Factors in its Formation (London, 1927):
Alfred Cobban, National Self-De termination (Chicago, 1949).
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relationship between the Basque provinces and
the Spanish
State had been by and large devoid of conflict.
Basque

nationalism, in a sense, thus grew out of Carlism.
for example, had come from a Carlist family.

Arana,

It was during

the continuing conflict process between the Spanish
State

and the Basque defense of the fueros that the notion
of

nationality first began to be used.

But Carlism remained

attached to medieval institutions and very parochial in
its political orientation.

While the nationalists, too.

made reference to the traditional institutions of the
Basques, their argument stemmed chiefly from the belief
that the Basques were a nationality different from the

Spanish and, consequently, had

a

right to self-determination.

The argument of the Car lists was essentially legalistic:

namely, that the Spanish State could not unilaterally

abrogate rights and customs of the local communities which
had existed since time immemorial.

Their demands consisted

in the restoration of their traditional rights.

The

Basque nationalists went a step further by maintaining that
the Basques, by virtue of being a different nationality,

had a right to political independence.

Nowhere does one find evidence that the nationalists
or the Car lists asked for greater participation in the

central national institutions as a compensation for the loss
of their local autonomy.

Obviously, this would have been

remedy had the main issue been one of insuring greater

a
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political participation for the Basques.

Had such demands

been made, one could have interpreted
them as acceptance
of the central political institutions, and
the assumptions
underlying them. But this was not the case nor
was it the
issue.
The main concern of the nationalists was
to arrest
the assimilation process, which had been proceeding
for

centuries, or reverse it, and preserve the Identity of
the
Basques as a people. There is a difference between this

position and the demands of an ethnic group which desires

greater participation in the social and political institutioni
of the state to which it belongs.

This, by and large, has

been the case of the ethnic minorities, both black and
white, which have immigrated to the United States.

Their

willingness to become part of the American society was not
necessarily reciprocated by the existing socio-political
elite.

Demands for greater participation may imply a

willingness on the part of the ethnic minority to recognize
the legitimacy of the existing political institutions.

But if the primary concern of a given ethnic group is to

preserve its identity, then the form of government under

which it lives may be of little concern.

In the case of

the Basque nationalists, for example, they showed little

concern for the central political institutions which they

considered as a Spanish problem and only relevant to them
to the extent that Basque political objectives could be

advanced.
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In journalistic accounts of Basque
nationalism it is

sometimes asserted that the reason for the lack
of greater
French 3asque nationalism lies in the fact that they
enjoy
greater political freedom than the Spanish Basques. 3 H

But

a closer look at the problem does not give much
credence to

this interpretation.

Spanish Basque nationalism emerged

precisely at the time when Spain was governed by a fairly
democratic political system.

The regime brought about by

the Restoration (1876-1923) was one of the more democratic

political regimes in Spanish political history.

"The

legitimacy of the parties had been recognized, basic civil

llbertles--freedom of association (Law of 1887), of the
press, and so forth— were respected and there was toleration
of wide (but not perfect) freedom for some trade union

movements. "3 12

in

short, Basque nationalism emerged in a

period which gave the PNV open, relatively democratic, and

almost "ideal" political conditions to function and

proselytize followers.

Again during the second Spanish

Republic the PNV emerged with great vigor.
The notion that Spanish Basque nationalism has been a

reaction to political oppression may have some credence
3*1 The New York Times

312 Juan J. Linz, "The Party System In Spain Past and
Future," in Seymour M. Lip set and Stein Rokkan (eds.)
The Free
Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York:
excellent
an
is
article
202.
Linz»s
Pre 88, 1967), p.
treatment of the party system under the Restoration.
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with regard to the Franco regime and the regime of
de Rivera.

Prirao

But again, this interpretation can only be

carried so far.

Although Primo de Rivera suppressed the

Basque political organizations— a policy adopted towards

other political organizations throughout Spain— he,
nevertheless, allowed, and even encouraged, the different

regions to manifest their cultural distinctions.

But to

Primo de Rivera "regionalism meant folk-lore, country

dancing, regional literature, and home craf ts— politically
safe, attractive to tourists, and a proof of diversity in

unity." 313
It has been only recently, under the Franco regime,

that severe policies have been adopted toward some of the

Basque provinces:

the abrogation of the concierto economico

for the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, the prohibition

of publications in euskera . and the use of euskera at

Church services.

With these exceptions, we have found no

evidence that the Basques have been selected for any

particular type of discrimination.

And recently the regime

has overlooked the increasing use of euskera in publications. 3
The authoritarianism experienced in the Basque region does
313 Carr, op. cit .. p. 568.
3 14 There

are now some newspapers in Vizcaya and
Guipuzcoa which are printing some columns in euskera . See
El Dlario Vasco of San Sebastian, La Hoi a de Lunes of
Bilbao, and the Dlario de Navarra of Pamplona. See also
Chapter V of this dissertation, p. 156.

^
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not seem to be any worse than in the other Spanish
regions,
although in the regions with strong regional sentiment,
the government has been more sensitive to cultural

activities for it interprets them as having a political
content.

Traditionally the Spanish Basques have enjoyed greater

autonomy than the French Basques.

It was not until the

Franco regime that the Spanish Basque provinces really

began to experience the degree of control that the French
Basques have experienced since 1789.

It would indeed be

difficult to attribute the rise of Basque nationalism
simply to the lack of democratic freedoms or to political

oppression.
Moreover, the recent nationalist aspirations of the

French Basques further suggests that the form of political
structure may not be that relevant in helping to explain
the rise of ethnic nationalism in a multi-national state.

Although there were some structural changes brought about

with the advent of the Fifth French Republic, particularly
regarding the organization of the central political
institutions, the traditional administrative structure of
the French state, remained basically the same.

Other

cases alPQ suggest that the form of political organization
of a given state and the rise of ethnic nationalism may

have very little relationship.

The Scots, the Welsh, and

the French Canadians are cases in point; all of them live

within democratic states.
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It is also sometimes presumed that ethnic
discord is
the product of economic grievances resulting
from the

politically subordinate position of the ethnic minority.
This assumption is replete in the literature on race

relations. 315

But this explanation must also be taken

with some skepticism, because we find variations in this
area.

With respect to the Basques, one of the striking

facts of the Basque region is its relative economic

advancement in comparison to the other provinces and to the
Spanish national economy.

This further suggests that

political subordination of an ethnic group need not mean
economic retardation.
The appearance of Basque nationalism coincided with
the Industrial development of the Basque region, particularly

the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.

In 1877 Spain

produced 1.58 million tons of iron-ore, 1.04 million tons
of which was produced in the province of Vizcaya alone.
By 1900 Spain was producing 21.5 per cent of the world's

output of iron-ore. 316
and Sweden.

Of Spain 1

it had surpassed Italy, France,
s

252 iron-ore mines 106 were

^ ^Mohammed A.

Nawawi, "Stagnation as a Basis of
Regionalism," Asian Survey . IX, December 1969. In his
study of Scottish nationalism John E. Schwartz also puts
emphasis on this variable. For citation see p. 1 of
Chapter I. See also Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan,
A Comparative Approach (New York;
Ethnic Stratification:
l$<tf>,

pp.

168,

l$6-$», 386-65.

3* 6 Ronald Chilcote, Spain's Iron and Steel Industry

(Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business Research, University of
Texas, 1968), pp. 2G-23.
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concentrated in Vlzcaya and over 75 per
cent of Spain's
12,000 miners were located in that province. 317
According
to one study, 318 between 1875 and 19Q0>
9f500f000 tong Qf

iron-ore were exported from Spain, thus bringing
into the
Basque region an average annual sum of 100
million pesetas
making the Basque country the leading financial center
of

Spain.

It was with the revenues from the exportation of

iron-ore that Basque capitalists embarked on the industrial

development of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.

In 1902 the Altos

Homos de Vizcaya, an iron-steel joint

stock company with

a capital of 32 million pesetas, was founded. 3 19

Also

by

the turn of the century Basque capitalists became pioneers
in the areas of electricity, financing hydroelectric

projects, iron- steel, chemicals, cement and paper industries.
Tolosa, the old capital of Guipuzcoa, became the paper

capital of Spain.

San Sebastian had the biggest cement

factory in Spain.
At the end of the nineteenth century great strides

were also made to expand the merchant marine of the region.
According to Jaime Vives, from 1846 to 1902, Bilbao spent

approximately 130 million pesetas buying foreign vessels
317 Ibld .. p. 24.

Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain
University Press, 1969;, p. 663.
Princeton
(Princeton:
3 18 Jaime

319 lbld .. p. 667.
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so that by the end of the century 39 per
cent of the total

merchant marine of Spain was concentrated In
Vizcaya.320
Basque entrepreneurial activities were not
limited
to the Basque region.
In the area of finance the Basque
banks began to spread their activities throughout
Spain.
They were particularly active in hydroelectric concerns

and chemical factories.

By 1908, 30 per cent of the total

Spanish investments were Basque, thus making the Basque
banks the single most important financial center of
Spain. 32 ! After World War II, says Carr, Basque banks

began "to play a part in the Spanish economy resembling
that of the German banks." 322

The Basque influence in the

Spanish economy gave rise to the following saying:

"Todo

para Espana y Espana para Euzkadi." 323

Although Spain went through a "gold fever" in the
early years of the Restoration, by 1887 the Spanish
economy began to experience a depression.

The loss of

the remnants of the Spanish Empire apparently furthered

this downward trend of the economy.

But it seems that this

trend was not equally felt throughout Spain.

While on the

whole the Spanish economy was going through a period of
32 0 Ibld ..

p. 691.

321 Carr, op. cit .. p. 435.

322 Ibid .. p. 406.

323 Ramon Sierra Bustamente. Euzkadi de Sablno de Arana
(Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1941), p. 248.
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stagnancy, in the Basque region economic growth
continued.
The Basque provinces and Catalonia remained
the dynamic

centers of the Spanish economy.

Illustrative of this

growth is the fact that between 1900 and 1913, the product!
of steel in the Basque region expanded by 263 per cent,
and

between 1920 and 1930 by 235 per cent.

"<T)his,» says

Carr, "was twice the rate of expension of the world

production 1900-50. "324

The period under Primo de Rivera

was also a relatively prosperous period.
of the cement industry.

This was the age

And in 1929, "iron and steel

production was twice that of 1917. 32 5
TABLE

2

SPANISH PROVINCES LEADING IN PER CAPITA INCOME, 1967
(in thousand pesetas)
196?

1967

Rank
order

Madrid

36,796

66,545

1

80.85

Vizcaya

38,717

66,052

2

70.60

Guipuzcoa

35,902

65,673

3

82.92

Barcelona

35,288

62,615

4

77.44

Alava

30,503

62,027

5

103.35

53,503

6

Navarra
Spain

24,496

% Change

81.58

44,481

Source: Camara Oficial de Industrie de Guipuzcoa, Estructura
economica-lndustrlal de Guipuzcoa y su evoluclon
Madrid, 1970, p. 212.

324 Carr, op. clt .. p. 407.

325 Ib id
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Basque nationalist activities during the
1960»s also
seemed to have been accompanied by a relatively
high
economic growth of the Spanish economy. The
period between
1957 and 1967 was one of rapid economic expansion.

"During

this decade the Spanish economy grew at an annual
average

rate of

9

per cent, one of the highest in the Western

world." 326

The Basque provinces shared in this growth.

With respect to per capita income, in 1967 the province
of

Vizcaya occupied second place and Gulpuzcoa third place.
As shown in Table 2, even Navarra, one of the less

TABLE 3
PER CAPITA DISPOSABLE INCOME OF THE BASQUE
PROVINCES (1967)
(in thousand pesetas)

Disposable

Province

I,ncome

Rank
order

Guipuzcoa

57,154

1

Vizcaya

54,545

2

A lava

53,028

3

Barcelona

52,377

4

Madrid

51,623

5

Navarra

47,266

6

Spain

39,789

Source:

Banco de Bilbao, Renta Naclonal de tspana
y su distrlbuclon provincial . (Bilbao" 1967)
p.

27

326 Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of
Modern Spain (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
xiii. This work is probably the first systematic
1970),
study of economic planning under the Franco regime.
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industrialized province, of Spain, had

a

per capita income

above the national average of 44,481 pesetas.

The per cent

change in the province of Guipuzcoa was higher
than the
national average. This is the area which has been
the

center of intense nationalist activities during the
latter
part of the 1960«s.

While the national increase in the net product was
104.65 per cent between 1962-67, in Guipuzcoa it increased

by 109.63 per cent.

Between 1955-67, the revenue in the

Basque provinces Increased by 62.9 per cent while nationally
It Increased by 6.3 per cent. 327

When we look at the distribution of the disposable
income, we also find that the Basque provinces rank higher

than the national average.

As indicated by the table, all

of the Basque provinces have a disposable income higher

than the national average.

This table suggests that the

Basques may not be unduly burdened with taxes, particularly

when we compare them with the Madrid province which
occupies first rank in terms of per capita income, but In
terms of disposable per capita Income is below all of the

Basque provinces except Navarra.

Although these selected figures do not permit us to
draw far-reaching conclusions regarding the relationship
between ethnic nationalism and economic variables, they
327 Camara Official de Industrie de Guipuzcoa. Estructura
egogomlco-| ndu8trlal de Guipuzcoa y su eyolucjon (Madrid,
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permit us to point out that the Basque economy
has not been
characterized by stagnancy and that its development has
been superior to that of the national economy, thus
giving
the inhabitants of this region a per capita income higher

than the national average.

It would be more revealing,

however, if we could find out the changes in the distribution
of income in the area over a long period of time and to see

how economic growth has affected this distribution.
The point to be made is that the economic picture of

the Basque region for the period under discussion gives

little credence to the hypothesis that attributes ethnic
conflict, or ethnic nationalism, to perceptions of economic

deprivation vis-a-vis other groups within the same society
or to competition for economic resources.

More importantly,

it should be added, the propaganda of the nationalists

scarcely touches on questions of economic grievances; and

when it does, it is primarily to show that the Basques could
do well by themselves. 32&

Basque industrialists were

criticized by the nationalists not because of their wealth,
or because they "exploited" the Basques, but because of their
lack of enthusiasm for Basque nationalism.
If Basque industry and businesses were primarily

owned by non-Basques, furthermore, one might still be able
to make the argument that despite the relative economic

328 See Andoni de Soraluze, Rloueza
y Economla del
Ekin, 1945;.
Vasca
Editorial
Pais Vasco (Buenos Aires:
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advancement of the Basque region, the Basques
perceived
themselves as being exploited by "foreigners."

But no such

argument can be made for Basque industry and
finance is
owned by Basque capitalists. In addition, Linz
has found
that "the ** at ive Basques rate businessmen more
highly
than do the non-native residents of this area." 329
In his study of ethnic conflict in Africa and Asia,

Donald Horowitz noticed a careerist component underlying
the problem:

namely, that a large part of the conflict

stemmed from the competition between the members of the

diverse ethnic groups for positions in the national
bureaucracy and in the armed forces.

"(T)here is hardly

an ethnically-divided country," he says, "without its
•civil service 1

,

and often those companions, the 'police

issue 1 and the •armed services issue ".330
I

jn

these

countries, he says, for the educated middle classes these

may be the only lucrative positions available since the
private sector does not offer adequate opportunities to
fulfill one's aspirations.

Without denying the influence of the careerist component
in Basque nationalism, the selected evidence available and

the industrialized nature of the Basque region does not

allow us to emphasize this variable.

The evidence available

on the socio-economic background of some of the leaders of
329 "Early State-Building", p. !02.

330 Horowitz, op. clt .. p. 173.
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Basque nationalism, suggests that most of them were
the

products of an urban environment and that some of them
were economically well-off, did not lack social status
and could have pursued successful careers within the

structure of Spanish society.

Sabino de Arana, for example,

the founder of the PKV, came from a fairly wealthy family

from Bilbao which had made its fortune in the shipbuilding
industry.

His father owned the Compania Euskalduna.

Arana did not lack social status nor did he experience

economic insecurity.

The evidence on his socio-economic

background points to the conclusion that— given the socio-

economic structure of Spanish society at the end of the

nineteenth century— he belonged to a privileged class.
He was educated at a private Jesuit school at Orduna and

from there went to the University of Barcelona to study
law.

He was wealthy enough so that he did not have to

worry about employment, thus devoting his time and energies
to the cause of Basque nationalism. 331

Aguirre, who became the leader of the Party during
the 1930»8 and after 1936 president of the Euzkadi

Government, also came from a well-to-do middle class
background.

Also educated at a private Jesuit school and

with a law degree from the University of Deusto.

He

held an executive position in his family^ business, a
331 see Basaldua op, clt .
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chocolate factory.

He had also been involved in
social

activities, as leader of Acclon

Cairn]

K„

and founded a

youth organization, the Eusko-Maj.te« « 332
vr
Manuel de Irujo, another leading personality
.

of Basque

nationalism, held a law degree, was on the board
of
directors in one of the paper factories of
Tolosa, and

helped to found several paper and hydroelectric
enterprises. 3 33
Telesforo de Monzon, who became a member of the
Euzkadi
Government, came from a wealthy and "distinguished family"
of Guipuzcoa.334

Thus the picture that emerges regarding the socio-

economic background of some of the leaders of Basque
nationalism, is not one of bohemian or romantic revolu-

tionaries or alienated intelligentsia, but rather, on the
contrary, one of socially integrated stable family men who
had achieved some degree of social success and who might

even be characterized as members of the "establishment."

They were close to, and participated in, the industrial
and commercial world around them.
The continued development of the economy of the Basque

region has offered the educated Basques opportunities to
fulfill their career aspirations in the private sector
£n Defensa de la Verdad . Buenos Aires:
Vasca Ekin, 1956, p. 120.
333

Editorial

A. de Lizarra, Los Vascos y la Republics Espanola
Ekin, 1944), p. 99.

(Buenos Aires:

334^guirre, Entre la Liber tad y la Revo luc ion , p. 503
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rather than in the public bureaucracy.
to a curious situation.

This may give rise

Xn a society where industrialism

is unevenly distributed, we may find a
high percentage of

public officials, such as in the bureaucracy and the
armed forces, coming from the least economically
developed
areas of the society.

In his study of regional differences

within Spain, Linz, found this pattern.

He found "that

Catalans and Basques are underrepresented in the Spanish
top Judiciary and particularly the Supreme Court."

But

this underrepresentation, he argues, is not due to any

conscious policy of discrimination but "to the more

rewarding alternatives open to a young lawyer in the
industry or commerce of those regions." 335

The law graduates

of Castile, Gallcia or Andalucia do not have as many

alternatives as those of the Basque country and Catalonia.
In his studies of economic development, Albert

Hirschman has also found a similar pattern:
The poorer sections of the country, where
careers in Industry and trade are not promising,
often produce, for this reason, a majority of
the country 1 s successful politicians and
thereby acquire influential spokesmen in the
councils of government. 33 6
If competition for public employment or careers in the

armed services were issues in the Basque region, one might
find a higher prestige given to these positions.

In his

335 "Early State-Building," p. 104.

336 Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic
Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 185.
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survey of regional differences regarding
occupational
prestige, Linz found that In Industrialized
Spain businessmen
were ranked higher than public servants and
military
men.

"The relative prestige of public eroplayment,
or the army,
in the different regions of Spain, w he says,
"appear

clearly related to the over and under-recruitment
of those
elites in each region." 337 In his survey of students'
career preferences he found a high percentage (90 per
cent)
of those of San Sebastian, the capital city of Guipuzcoa,

preferlng to «nter a career ln the pr i vate

8 « ct0 r,

while

in Ciudad Real, a provincial city, only 39 per cent made

such a preference, 338

Making reference to the linguistic issue which keeps
cropping up in controversies involving ethnic discord,
Horowitz concludes that "without the careerist incentives,
there would be much less leadership for linguistic
causes." 33 ^

In the Basque case, however, it seems to be

difficult to link or relate the linguistic issue with the
careerist component.

To begin with roost of the Basques are

fluent in Castlllan.

When the PNV emerged, it was extremely

rare to find a person that was not very fluent in Castilian.
As for today, the discussion of this issue in the Basque

country indicates that one no longer finds a person who
337 "Early State Building," p. 95.

338 Linz, "The Eight Spalns," p. 304.
339 Horowitz, op. clt ,« p. 175.
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speaks only euskera, and apparently only a
small percentage
of the Basque population can read and write
euskera ,

Linz's survey of regional housewives who had
learned first
the regional language shows that the Basque
region has

the

lowest percentage of those who came into contact first
with
the regional language and later learned Castilian.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEWIVES WHO LEARNED FIRST
THE REGIONAL LANGUAGE TO:
Re^^on

Understand

Speak

Read

Write

Balearic Islands

85

84

1

2

Galicia

75

76

4

3

Catalonia

54

53

14

13

Valencian Region

48

47

1

mm

Basque country

41

40

10

9

Source:

Juan J. Linz, "Early State- Building and Late
Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The
Case of Spain." Paper presented at the UNESCO
Conference on Nation- Building , Normandie, August
1970, p. 86.

It might not be unreasonable to assume that the

percentage among men probably is not any higher.

It is

interesting to notice, however, that although the Basque

country is low in the percentage of those who learned first
to understand and speak the language, it is relatively high
in the percentage of those who learned to read and write.

This might suggest that perhaps the local language is taken

more seriously in this region, with the exception of
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Catalonia, than in the other regions.

That the attachment

to the language is probably more
sentimental than utilitarian
is suggested by the fact that while 69
per cent of the

housewives of the Basque country would like their
children
to learn Basque, only 31 per cent believed it to
be
necessary,
TABLE 5

ATTITUDES OF HOUSEWIVES TOWARD THEIR CHILDREN
SPEAKING THE REGIONAL LANGUAGE
Would like
(very much or
fairlv much) %

Region

Believe it
necessary
(very much or
fairlv much) % .-Difference

Catalonia

97

87

10

Balearic Islands

91

73

16

Valencian Region

78

50

28

Galicia

73

49

24

Basque country

69

31

38

Source:

Juan J. Linz, "Early State- Building and Late
Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: The
Case of Spain.
Paper presented at the UNESCO
Conference on Nation- Building. Normandie, August
1970, p. 85.

As the table shows, the Basque region has the lowest

percentage of respondents that would like to have their

children learn Basque, but the greatest percentage difference
between those who felt that learning the regional language
was necessary.

In the Basque country knowledge of the

^"These figures have another level of significance
which shall be discussed in the next chapter.
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language Is not associated with the
process of social
mobility. One might suppose that If
the housewives
perceived the language to be an Important
asset for career
purposes, one should have expected a
greater percentage
to

have responded that It was necessary.

By contrast, In

Catalonia, where 87 per cent believed that
It was necessary
to learn the local language, knowing the
local language
seems to be associated with social mobility.

"In Catalonia,

the desire is associated somewhat with a higher
social

position, while in the Basque country the attachment
to the

vernacular seems to be stronger among the middle classes. 34 1
But In all regions Castilian seems to be preferred as
the

language to be used in the educational system, although
this preference seems to be less marked in the Basque and

Catalonia regions.

The population of those favoring the

local language in secondary education (the bachillerato) is

also lower in the Basque region.
It is difficult to make a case that interest in the

local language in the Basque region is primarily related
to considerations of social mobility.

In the first place,

among the leaders of Basque nationalism those Who could
speak the local language were the exception rather than the
rule, which meant that if euskera was made the official

language of the Basque country or a requirement for employment
in the public bureaucracy of the region, they, too, would have
34 *"Eariy State- Building," p. 88.
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to learn it.

Secondly, the nationalists did not argue
for

the exclusive use of the Basque language
but for bilingualisra
for the Basque region. In the Basque region
it seems that
the linguistic issue is primarily symbolic, and
it seems
to be primarily among members of the middle classes
and the

upper classes that one finds cultural or academic interest
in the local language.

On the basis of the evidence available, in this chapter

we have indicated that the growth of Basque nationalism has
accompanied the economic growth of the Basque country.
This does not mean, however, that economic deprivation may

not be unrelated to the rise of ethnic nationalism.

economic variables may work in various ways.

But

One may

witness the case, such as the black population of the
United States which has a lower socio-economic status than
the white population, and give the aspirations for socio-

economic betterment as one of the reasons underlying much
of the recent wave of black nationalism, the assumption

being that once socio-economic betterment has been

achieved black nationalism should subside.

On the other

hand we may have a case such as the Basques in which

socio-economic betterment in relation to the society in

which they live may have the effect of reinforcing their
cultural identity.

Since the Basque region is economically

more advanced than the rest of Spain, the Basques can point
to this as a source of pride and exhibit feelings of

10-

superiority when referring to the other regions
of Spain
and further maintain that the rest of the
country is a
burden on them, or that they have to support
the rest of
the country. 342 Albert Hirschman, for example,
noticed this
in his study of economic development:
The progressive sectors and regions of an
underdeveloped economy are easily overlmpressed
with their own rate of development. At the
same time, they set themselves apart from the
less progressive sectors by creating a picture
of the latter as lazy, bungling, intriguing,
and generally hopeless. There seems to be a
cliquishness about progress when it first
appears that recalls the same phenomenon
among adolescents. 3 ^ 3

This does not mean that economic development or lack of
it creates ethnicity, but it may reinforce it.

-^Oliveira describes this attitude on the part of
the Basque nationalists in these terms:
"The non-Basque
Spaniards living and working in the Basque Provinces were
regarded with singular disdain by the nationalists, who
rejected them as members of an infearior race, calling
them roaouetos." r p. 417. In an article in the New York
Times. (December 3, 1968), Richard Eder quoted a similar
view from a young Basque: "We cannot carry Spain in our
backs indefinitely. The Castilians, the Andalusians are
uneducated and primitive and they are not really ready for
democracy. As long as we tied to Spain, we shall have to
endure their dictatorship.", p. 11.
343 Hirschman, op. cit ..
p. 186.

CHAPTER

VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Basque nationalism, as discussed in this
study, is the
product of the unsuccessful efforts at
nation-building in

nineteenth century Spain.

This is not to imply, however,

that Basque ethnicity is the direct or
immediate product of
nineteenth century politics, for Basque identification,
as

discussed earlier, had long historical roots.

But this

Identification had never coalesced into a nationalist

movement until the latter part of the nineteenth century

when nationalism had come into vogue throughout Europe
and the principle of self-determination had acquired
legitimacy.

Basque nationalism is partly a reaction to the crisis
of political legitimacy that occurred in Spain with the

advent of the nineteenth century.

The Cadiz Constitution

of 1812 which envisioned a centralized and secular state

along the lines of the French model introduced conflict
into Spanish society between the adherents of a traditional

decentralized Spain organized around the Church and Throne
and the proponents of the secular state.

This conflict was

further exacerbated by the dynastic struggles which occurs vd

after the death of Ferdinand VII.
Under the political order envisioned by the 1812
consitiution, the traditional autonomy of the Basque
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provinces would come to an end; and the
Basques would
henceforth be submitted to the uniform
rule of the Madrid
government. Initially the Basque provinces
reacted
by

taking up arms in the name of God and their
traditional
liberties, the fueros.
This led to several violent

conflicts (the Car list Wars) culminating eventually
(1876)
in the almost complete loss of the fueros . The
Madrid

government allowed the Basque provinces to retain some
degree of autonomy in their fiscal affairs.

Initially it seems that Carlismo was as much motivated
by the desire to preserve the religious unity of Spain as
by an anti-centralist sentiment, thus giving early Basque

regionalism an almost religious fundamentalism flavor, an
orientation retained by the Partido Kacionallsta Vasco
(PNV) which adopted as its slogan, "God and the Old Laws."
The initial reaction against the loss of the fueros

subsided somewhat under the Restoration (1876-1923) with
segments of the Basque population accepting the new state
of affairs under the conclerto economlco .

Carlismo 1 s

appeal was gradually reduced to the province of Navarra
and to a lesser degree in the province of Alava.

From the 1890*8 onwards Basque opposition to the
center, the Madrid government, was divided into three
groups:

those who supported the status quo under the

concierto economico . the arrangement under which the
provinces were given some degree of fiscal autonomy, those

who wanted the restitution of the medieval
autonomy with
decentralized monarchy, the Carlists, and a later

a

group,

the nationalists, who claimed that the Basques
had a

right to political independence, basing their argument
on
the grounds that the Basques were a different ethnic
group or "race".

It was the nationalists that the Madrid

government viewed as the greatest challenge and threat
because initially their demands were viewed by the Madrid

government as incompatible with the notion of a Spanish
nation and a Spanish State and presented the possibility
of reviving the Carlist sentiment which seemed to have

remained dormant since 1876.
Basque nationalism was launched in the 1890»s from

an urban platform and led by urban people who made use of
traditional Basque symbols.

This was also the time when

the Basque region, particularly the provinces of Vizcaya

and Guipuzcoa, were going through a process of rapid

economic change and industrialization.

It has been in

these two provinces that Basque nationalism has received
its greatest support both from segments of the middle

class and the peasantry.

Undoubtedly the large influx of

non-Basques coming into the Basque region looking for work
was a factor helping the emergence of Basque nationalism,
for it probably reminded

the Basques of their fast

disappearing identity, a phenomenon out of which they
made great capital.

Basque nationalism, then, was the
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product of an urban setting, and led
by people exposed to,
and acquainted with, the forces of
modernization.

Although initially the nationalists did
not receive
an enthusiastic reception to their ideas,
they gradually
acquired enough support so that by 1936, under
the

second

Spanish Republic, the Basque provinces were given
a
statute of autonomy.

The provinces of Alava and Navarra

continued to remain in the periphery of Basque nationalism
and oriented more to their medieval autonomy and instituti

Basque autonomy under the Republic was short-lived.
The Civil War that engulfed Spain between 1936-1939 once
ap.ain brought the Basque provinces into open conflict with

the central government.

Those provinces that chose to

fight with the Republic, Vizcaya, and Guipuzcoa, were

stripped of all autonomy and submitted to the direct rule
of Madrid while Navarra and Alava, which remained in

Franco^ camp once the war began, were allowed
their conclerto economlco .

to retain

The end of the Spanish Civil

War also brought to an end, with the force of arms, the

conflict between the Basques and the central government

which had begun in 1812.
As a result of the Civil War, the PNV had to go into

exile into France, from where it has maintained a small

underground network through which it has tried to keep the

question of Basque autonomy alive.

From 1939 to the

early 1960*8 Basque opposition to Madrid was primarily
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manifested by the exiles in Europe and Latin
America.
after the 1960«s we begin to see emergence

But

of a Basque

domestic opposition to the Madrid government
manifested
primarily by members of the Basque clergy and a
new
nationalist group composed primarily of young
people in
their twenties, Euzkadl ta Askatasuna ( ETA) which
had
split from the youth wing of the Parti do Kacionallsta

y* 8 ? 0 *

Thts recent group which has emerged to challenge

the leadership of the PNV has taken a more radical approach
in its activities and is more secular in its political

orientation than the PNV.

it claims to adhere to a

socialist ideology and believes that a solution to the
Basque question lies in an independent Euzkadl in which

both Spanish and French Basques shall live.

ETA seems to

be a radical departure from traditional Basque nationalism

in that it seems to be strongly concerned with issues of

socio-economic reform and claims to speak for all the
Basques, not just the Spanish Basques, although apparently

most of its membership comes from Spain and most of its

activities have concentrated in Spain.

As we recall, the

PNV scarcely gave any attention to class issues and devoted
its attention only to the Spanish Basques.

While it has been ETA which recently has made Basque

nationalism a live issue and apparently their activities
have received some type of local support, as evidenced
by the fact that the local population has not been willing
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to tell the local authorities
the whereabouts of ETA
members, it seems that the old PNV
still claims the support
of large segments of the Basque
middle classes. Apparently

ETA's methods and ideology seem
objectionable to broad
segments of the Basque population.
In view of the

religiosity of the Basque region, a highly
secular
political organization may fall to capture
broad

support.

If we recall, the Acclon hac lonalista
v«f^« (ANV), the

Leftist organization of Basque nationalism, never
acquired
any significant following. On the other hand,
with the
Church's changing attitude towards the Left and its
apparent willingness to engage in dialogue with Leftist
groups, quite possibly a more Leftist oriented Basque

nationalist party could emerge.
What are the future prospects of Basque nationalism
and the prospects for some type of Basque autonomy?

Recent events surrounding the Burgos trial of sixteen ETA
members suggest that the present government of Spain is as
opposed as ever to grant any official recognition to the

ethnically plural nature of Spanish society, that is, to

recognize the fact that the political entity known as
Spain remains for significant members of the Spanish

society a state rather than a nation.

The government has

launched a campaign to root out and eliminate ETA as a

political organization.
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The fate of Basque nationalism
and autonomy will
largely depend on the nature of
the political regime that
will succeed Franco. If . more
llbcral regime
on
representative democracy follows Franco
undoubtedly the PNV
will emerge on the political scene
and continue to demand
some type of autonomy. A more
liberal regime, however, will
be no assurance that Basque autonomy
will be forthcoming

^

for, in the past, opposition to
autonomy for the peripheral
regions has been manifested by both
liberal and conservative

governments.

In Catalonia the issue of local autonomy
is

still very much alive.

Just recently, a group of Catalans,

known as the Assembly of Catalonia, met secretly
to discuss
a strategy of opposition to the government.
Among
their

demands they asked for the restitution of the
Catalan
Statute of autonomy given by the Republic in 1932. 3

^

Despite the present government's seemingly inflexible

position on the issue of autonomy for the periphery, there
are some indications that some segments of the Spanish

population may be willing to reach an accommodation with
the Basques and the Catalans.

The hierarchy of the

Spanish Church, for example, just recently officially

recognized the ethnic make up of Spanish society and asked
the government respect the personality of the ethnic

minorities of Spain. 3 * 5
1

^

At the same time there is evidence

The New York Times . November 9, 1971, p. 8

5 See

note 278, Chapter V.
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that the army and some of the Falangist
groups are opposed
to any notion of local autonomy. Their
slogan remains:
"Espana, Una y Grande."

Whatever the regime that succeeds Franco, the
question
of Basque and Catalan autonomy will continue to
be a
pernicious issue in Spanish politics.

As Lin* has well

argued, "Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a

nation-state for a large part of the population, and only
a state but not a nation for important minorities." 3 ^ 6

Nat ion-building remains to be achieved in Spain despite
four centuries of Castilianization.

This example does

not look optimistic for political leaders in some of the

Afro-Asian countries who may have to live with weak
political structures or face political fragmentation as

witnessed in 1971 in the state of Pakistan.
Some Theoretical Implications

Nationalism is a complex subject.

As suggested by thi«

study, nationalist sentiment does not affect a whole

population in a uniform pattern, nor does it seem to

manifest itself in a uniform way.

The overt manifestations

of nationalist sentiment seem to vary from time to time.
It does not seem to affect a self-differentiating group in

the same manner.

While a group of people may perceive

themselves as having a common ethnic identity, it does not
3 * 6 Linz,

"Early State-Building", p. 14.
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necessarily mean that all of them will manifest
the same
degree of nationalist sentiment. Some may be
content
with some degree of cultural autonomy or respect
for

the

culture of the group by the society. at large; to
this group
the label of cultural nationalists could be applied.
Others may aspire to outright political independence,
the
logical conclusion of nationalist sentiment.

These

variations in the intensity of nationalist sentiment,

within a given population and over periods of time, make
it difficult to draw across-the-board generalizations on

this subject.

Some students of nationalism who have spent

a great part of their lives devoted to this subject remained

puzzled with many aspects of it.
The complexity of this subject and the difficulty in

dissecting it are compounded by the fact that this is an
area in which we are dealing with a peopled feelings and

perceptions regarding themselves as

a

group, and their

relationships with other self-differentiating groups.

As

aptly stated by a student of this subject, it is "the self-

view of one , s group and not the tangible characteristics
that is the essence in determining the existence or

^^One of the more prominent students of this
subject, Carlton Hayes, ends one of his studies by
concluding that "we really do not know what has given vogue
to nationalism in modern times." Carlton J. H. Hayes,
The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York:
Crowell-Collier-Macmillan, 1932), p. 302.
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non-xistance of a

nation.'' 3 * 8

Because nationalism t. a

matter of feeling, it is difficult to
be perceived by the
observer.
"There is an understandable propensity,"
says
the same writer, "when investigating
a case of ethnic
discord, to perceive the struggle in terms
of its more

readily discernable features." 349

Thus what may be a

manifestation of nationalism will be explained as
a
linguistic and/or religious problem, or in terms of
grievances due to economic differentiation, if such

differentiation exists, between the several groups living

within the same state.

Consequently, the temptation is to

conclude that if the more readily perceived grievances are

ameliorated or corrected, the problem will disappear or
subside.
But the comparative literature suggests, says Walker

Connor, that nationalist sentiment may persist unabated

irrespective of the fact that the more tangible aspects of

nationalism have virtually disappeared.

For example, the

"Irish nation persisted after the virtual disappearance of
Gaelic, despite the pre-1920's slogans to describe Gaelic
and Irish identity as inseparable."

"National identity

may survive substantial alterations in language, religion,
348 Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or NationDestroying?", p. 25. To be published in the forthcoming
Spring (1972) issue of World Politics .
3 * 9 Ibld.

2 OA

economic status or any other tangible manlfeatatlona
of
ita culture." 3

^

ln the case of the Ba8ques> the ca8ual

observer of the Basque region may find little tangible

evidence of a Basque identity.

The Basque language, for

example, has long ceased to be a normal means of communication

among the Basques.

Moreover, the evidence on the back*

ground of the proponents of Basque nationalism indicates
that a substantial number, if not most, were ignorant of
the Basque language or only peripherally acquainted with
it, thus suggesting that the presence or absence of the

local language may have little relationship to the

intensity of nationalist sentiments.

This contrasts with

Catalonia where one finds extensive use of the local
language and a rich literary tradition in Catalan.

At

the same time students of Catalan nationalism have found
that, while it has had a much broader source of support

than Basque nationalism, it has not been as intensive and
as exclusive as Basque nationalism. 35 *

Catalan nationalists

have been willing to assimilate non-Catalans into Catalan
society while Basque nationalists have traditionally

refused to consider such ideas.
Relying primarily on the extenslveness of the use
of the local language in order to measure the existence or
35 0 lbld .
351 Linz, "Early State-Building," p. 79.
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non-existence of Basque nationalism, one
would have to
conclude that it did not exist, for, a.
we saw, euskera 1.
hardly spoken by the basques. A perusal of
the Cortes
debates on this issue reveals the extent to
which nonBasque deputies, during the Restoration and the
second
Republic, kept maintaining that Basque nationalism,

or the

existence of a Basque nation, was untenable in view
of the
fact that the Basques could not really show a
distinct
culture from that of Spain and that their language hardly
existed, and what existed was broken up in different

dialects.

Still on this theme, we have the case of

Galicia (franco's home region) where the local language is
more widely spoken than in the Basque region, and yet
nationalist aspirations hardly exist, although during
the second Spanish Republic there was also some sentiment
for some degree of local autonomy.

However, it was never

as extensive as that of Catalonia and the Basque country.

Cultural assimilation of a minority group into a
larger cultural or ethnic group need not mean the loss of
the previous ethnic identity.

This phenomenon is borne

out by the studies on assimilation in American society.
In his study of assimilation in American life, Hilton

Gordon^S^ has made some valuable distinctions regarding
the process of assimilation and has devised a model which

•"^Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life
(New York j Oxford University Press, 1964), pp# 66-67.
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clartfle. some of the theoretical
shortcoming, raised In
the first chapter of this dissertation.
Rather than
discussing assimilation as an either or
process, Milton
Gordon breaks it down into seven processes
which give rise
to seven different types of assimilation
which enable one
to look at assimilation in terms of a
continuum starting

with cultural or behavioral assimilation and
ending with
civic assimilation. Civic assimilation might
be looked

upon as complete assimilation.

(See Table 6).

With Milton Gordon's model it now becomes possible
to
measure the extent to which ethnically divided societies
are approaching integration or in Milton Gordon's
t
terms,

civic assimilation.

According to the model an ethnic group

may adopt the language and cultural traits of another
group, the host society, and yet retain its ethnic identity,

Although cultural or behavioral assimilation is apt to be
the first type to occur, it does not necessarily mean that
the other types will follow.

The far more important type

of assimilation is structural assimilation.

This, according

to Gordon, is "the keystone of the arch of assimilation." 353

Once structural assimilation has taken place it means that
the range of contacts between members of the ethnic group

and the host society has expanded, such as contacts at
the primary group level.

ifcid..,

p. 81.

From here martial assimilation
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TABLE
THE ASSIMILATION VARIABLES

Subprocess or
Condition

Type or Stage of
Assimilation

Special
Term

Change of cultural
patterns to those of
the host society

Cultural or
behavioral
assimilation

Acculturation

Large-scale entrance
into cliques, clubs,
and institutions of
the host society, on
primary group level

Structural
assimilation

None

Large-scale
intermarriage

Marital
assimi latlon

Amalgamation

Development of a
sense of peoplehood
based exclusively
on host society

Identifications 1
assimi lation

None

Absence of prejudice

Attitude
receptional
assimilation

None

Absence of
discrimination

Behavioral
receptional
assimilation

None

Absence of value and
power conflict

Civic assimilation

None

Source:

Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 71.
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will follow and once this happens inevitably
the remaining
types will be achieved. With the achievement
of civic

assimilation, the

e^ic

group has acquired the identity

of the host society.
The model does not imply that the processes of

assimilation will take place in the same fashion ir all
societies that may contain several ethnic groups.

The

scope and the speed of these processes may differ from

society to society and will undoubtedly depend on a variety
of circumstances, the most important of which being the

attitudes of the minority group towards the host society.
In the case of the Basques, there ig little question

that cultural or behavioral assimilation has taken place,

but structural assimilation has not proceeded very far.

The failure of structural assimilation, however, is not
due to the refusal of Spanish society, but, on the

contrary, to the refusal of the Basques to acquire a new

identity which would make them indistinguishable from
other Spaniards.
been achieved.

Identif icational assimilation has not
As discussed earlier, one of the primary

objectives of the founders of the PNV was precisely to
stop any further degree of assimilation.

And this still

remains as one of the goals of Basque nationalist groups.
In the first chapter of this study, we raised some

of the theoretical issues discussed in the literature of

political development and national integration.

Some of
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the.e theoretical issues served as
the point of departure,
or backdrop for this study on
the question of Basque
nationalism. We wanted to see if Basque
nationalism
deviated from, or conformed to, the
theoretical postulates
presented in the literature on political
development. Now
that we have completed our discussion of
the rise and

continued growth of Basque nationalism, a
recapitulation
of some of the issues raised earlier seems
in
order.

The literature on political development, on
the role

of communications in the process of national
Integration

and on the general process of modernization has emphasized
the end result of "homogenization.

It was assumed that

the process of modernization affects all cultures roughly
in the same manner and that it was irreversible and

unilinear.

Consequently, states composed of diverse ethnic

groups should eventually become nationally integrated.

Traditional cultures would give way to the onslaught of
modernization.

It was further

assumed that the changes

associated with the process of modernization were of a
systemic nature, that is, changes in one dimension

implied changes in all the other dimensions of the system.
It was believed that modernity would supplant tradition,

thus the tendency to think in terms of the convergence of

modern societies, since technologically speaking they are
so much alike.

As of late some of the writers on

modernization and convergence theory, such as Samuel

P.
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Huntington, have reconsidered their earlier
position.

In

a recent article Huntington recanted his
early view on

this subject and instead argued that "contrary to
the

common idea that modernization produces homogenlzation
or convergence, it could be said that it may reinforce
the distinctive characteristics of each society and thus,

broaden the differences between societies rather
than
narrow them. "354 Our case study also suggests
that this
is another possibility as opposed to the
notion of

convergence.
The first conclusion that emerges from our study is

that the socio-economic processes associated with social

mobilization which according to Deutsch will force people
to look for "new patterns of group affiliation and new

images of personal identity," 355 did not seem to bring

about the attitudlnal changes conducive to national
integration.

Instead the process of modernization that

354

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Changes
Modernization, Development and Politics", Comparative
Politics. Vol 3 (April, 1971), p. 298. Earlier, however,
he and Brzezinski had maintained that "...industrialization
and urbanization. . .give rise to a common culture found in
all modern societies. The industrial process imposes
uniformities in equipment, skills, techniques, and
organization. Industrial culture is the same in Sverdlovsk
and Detroit. Eventually this culture will produce similar
institutions." See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P.
Huntington, Political Power: U.S.A. /U.S.S.R. (New York:
The Viking Press, 1967), p. 10.
355Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard lff« Gable
(©<3s.) Political Development and Social Change (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 205.
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occurred In Spain and in the Basque country
seemed to have
had the effect of reinforcing the cultural
differentiation
of the Basques.
The thesis behind much of the literature on
political

development seems to overlook the point that in some
cases
nations had already coalesced and national identity had
become established before the process of modernization
got under way.

As examples, one might cite Ireland,

Portugal, Korea, and Japan.

This suggests that societies

need not go through the process of industrialization, and
the other concomitant social processes known as modernization
in order to become integrated, that is, to develop a

national identity.

In some cases the process of national

integration developed prior to what has come to be known
as modernization.

Two other interesting theoretical points emerge from
our case study.

First, it is generally believed that

urbanization and the growth of the market economy also
lead to the growth of secularization— thus one of the

reasons for believing that modernity and tradition cannot
coexist.

But our study suggests that this need not be

necessarily the case.

Despite the fact that the Basque

356j 0 hn H. Kautsky, for example, argues that
"One could
modernization and secularization go together:
thus define the process of modernization," he says, "as
one of secularization, but it also involves a great number
of other interrelated factors." The Political Consequences
of Modernization (New York* John Wiley and Sons Inc, 1977),
P.
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country Is one of the more industrialized
regions of Spain,
at the same time it also remains one of
the most religious
regions of the country. 35 ? Other areas of Spain
much more
traditional in the organization of their economic
life and
much less acquainted with the modern aspects of
contemporary
life do not manifest the same degree of religiosity
that

one finds in the Basque country.
Second, it is also generally believed that political

parties play the role of integrator in the process of

nation-building, and in the literature on political parties
the notion of integration looms large as one of the

cardinal functions of parties. 358

But the literature on

political parties, however, has used as a model societies,
such as the United States and European societies, which had

already achieved a substantial degree of national
integration.

But in ethnically divided societies political

parties may play just the opposite role.

Rather than

helping to bring about national integration, political
parties instead seem to capitalize on ethnic differences
and thus may become obstacles in the path of national
integration.

We must remember that the European nation-

35 ?For an index of Basque religiosity see Linz,
"Early State- Building," p. 135.
35 &See James S, Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., (eds)
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical
Africa (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1966);
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds), Political
Princeton
Parties and Political Development (Princeton!
University Press, 1966).
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states emerged, by and large, under
authoritarian political
system, where political parties in
the modern sense were
non-existent. For the Afro- Asian states,
and for those
European states that did not achieve
national integration
before the process of modernization got
under way, and
before democracy became a popular ideology,
the process
of national integration may. endure for a
long time and
may not succeed. Instead we may witness
further political

fragmentation*
It seems to this writer that one of the weaknesses

of the literature on political development and
national

integration stems from the fact that it has overly stressed
the rational element in human behavior.

It has looked

upon man as primarily motivated by economic considerations.
This view is particularly evident in Professor Deutsch»s

work on nationalism.

In his work the nation seems to

emerge as a trading company to satisfy the socio-economic
aspirations of its members and thus he underestimates the

possibility that men may act for goals other than socioeconomic gain.

To view nationalism as "an effort to

convert the channels of culture into storm ladders for
masses individual to social and economic advancement"
is to view it as no more than an opportunistic movement.

This overlooks the emotional attachment to cultural
359
p. 103,

Karl W, Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications
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traditions and group identification.

If men were indeed

this rational, and if a nation's
existence was dependent
on how well it satisfied the
socio-economic aspirations of
its members, we should be able to
see the disintegration
of nations as soon as socio-economic
conditions worsened.
But there is historical evidence which
suggests, however,
that it is precisely at periods of great
social stress
and economic deprivation that national
leaders have been

able to evoke the most intense degree of
nationalism.
Purely from an economic and personal gain
point

of view,

it is difficult to explain why an American Jew,
for example,

gives any aid to the state of Israel, or even
identifies

with it.

More importantly, the studies on nationalism indicate

that nationalistic leaders hardly ever ask the question

regarding the economic feasibility of the political
units which they wish to govern, e.g., Bangladesh,

Anguilla.360

This seems to be, in fact, among the last

considerations.

In the case of the Basques, some of the

leading personalities of Basque nationalism lost much of

their wealth as a result of their involvement with the

movement
As suggested by our study, the growth of modernity,

360por a goo<j discussion on the relationship between
economic variables see Walker Connor, "Nation-Destroying
or Nation-Building?"; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to
Nation (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1969); and Walter Sulzbach,
National Consciousness (Washington, D.C.: American
Council on Public Affairs, 1943).
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with Its underlying process of social
mobilization, need
not mean the loss of traditional identities
and the quest
for new ones.
To be sure, socio-economic changes have
brought about changes in many aspects of
traditional
cultures but this does not mean the loss of group
identity.
Despite the fact that American society has gone through
great technological changes since the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries, this does not mean that Americans
have gradually begun to lose their identity and are
looking for a new one.

societies.

The same could be said of European

The evidence seems to suggest that ethnic

nationalism and group identity can accomodate itself rather

well to econoraico-technological innovations.

Some of our

modern ideologies which have postulated universal outlooks,
as opposed to national or parochial ones, have eventually

become nationalized.

Christianity, for example, which

emerged as a universal religion recognizing all men

without any distinctions was eventually appropriated by
nationalism, and in some cases, such as Ireland, even

reinforced nationalism.

Paradoxical as it might seem, it

is among segments of the Catholic clergy, exposed to

universal values, that we may also find some of the more

nationalistic people, as illustrated by segments of the
Basque clergy.

Nationalism has proved to be more powerful

than religious affiliation.
Marxism;

The same has happened to

it, too, has become nationalized.

It may well
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be, and the evidence available seems
to suggest this

direction, that political modernization,
as Clifford
Geertz has argued, "does not do away with
ethnocentrism,
it merely modernizes it # "36l

Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolutionj
Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the Mew
States", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), O ld Societies and flew
The Free Press, 1963), p. 154 #
States (New York*
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TABLE 7

MUNICIPAL VOTE ON THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY
JUNE 19 f 1932
Yes
Municipalities

No
Municipalities

A lava

52

11

14

77

Guipuzcoa

84

2

3

89

Navarra

109

123

35

267

Viz cay

109

1

6

116

Total

354

137

58

549

Provinces

Source:

Abstentions

F. Javier de Landaburu, La Causa del Pueblo
Vasco (Paris: n.p., 1956), p. 13.
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PLEBISCITE ON THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY
NOVEMBER 5, 1933
No. of

Provinces

Electors

Vizcaya

267,466

236,564

5,065

0

Guipuzcoa

166,365

149,177

2,436

248

A lava

56,056

26,015

6,695

109

Total

489,887

411,756

14,196

357

Source:

Yes

No

Abstentions

F. Javier de Landaburu, La Causa del Pueblo
Vasco, (n.p.), (Paris, 1^56), p. T5.
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TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE BASQUE
COUNTRY AND
SELECTED AREAS OF SPAIN BY OCCUPATION
(1970)

T-).

% of tho POP.
M
in agri. and fish

Regions
,

% In
Industry

% in
services

Madrid

5

40

55

Barcelona

5

56

39

Pais Vasco

14

55

31

Extremadura

60

20

20

Galicia

67

15

18

Spain (total)

36

33

31

Source:

FOESSA, 1970:172
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TABLE 10

POPULATION OF THE FRENCH BASQUE REGION (1962)

Population

IfcflsrlBst

Labourd

Are*

Persons
km 2

-.per

152,000

800 km 2

190

Basse-Navarre

85,000

1,284 km 2

27

Soule

20,000

785 km 2

25

Total

207,000

Sources

2,869

Zeruko Argla. January 11, 1970.

72

22:
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BASQUE SPEAKING AREA FROM 16TH TO
20TH CENTURY (SPAIN)
•

X.

X x A A X x

Source:

Basque-speaking Area in the 20th Century
Basque- speak ins Area in the 19th Century
Basque- speaking Area from the 16th Century
to the 18th Century
Boundary of the Basque Country of Spain
Spanish-French Border

Julio Caro Baroja, M ateria les para v
hi.storia..c\-i la Icy.- i:a vasca (Salamanca;
University of Salamanca 1945), p. 255.
.:
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